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Thesis Abstract 
 
The relationship between art, illusion and reality has been part of philosophical 
debate for centuries. With the increasing use of digital technologies in modern 
cinema, this debate entered a new dimension. This thesis aims to discuss the 
notion of illusions as a system of stories and values that inspire a culture similar to 
other grand narratives, such as mythology or religion. Cinema thus becomes the 
postmodern ‗mythmaking machine‘ par excellence in a world that has increasing 
difficulties in creating unifying concepts and positive illusions that can inspire a 
culture and give hope. I will argue that illusions have always been a crucial element 
of culture, and my hypothesis is that they are not necessarily a sign of people‘s 
naivety or unconscious manipulationas has often been argued but a conscious 
choice, deriving from a longing for positive inspiration. This longing is particularly 
strong in times of ideological crisis, when other institutions fail to provide relief 
and guidance. This seems to be emphasised by the fact that in the last decade, at a 
time of deep ideological crisis, mainstream cinema has seen a significant revival of 
grand mythic epics.  
The thesis focuses on three key aspects: the area of belief, illusion and the creation 
of myths; the relationship between realism and illusion; and the possibilities of 
modern cinema in relation to these aspects. I chose to base my research project 
on continental philosophy rather than classic film theory or analytic philosophy in 
order to stimulate a new debate in film studies and philosophy that links 
traditional aesthetic concepts with contemporary thoughts on society and cinema. 
To begin with I draw on theories by Nietzsche, Kracauer and Deleuzeto unravel 
the interesting similarities in their works, such as the redemptive capacities of art 
and the acknowledgement that illusion/art/cinema is always closely related to the 
state of the society that produces them. This is then applied to recent Hollywood 
epics, namely The Lord of the Rings (P. Jackson, 2001-04), Troy(W. Petersen, 2004) 
and Avatar (J. Cameron, 2009). Here I argue that rather than being mere escapism, 
mainstream cinemacan have an important function in providing postmodern 
culture with important illusions, which is significantly facilitated by new digital 
technologies.The thesis concludes that these technologies present new creative 
opportunities for filmmakers and philosophers alike.   
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“We have art in order not to perish of the 
truth.” 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power, §822 
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Prologue: 
Introduction and Background 
 
In the summer of 2002 I completed my MA dissertation on the philosophical 
basis of Gilles‘s Deleuze‘s cinema books, where I discussed the ways in which 
Deleuze uses the theories of Henri Bergson and Friedrich Nietzsche for his 
analysis of cinema. This interesting project brought up a variety of further 
questions that could not be answered within the scope of this work and suggested 
a more in-depth research project. One of the problems that arose was Deleuze‘s 
apparently dismissive attitude towards modern Hollywood cinema, or what he 
perceived as the mainstream. As an enthusiast for this cinema I wondered why he 
seems to assume that a critical and thorough analysis of modern cinema should be 
confined to art cinema and experimental film. In addition, I had also previously 
written an essay on Nietzsche‘s The Birth of Tragedy,1 and was somehow surprised 
that Deleuze, despite discussing Nietzsche‘s theories at length in his second 
cinema book, makes no mention of this first of Nietzsche‘s works, which so 
directly discusses our relationship with art and aesthetics and its importance for 
our life.  
 
While these questions were lingering in my head, I came to notice in the following 
years a sudden flood of historic epics, with Hollywood blockbusterfilms like Troy 
(dir. W. Petersen, 2004), Alexander (dir. O. Stone, 2004), King Arthur (dir. A. 
Fuqua, 2004) andHidalgo (dir. J. Johnston, 2004) all coming out in one year. I 
started wondering about the reasons for this surprising new interest in a type of 
film that seems to have been a distinct feature of the 1950s but has rarely been 
made since. There were of course the odd exceptions throughout the years, in the 
Nineties for example the historic epicsDances with Wolves (dir. Kevin Costner, 
1990) and Braveheart (dir. Mel Gibson, 1995), but we could argue that these 
productions were largely driven by the individual interests of their respective main 
actor, who tellingly also take on the role of the director.  
 
                                            
1 Magerstädt, S. (2001). Der tragische Gott – Über den Begriff des Dionysischen in 
Nietzsches ‗Die Geburt der Tragödie‘. Munich: GRIN.  
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When subsequently working in the scriptwriting department of several TV 
production companies in Germany, through which I developed an increasing 
interest in the art of storytelling and its importance for narrative cinema, I started 
looking at stories not so much as literary texts that are to be interpreted in 
linguistic or analytical terms, but as a common set of ideas that is told from 
generation to generation. I began thinking about the ways in which cinema 
continues this tradition of storytelling from ancient myths, via religious narratives 
to contemporary popular culture. Moreover, these ideas became more and more 
connected to the questions regarding Deleuze‘s view on Hollywood cinema and 
Nietzsche‘s notions of art and life that I have been struggling with since the 
completion of my MA dissertation. Finally, they resulted in a more specific 
hypothesis that became the basis for this thesis.  
 
My hypothesis, therefore, is that illusions (cinematic or otherwise) have always 
been a crucial element of human culture. Moreover, they are not a naivety or 
unconscious manipulation but rather can be a conscious choice, deriving from a 
natural creative instinct and a longing for positive inspiration. This longing is 
particularly strong in times of ideological crises, when traditional systems such as 
religion or myth are perceived as failing to provide universal concepts. As a 
consequence, we are looking for other creative practices to produce these ideas. 
Here the cinema with its universal narratives is particularly equipped to create 
these unifying illusions. This can be exemplified in the revival of mythic and 
historic epics in the last decade, which reflects the anxieties of this generation and 
its longing for universal myths. 
 
There are two crucial terms in this statement that require further definition. 
Firstly, I use the term ‗illusions‘ in a very broad sense to characterise universal 
stories and myths – meta-narratives. Moreover, in contrast to more common uses 
of the word, which often associate it with negative connotations such as 
manipulation and false beliefs, I will use the term in a more positive sense 
throughout this thesis to describe a system of ideas and values that inspire a 
culture. Nevertheless there will be notions in the thesis that reflect the more 
problematic side of illusions in relation to dominant ideologies, not least to 
distinguish the positive illusions favoured here from the more negative aspects. 
 8 
 
The second term – crisis – is more difficult to define. In general, the term not 
necessarily refers to dramatic and sudden changes but is used to define a 
development in society that causes insecurity and scepticism, the loss of unifying 
ideas and universal beliefs. Although all three writers discussed in this thesis refer 
to a certain state of crisis in relation to their aesthetic theories, the individual 
definitions differ significantly. For Nietzsche, crisis is mostly related to a deep, 
personal and spiritual unease, a loss of certainties and the acknowledgement of 
nature‘s cruel and unpredictable side. Nevertheless, he also applies this concept to 
modern society at large as I will discuss in the first chapter. For Kracauer, crisis is 
more directly linked to tendencies in society. It is less individual and more related 
to the politicaland social sphere. In connection to cinema, his notion of crisis is 
also linked to our connection with the physical world around us, which gives the 
original spiritual idea of crisis a materialist spin. How these two spheres can be 
connected will be discussed when looking at Deleuze‘s theories and digital 
cinema. Unlike Nietzsche and Kracauer, who describe the loss of binding norms 
and unifying concepts as a gradual process that has affected post-enlightenment 
society, Deleuze explicitly names the Second World War as the event that 
shattered the old system of images and beliefs presented in cinema. What all three 
writers have in common is the notion that the vast majority of individuals in our 
modern or post-modern world is lacking ideological and/or spiritual certainties, 
ideas to hold on to, which he or she is longing for.  
 
In addition to these two terms the notion of redemption will play a significant role 
throughout this thesis. Again for Nietzsche, the term has a strong spiritual and 
personal emphasis, whereas for Kracauer the term has a rather materialistic 
component as we will see more in detail in the following chapter. Whereas in 
Kracauer‘s concept of redemption, the cinema reunites us with the world, 
Nietzsche‘s notion of redemption saves us from despair. Finally, Deleuze rarely 
uses the term redemption to the same degree but speaks more general about 
‗reinstatement of belief‘. However, what all three have in common is that 
redemption describes a process that brings back to us a sense of unity and belief, 
which seemed previously lost. 
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This thesis, then, looks at the way in which cinema, like myth and religion before, 
continues to create these ideas and stories that can provide meaning for our life. 
Moreover, with the new digital technologies we are now able to produce these 
grand illusions on a more convincing level than ever before. In summary, I argue 
that at a time when our need for illusion seems to beparticularly strong, the 
seemingly endless possibilities of digital technologies to create new modal worlds 
and epic myths, led to a revival of cinematic epics in the last decade. Despite 
taking works of continental philosophy as my basis, the question is not so much 
how cinema simply engages with philosophy. Rather, I will approach film as part 
of a system of ideas that enables human beings to understand their world, be it in 
mythological, religious, philosophical or cinematic terms.  
 
Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, no theorist has yet acknowledged the 
value of Friedrich Nietzsche‘s first book The Birth of Tragedy and its aesthetic 
concepts for an analysis of cinema. The very few scholars who mention Nietzsche 
in the context of film, such as Deleuze and Frampton, all focus on the notions of 
truth and morality developed in his later writings. I also revisit Siegfried 
Kracauer‘s writings on film, focussing on his Theory of Film, which has not yet 
received the recognition it deserves. I argue that most critics of his work have 
focussed on his concept of photographic realism and thus overlooked the more 
subtle and interesting questions, Kracauer poses with regard to cinema‘s 
connection with our culture. I acknowledge that I will take certain liberties in the 
use of Kracauer‘s theories and often take his statements as an inspiration to 
develop further lines of thought rather than providing an explicit exegesis of his 
work. This is largely owed to the fact that several of the points that I consider 
relevant and interesting for my thesis are developed by Kracauer more as an 
afterthought and not discussed as in-depth as other parts of his writings. 
Nevertheless, I hope to show that this attempt can be fruitful in finding ideas in 
Kracauer that go beyond the common reception. 
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Historical developments in the relationship between film and philosophy 
 
Of course there has been previous interest in the connection between cinema and 
philosophy. One of the earliest theorists of cinema, Hugo Münsterberg, discusses 
the psychological affects and aesthetic dimensions of cinema in relation to theatre 
in his final work The Photoplay (1916). He suggests that cinema has a unique 
possibility in using a variety of visual representations, which allow it to present 
emotional and mental states in a way that other art forms cannot.  
 
A few years later, Jean Epstein argues for a subjective, experimental style of 
cinema in his first book Bonjour cinéma (1921). For him, cinema should move 
beyond merely rehashing historic, social and romantic narratives and attempt a 
more impressionist and poetic style of representing reality. His interest was 
primarily in the visual components of the images and as a filmmaker he created 
unique pieces of art, always trying to escape the boundaries of classic narrative 
cinema. Yet aside from his criticism of narrative cinema, he was also one of the 
first film theorists to draw connections between cinema and philosophy. In an 
essay first published in 1930 he notes that  
 
―The cinema is a particular form of knowing, in that it represents the world 
in its continuous mobility, as well as a general form of knowing because, once 
it addresses all of the senses, each will be able to surpass its physiological 
limitations. No more than twenty years have been spent on tentative research, 
and we can already measure the significance of the change that the cinema – 
in its expression of the external and internal movement of all beings – has 
brought to bear on our thinking. Even now we correct ourselves according to 
a reality where time never stops, where values only exist so long as they vary, 
where nothing exists except in becoming, where a phenomenon without 
velocity is inconceivable.―(Epstein, 1993, p.64) 
 
The idea that cinema changes our way of thinking is an important notion for my 
thesis, but Epstein‘s criticism of narration and his strong emphasis on style are in 
stark contrast to my discussion of stories and their importance for cinematic 
illusions. 
 
Whereas Münsterberg, Epstein, Bazin, Kracauer and more recently Cavell have all 
discussed cinema in its relation to other art forms, mainly photography and 
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theatre, other scholars, such as Christian Metz have examined cinema from the 
perspective of semiotics and psychoanalysis and argued we could read films as 
language consisting of signifiers that need to be decoded.2In addition, many 
theorists have focussed on specific genres and individual filmmakers, rather than 
looking at cinema in connection with storytelling and mythmaking.  
 
Since I started this project in 2005, the area of film and philosophy has developed 
significantly. Despite the growing interest in this area, a truly interdisciplinary 
study about the way in which cinema creates universal ideas and concepts is still in 
its infancy and there is currently no consistency with regard to the directions in 
which the field develops. 
 
Thomas Wartenberg, one of the scholars currently working in this field, places 
himself in a ‗moderate‘ area of film and philosophy.3 He argues against an 
‗extreme‘ take on film as thinking, which he sees in theorists such as Mulhall and 
Frampton, in his latest book Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy (2007). 
Nevertheless, he acknowledges that films can ‗do philosophy‘, but he is generally 
sceptical that they have a ‗mind‘ of their own as Frampton argues. (Frampton, 
Filmosophy, 2009). For Wartenberg one of the problems is that film and philosophy 
seem to have different basic concerns, especially when taking commercial 
Hollywood cinema into account that is according to Wartenberg less interested in 
producing knowledge and primarily interested in making money. This notion 
implies not only a much generalised understanding of philosophy, but also a 
rather simplified view of Hollywood cinema. As I will show throughout this 
thesis, the simple fact that Hollywood cinema aims to make money does not 
automatically exclude any possibility for creating more universal concepts and 
ideas. Nevertheless, Wartenberg (2007) recognises ―that films are capable of 
                                            
2 For an overview of the theories by Münsterberg, Bazin, Kracauer and Cavell: See 
Colman, F. (ed.). 2009. Film, Theory and Philosophy: The Key Thinkers. Durham: Acumen.  
More details on Jean Epstein can be found here: Aitken, I., (2002). European film theory and 
cinema: a critical introduction. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
3 He discussed his theory and argued for a moderate approach towards film and 
philosophy in contrast to what he called the more extreme or radical positions of Mulhall 
and Frampton in his plenary paper Cinematic Philosophy: Defence of a moderate position, 
presented at the Film-Philosophy conference at Warwick University, 2010. 
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giving philosophical ideas a liveliness and vivacity‖ (p.4) that many philosophical 
texts are lacking and thus may help people to better understand philosophical 
concepts and engage with them in a more open-mindedway. One of the problems 
with his theory is Wartenberg‘s focus on finding philosophical concepts in 
individual films instead of looking at cinema in general.  
 
Stephen Mulhall takes the more ambitious route and argues for cinema‘s capacity 
to provide a truly unique way of thinking. He initially developed his ideas in his 
book On Film (2002), in which he offers a profound and illuminating study of the 
Alien series. Later, he refined his ideas in his paper ‗Film as Philosophy: The Very 
Idea‘ (2008). Here, he criticises the fact that many scholars either simply try to 
apply previously developed philosophical theories to the examination of cinema 
or to analyse film from the perspective of a distant observer. Mulhall argues that 
by doing so they fail to recognise cinema‘s ability to create philosophical ideas 
within its own framework. He writes that film can develop ―a discourse which 
acknowledges […] the ways in which its words are interwoven with other words, 
responsive to the world and capable of being projected into new contexts […] in 
ways that illuminate both words and world.‖ (Mulhall, 2008, p.10). What he claims 
here is that films are by no means always entirely unconscious about their 
contexts, but mostly present a certain self-reflectiveness by which they position 
themselves within the context of a filmmaker‘s oeuvre, a specific genre or a social 
discourse. Mulhall further suggests that we should allow our experience of films 
to teach us ―what ethics, art, imagination, emotions and thinking might be‖ and 
ultimately ―what philosophizing might be‖. (Mulhall, 2008, p.13). Consequently, 
Mulhall argues that the formal reasoning of philosophy may not be the only way 
of creating concepts and that we should be open to the suggestion that film can 
discuss ideas in a different way, that isby representing us with images and models 
of this ideas.  
 
This notion of cinema as creating ideas and imageslinks to Deleuze‘s view of film 
and philosophy, which he laid out in an interview in the Cahiers du Cinéma in the 
 13 
Seventies.4 He remarks that Jean-Luc Godard has a nice formula: Ce n‟est pas une 
image juste, c‟est juste une image5 and suggests that 
 
―philosophers should say that too, and practise what they preach: no sound 
ideas, just ideas […] because sound ideas are always ideas which conform to 
dominant meanings or established slogans, they are always ideas which verify 
something, even if that something is in the future, even if that future is 
revolutionary. Whereas ‗just ideas‘ corresponds to what is in the making in 
the present, it‘s a stammering of ideas, something that can only be expressed 
in the form of questions, questions of the sort which tend to be difficult to 
answer. Or else which show something utterly simple and obvious‖ (Deleuze, 
2000, p.125, emphasis in original). 
 
This statement seems very relevant to my thesis insofar as it aims to raise 
questions that cannot always be easily answered. The films discussed in the 
second part of the thesis seem in many ways ahead of suitable philosophical 
theories and pose questions that challenge the philosophical discourse not only 
about film but also about us and our world. In that sense cinema does teach us a 
new way of philosophising, as Mulhall suggests. 
 
Another interesting contribution towards the current debate is Irving Singer‘s 
recent book Cinematic Mythmaking: Philosophy in Film (2008). Here, he discusses 
cinema as a medium that creates modern myths by combining philosophical and 
aesthetic concepts. His notion that cinema continues ―the mythmaking function 
of traditional religious culture‖ (Sinnerbrink, 2010, p.378) is interesting, although 
his analysesfocus on exceptional filmmakers such as Cocteau, Fellini and Kubrick, 
which is in contrast to my attempt to move away from this elitist focus on 
particularly renowned authors towards a more general discussion of mainstream 
Hollywood cinema.Not all these theories could be incorporated into my research 
and I made a conscious choice to focus on very specific philosophical theories, 
the reasons for this selection will hopefully become clear throughout the thesis. 
 
                                            
4 Deleuze, G., 2000. On Sur et sous la communication: three questions on six fois deux. 
In: Wilson, D., (ed.) Cahiers du Cinéma. Volume 4.1973-1978. London: Routledge. 
5 Cited by Deleuze from Godard‘s filmVent d‟est (1969) 
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Scope of research 
 
This thesis does not directly follow the aforementioned approachesin film studies 
but aims to find its own trajectory to develop new ideas. More specifically, I 
decided not to look at psychological aspects of spectatorship, approaches from 
philosophy that ‗read‘ films as language or look at the ways in which they present 
a certain authorship. Rather, I chose to focus on the idea of art as a redemptive 
power, as portrayed in various ways in the works of Nietzsche, Kracauer and 
Deleuze. Bringing these three thinkers and their respective ideas about illusion, art 
and reality together will allow me to connect traditional philosophical concepts to 
new developments in modern mainstream cinema. The approach of this thesis is 
to think about cinema from a point of view rooted in continental philosophy, but 
it also brings together ideas from other areas such as religious studies, classical 
film theory and scriptwriting. Similarly, when analysing individual cinematic 
examples, I treat them as significant insofar as they are symptomatic for a certain 
tendency in mainstream cinema at large that reflects developments in society, 
incorporating religious and philosophical ideas. Therefore, these films do not 
simply illustrate individual theoretical discoursesbut more general ideas about the 
relationship between storytelling and illusion. 
 
The two key ideas informing this thesis are the notion of redemption and belief 
on the one hand and the development from movement-image to time-image on 
the other. These aspects are connected insofar as the argument is as follows. 
Firstly, we need something to believe in, but in order to be able to do so we, 
secondly, need to have a sense of realism and truthfulness. Finally, this 
truthfulness is significantly improved by the possibilities of modern digital 
technologies, such as computer generated images and digital editing.The 
philosophical theories on art, redemption and belief enable me to create a 
philosophical framework, while Deleuze‘s model of the movement-image analyses 
the images and narratives of mainstream cinema, which according to him are 
crucial in creating a system of truth and believability. The focus here is on the 
storytelling function of cinema and its ability to create necessary illusions, which is 
supported by the visual component of the film in a way that may make it all the 
more influential than previous illusions. 
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Structure of work 
 
Several more specific research questions result from my initial hypothesis and 
preliminary research. The primary question is: Are illusions a necessary part of our 
life?If yes, how does cinema, in particular mainstream Hollywood cinema, 
contribute to its creation? Resulting from this are the further questions: what are 
necessary illusionsand how are they created apart from the cinema? How does 
cinema compare to other ―illusionist‖ systems? In fact, what are real images? 
Furthermore, what has changed – artistically and culturally – since the invention 
of cinema? In which way does modern technology influence the creation of 
illusions?  
 
Although both parts of the thesis are very distinct in their content, they are more 
closely related than it may appear on first sight. The aim of my thesis is not simply 
to apply the philosophical theories introduced in the first part, to the analysis of 
the films in Part II. Rather, whereas the first part develops the necessary 
foundations for an understanding of the cinematic theories presented in Part II; 
the film analyses in the second part demonstrate the practical relevance of these 
philosophical concepts. Thus, the films continue the debate developed by 
philosophy in their own terms and by doing so provide us with new insights and 
ideas that in turn inspire new ideas in philosophy. Here I hope to find the right 
balance between the formal requirements of a thesis in producing sound and well-
structured arguments and the very idea that film-philosophy inspires us to depart 
from this traditional systematic approach and to allow the films to express their 
own ideas in the form of questions and images.  
 
Based on the overall structure of the thesis, the methodology of this work will be 
a combination of a more theoretical textual analysis and critical film analysis. As 
the area of illusion and cinema is vast and complex, I have defined three central 
aspects in this discourse, on which I will focus in my following examination: the 
relation between cinema and mythology/religion; cinema and realism/reality; and 
modern cinema and digital technologies. Bringing these aspects together instead 
of treating them independently as previous theorists have done, allows me to 
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show how these aspects link up to create philosophical concepts in the post-
modern digital age – illusions that are necessary for our culture.  
 
In addition, I have structured the analysis of relevant background literature 
around the selected key writings by Friedrich Nietzsche, Siegfried Kracauer and 
Gilles Deleuze, which are each central to one of the above mentioned themes. 
This allows me to discuss the philosophical aspects of each work in its relevance 
to cinema as well as showing the connections between the theorists. I will then 
develop these essential similarities further in the second part of the thesis and 
discuss the philosophical concepts in relation to the analysis of the cinematic 
examples. 
 
The first part of the thesis, then, aims to provide an overview of the current 
debates that can be related to the problem of illusion. To gain a profound basis 
for my examination of illusion in its relation to Hollywood cinema I will look at 
philosophical discourses as well as approaches from film studies. The first three 
chapters focus on specific key areas and each chapter evolves around one of the 
key theorists. The first chapter is based on Nietzsche‘s ideas on myth, illusion 
artistic creation. This is followed by Kracauer‘s notions on realism and the 
cinema. Finally I will look at Deleuze‘s cinema books which describe cinema‘s 
development from the movement-image to the time-image.This work forms the 
basis for my analysis of the most recent tendencies in mainstream cinema. In 
addition, each chapter will also review recent literature that provides further 
insights in the respective topic. By analysing these key areas, of cinema‘s relation 
to myth and religion, concepts of realism and the influence of modern digital 
technologies that links the two, this first part seeks to provide the groundwork for 
further discussion of modern mainstream cinema in the second part of the thesis. 
 
More specifically, chapter one examines a selection of mythological, religious and 
ideological approaches to cinema that look at cinema as part of our cultural and 
social sphere. I will argue that by comparing cinema with myth and religion rather 
than with traditional art forms such as literature, photography and theatre, we can 
gain a new perspective on cinema and its metaphysical functions. The chapter will 
look at the way in which illusion has been interpreted and explore the role of the 
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narration in the creation of myths and illusions. Here, the notion of storytelling is 
particularly helpful in linking religious narratives and myths with cinematic 
creations. The first part of this opening chapter starts with Friedrich Nietzsche‘s 
philosophical concepts on art and his theories on the relationship between 
aesthetics and ethics. Drawing on ancient Greek culture in his first work The Birth 
of Tragedy, Nietzsche argued that human beings always had an instinctive drive to 
create illusions – either in the form of myth or art, which enabled them 
consciously to deal with the cruelty and unpredictability of daily life. Following his 
thoughts, aspects such as ‗superficiality‘ and the focus on appearance become a 
conscious choice based on the acknowledgement of reality and not a naïve 
attitude of ―not wanting to know‖.I suggest that these ideas can be applied to the 
analysis of the role of cinema, too; especially Nietzsche‘s idea of art as the creation 
of truth, a truth that is no less an illusion necessary for human existence. Following 
Nietzsche‘s notion that we create illusions to redeem us from the cruelty of reality 
as well as his acknowledgement of artistic drives in nature; the second part of this 
chapter analyses more contemporary ideas on the relationship between myth, 
ideology and cinema. Here, I will examine theories that discuss the subject from 
the perspective of film studies and sociology as well as from a theological point of 
view, which will enable me to discuss the subject from various angles.  
 
Subsequently, chapter two looks at concepts of perception and illusion in relation 
to cinematic realism and challenges the connection between realism and reality. 
Initially, I will investigate Siegfried Kracauer‘s idea of cinema as the redemption of 
physical reality as stated in the very title of his book Theory of Film (1961). In this 
work, Kracauer wrote about the decline of belief systems as well as binding norms 
mankind is facing today. He also goes as far as to speculate, if cinema could be the 
way out of our lack of belief, caused by science, in reuniting us with the world 
around us. In addition to this, Kracauer seems to be the first who distinctly 
discusses cinema in a context of mythology and faith. This chapter will further 
focus on his ideas on realism, ideology and illusion and show that there is more to 
Kracauer‘s concepts than his comparisons with photography and photographic 
realism, which have often been criticised as naïve and vague. Although several of 
Kracauer‘s ideas may at first seem contradictory to Nietzsche‘s concepts discussed 
in the first chapter, I aim to demonstrate the elementary similarities in both 
 18 
theoretical concepts.The second part of this chapter then proceeds to later 
concepts of cinematic realism and perception mainly by André Bazin. In addition, 
a recent essay by sociologist Dirk Baecker approaches realism as a form of 
communication and links Kracauer‘s theories to those of Gilles Deleuze, which 
will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter three,then, explores concepts of contemporary cinema based on Gilles 
Deleuze‘s concepts of the movement-image and the time-image. The first part 
follows the transition from the classic cinema of movement to a modern cinema 
of time. The emphasis of this analysis will be on the movement-image, its 
relevance for Hollywood cinema and the specific characteristics that link it to a 
system of believability and truthfulness. I will also raise the question if the 
movement-image really has lost its importance as Deleuze seems to suggest. In 
addition I will look at specific aspects of the time-image that may have influenced 
mainstream Hollywood cinema.At this point, I also intend to work out the 
specific connections Deleuze draws between cinema, perception and belief 
systems. One of the most interesting ideas in this context is Deleuze‘s statement 
that ―we no longer believe in this world‖ (Deleuze, 1989, p.166). He then goes 
further by suggesting that it is the role of modern cinema to reinstate our belief in 
this world.After analysing both images and further relevant aspects of Deleuze‘s 
writings on cinema I proceed on to the contemporary aspects of cinema. In this 
context, I will discuss how Deleuze‘s ideas can be developed further with regard 
to the growing influence of digital technologies on cinema, as well as the new 
challenges this impact poses for theorists.In addition, I will also look at the 
influence Deleuze‘s theories had on recent theorists, particularly in the area of 
film-philosophy. Here, I will focus on Daniel Frampton‘s work Filmosophy (2006).  
 
Finally I will apply the previously discussed aspects to digital cinema and 
introduce several theories that deal with the impact of computer generated images 
and digital technologies on our conception of aesthetics and realism in cinema. As 
we will see, the importance of new technologies lays not only with the technical 
aspects of image creation but also significantly challenges traditional concepts in 
film theory as well as philosophy. Therefore, this chapter finally brings together 
the previously defined key aspects and discusses notions of realism and the 
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creation of myths in its connection with digital cinema. These initial three 
chapters will thus lay out the theoretical framework for my subsequent 
investigation of contemporary Hollywood cinema in its relation to illusion and 
reality in the second part of this thesis. 
 
The second part of the thesis will continue the ideas from previously discussed 
writings and analyse the relevant aspects more in detail in relation to 
contemporary cinematic examples, which appear to be representative for our 
relation between cinema, reality and illusion. Here, I will defend my claim that 
Hollywood cinema, rather than being mere escapism, can have an important 
function in providing post-modern culture with important illusions. In addition, 
mainstream Hollywood cinema has an influence on large parts of society and thus 
seems more relevant for my research question about universal ideas and concepts 
that reflect on and influence society at large. This second part follows the 
structure of the first one insofar as each of the chapters highlights one of these 
key areas, such as myth and illusion in chapter four, realism and illusion in chapter 
five as well as digital technology and illusion in chapter six. Nonetheless, all these 
chapters will incorporate the theories by the aforementioned key writers and 
emphasise the connecting elements in their theories. The aim is here to develop 
these key concepts further and apply them to the analysis of some significant 
examples of Hollywood‘s most recent epic cinema.The reason for my particular 
choice of films is that I think each of them represents a certain aspect of my 
theories, such as belief and redemption in The Lord of the Rings (dir. P. Jackson, 
2001-03), realism and classic myths in Troy (dir. W. Petersen, 2004) and digital 
technologies and storytelling in Avatar (dir. J. Cameron, 2009). On the other hand, 
all three films simultaneously also refer to the other aspects of this thesis.  
Moreover I will explore the philosophical theories developed in the first part in its 
direct relation to contemporary cinema and see how they might be able to provide 
us with insights and inspiration for future debates in contemporary philosophy as 
well as film studies.  
 
The overall question is why the last decade has seen such a dramatic rise in mythic 
and historic epics and how this relates not only to technological developments, 
but also to an on-goingideological crisis in modern Western society. Philosopher 
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Eric Bronson has argued that according to Nietzsche, it is the role of the artist to 
proclaim happiness, especially in situations that seem to be hopeless. He adds that 
an ―artist looks at the pain of this world and does more than reproduce our world. 
She adds to it, enriches it, enlivens it […]. For Nietzsche, the artist can only exist 
in times of crises. It is the darkness that he lights.‖ (Bronson, p.77). This supports 
the idea that especially in the last decade, in a period of significant political, 
economic and social insecurity; cinema had a particularly strong output of mythic 
and epic narratives.  
 
The notion of the movement-image, developed by Deleuze, will also play a key 
role in this part of my thesis. This does not mean that the idea of illusion, belief 
and redemption becomes secondary. On the contrary, according to Deleuze, this 
specific type of image constitutes a system of truth. I therefore want to explore the 
reasons for the status of the movement-image as being truthful. Moreover, I want to 
find out how the movement-image itself has developed and what influence this 
has on the believability of films. How do the post-modern feelings of uprooting, 
of being lost and overstrained, as Deleuze describes in relation to the situation 
after World War II that significantly influenced post-war cinema, relate to our age 
of globalisation and electronic media? In general, I want to examine the validity of 
the movement-image to explain contemporary mainstream cinema and ask if the 
advent of the new digital world has had an impact on its ―truthfulness‖. 
 
In chapter four, I initially investigate the notion of myth, belief and redemption as 
presented in the Lord of the Rings trilogy (dir. Peter Jackson, 2001-03, USA/NZ). 
This film epic is not only relevant with regard to its widespread influence on the 
audience and its devoted followers but also because of its way to recreate mythic 
and religious narratives. I will discuss these films with regard to their mythic and 
religious dimensions within the story and as a film itself, but also compare its 
narrative to other mythic epics, such asthe Star Wars series (dir. G. Lucas and 
others, 1977-2005) and discuss how the cinematic storytelling helps in creating 
alternative worlds that are capable of providing concepts on which people base 
their system of beliefs. Both epics have shown a new dimension of creating 
illusions, through their epic stories, their way of producing images as well as the 
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devotion they receive from large parts of the audience.6Initially, the first part of 
this chapter will review theories of redemption, mythic structures and the ways in 
which different narratives – such as epics and fairytales – create meaningful 
illusions. This includes an examination of Nietzsche‘s ideas regarding the link 
between happiness and suffering and the notion of the redemptive power of 
artistic creation. In this context, I will also look at Deleuze‘s notion, that cinema 
should reinstate our belief in the world.It is important to note that I will talk 
about epic narratives in cinematic terms rather than as a literary genre, as 
cinematic epics include are not as clear-cut as literary epics and can include a 
variety of other narrative structures as will be shown in the analysis of The Lord of 
the Rings.  
 
The second part of this chapter analyses Peter Jackson‘s The Lord of the Rings more 
in-depth and compares the mythic elements of its story with those of other 
mythic narratives. In this context, I will discuss aspects such as the universe the 
film creates, the element of the hero‘s journey, and the eternal conflict between 
good and evil. Attention will be paid to the use of set-design and the general 
influence of the visual component of the film on its narrative. This provides the 
basis for a study of the films as cinematic epics, independently from their literary 
predecessor. In addition, I will explore in which way the films reflect the elements 
of the classic movement-image, such as binary relationships, the impression of 
wholeness and action-driven narratives that draw the audience in the story and 
allow them to ‗believe‘ in the world on screen.  Based on this idea, I will further 
look into the way in which the film creates concepts of the world relevant to 
people beyond the cinematic experience. In this context, I explore how the 
redemptive power of the film translates into metaphysical solace for the audience 
and helps us in creating unifying concepts for our own world. Moreover, I will 
analyse how crucial aspects of the movement-image relate to religious and 
mythological aspects of redemption by looking at the two narrative lines that 
                                            
6 In 2002 more than 70,000 people in Australia have declared in the census form that they 
are followers of the Jedi faith, the religion created by the Star Wars films. Although the 
Australian government eventually did not recognise it as a religion, I think this example 
shows quite well, how far fan-cult may go. See: ‗Jedi 'religion' grows in Australia‘. [online] 
BBC. Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/2218456.stm> 
[Accessed 13 February 2006]. 
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underline the overall story. Besides the theories of Nietzsche and Deleuze, the 
chapter will also discuss aspects of storytelling and mythic narratives.  
 
Chapter five will explore Deleuze‘s concept of the action-image more indepth, 
based on a comparison between Wolfgang Petersen‘s 2004 epic Troy with its 
1950s predecessor Helen of Troy (dir. R. Wise, 1956). The main question is here, 
how the movement-image can achieve a system of truthfulness and believability 
and how its most characteristic aspect – the action-image – has survived in 
contemporary mainstream cinema. As the focus point of this chapter is on the 
revival of historic epics in the last decade, I will also examine Kracauer‘s remarks 
about historic themes, which he sees as ‗uncinematic‘. Nevertheless, I aim to 
prove that the attempt at realism in the more recent examples brings them closer 
to his ideas of ‗cinematic content‘. In the second part of the chapter, I will analyse 
the two versions of the historic myth around the Trojan War. Based on the 
assumptions of all three key writers, which claimed that art/cinema reflects the 
issues and beliefs of a society, I compare the 1950s epic Helen of Troy with the 
contemporary version. The aim is to illustrate a shift in the attitudes towards 
realism, in the visual representation as well as in the narrative. Firstly, I will 
examine how modern concerns about war and ideological crises influence the 
narrative. As Judith E. Bernstock (1993) asserted in her essay ‗Classical Mythology 
in Twentieth-Century Art: An Overview of a Humanistic Approach‘:  
 
―The idea of war has been a constant element in the lives of contemporary 
artists, either as an existing phenomenon or as the threat of nuclear disaster. 
Understandably, several modern artists have looked to Homer's Iliad for 
inspiration, and have identified with its legendary heroes embroiled in the 
Trojan War, the paradigm of all wars.‖ (p.156). 
 
Secondly, I will look at the changes in the movement-image and the increasing 
influence of elements of the time-image on the creation of cinematic myths. The 
hypothesis will be that while maintaining the general model of the movement-
image, certain features of the time-image actually help enhancing the overall 
impact of the story and create a more reflective mood within the action-driven 
narrative. By playing with its own qualities and using them in more creative ways, 
the movement-image thus manages to renew itself and maintains its believability 
instead of descending into simple clichés.  
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Comparing the two epics, I also try to uncover why the particular genre of historic 
epics has been so popular at certain times and see how its revival relates to social 
and cultural changes. In this way I try to prove my hypothesis that the need for 
grand epic narratives is particular strong in times of ideological crisis and that 
contrary to Deleuze‘s prediction, the cinematic influence of the movement-image 
has not ceased after the Second World War. I will further show how the new 
possibilities of technologies have had an influence on the way stories are told and 
modified the narratives of the new epics of the last decade. 
 
Consequently, chapter six then looks at the most recent developments in digital 
cinema and continues the debate on the increasing link between movement-image 
and time-image. Looking at the latest trends in digital cinema, such as 3D 
technology and completely digitally created feature films, I explore how this 
further pushes the boundaries of the movement-image by apparently shifting the 
focus from the story towards the images. The question is also, how digital 
technology can develop from being a mere tool that at best enhances a story into 
a crucial element of the story. The basis of this chapter will be Deleuze‘s 
suggestion that we may need a new set of images for the electronic age. In 
contrast, I argue for an increasing mix of movement-image and time-image.  
 
The second part of this chapter then focuses on the most recent milestone in 
digital development, namely James Cameron‘s Avatar (dir. J. Cameron, 2009, 
USA/UK).Here, I will investigate the significance of its hypermodern imagery, its 
rather conservative narrative as well as its impact on a contemporary audience that 
is increasingly influenced by a video game aesthetic. In addition, I will also look at 
philosophical questions regarding the blurring between actual and virtual as well 
as evaluating the influence this has on the narrative structure of modern action 
epics. Deleuze had seen the shift from actuality to virtuality as crucial for the time-
image, which further seems to shift the focus in its direction. As he wrote in his 
second cinema book, the ―direct time-image is a phantom which has always 
haunted the cinema, but it took modern cinema to give a body to this phantom. 
This image is virtual, in opposition to the actuality of the movement-image. But, if 
virtual is opposed to actual, it is not opposed to real, far from it.‖ (p.40). This final 
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chapter will therefore have a closer look at this aspect and its influence not just on 
cinematic images, but also on philosophical concepts, such as the link between 
body and mind as well as fragmentation and our perception of reality.The chapter 
concludes that digital technologies can present new creative opportunities not 
only for filmmakers, but also for philosophers in providing a new dimension to 
create new possible worlds and thus stimulating new ways of thinking.  
 
All films analysed in the second part are not simply seen as unique and 
outstanding examples of recent Hollywood cinema, but have a direct connection 
to the philosophical concepts developed in Part I. In this way, the films reflect not 
only tendencies in cinema, but also in modern thinking. The chapters show the 
line of thought from the more traditional mythic ideas of redemption towards the 
ultimate move beyond the physical boundaries that present us with ideas of 
spirituality and rebirth on an entirely new level. On the cinematic level, we look at 
the rising influence of the time-image, but at the same time we see how the 
movement-image manages to renew itself. As a consequence, the ultimate model 
for contemporary cinema may lie in a composition of both, which reflects the 
increasingly blurred boundaries in a variety of other fields, such as actual/virtual, 
human/machine and mind/body. In this way it also encourages us to blur the 
boundaries of theory by moving beyond analysing contemporary cinema either in 
terms of film theory or philosophy alone, but as film-philosophy.  
 
In summary, the thesis supports the idea that illusions are a necessary part of our 
culture and illustrates how the revival of grand epic narratives in mainstream 
cinema in the last decade is linked not only to technological developments but to 
a distinct development in the social sphere. As filmmaker Martin Scorsese once 
remarked in an interview, cinema answers ―an ancient quest for the common 
unconscious. [it fulfils] a spiritual need that people have to share a common 
memory.‖7 In that way, cinema becomes the ‗mythmaking machine‘ par excellence 
in a world that has increasing difficulties in creating unifying concepts and positive 
illusions that can inspire and give hope. 
  
                                            
7 Quoted in Vanity Fair, March 2006, p.134 
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Part I: 
How real is reality? – On the relation of 
reality, art and illusion 
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Chapter One: 
From dream factory to cathedrals of pop culture – mythological, religious 
and ideological approaches to cinema 
 
As outlined in the introduction, in this opening chapter I will discuss the 
relationship between art, ideology and religion and see how this relationship can 
be applied to cinema. I start my quest with an analysis of Nietzsche‘s The Birth of 
Tragedy and the unique approach he develops towards the connection between art 
and life. Here, I will look at the redemptive qualities of cinema, the importance of 
creativity and artistic instincts in our interaction with the world and the role of 
stories in our belief. I will further examine Nietzsche‘s criticism of rationality and 
his concept of wisdom as a higher form of knowledge.  
 
I then proceed to more recent studies in this field that directly relate the ideas of 
illusion and belief to cinema. In this context I will discuss Screening the Sacred (1995) 
by Joel W. Martin and Conrad E. Ostwalt Jr., a study that analyses the existing 
religious, mythological and ideological approaches to cinema. They also describe 
the importance of storytelling in all aspects of the creation of myth and 
storytelling and emphasise that it is not only the so called art-house cinema that is 
able to interpret religious and ideological themes but defend that mainstream 
Hollywood cinema has an important place in our society. Whereas Martin and 
Ostwalt analyse the subject area from the perspective of film studies, John C. 
Lyden‘s book Film as Religion (2003), examines the relationship between cinema, 
myth and religion from the perspective of theological studies. He also 
acknowledges the role of storytelling in the development of religious ideas and 
criticises similar to Martin and Ostwalt the often limited approach in this field 
which only focuses on certain ‗intellectual‘ films. 
 
At the end of this chapter, I will have a closer look at Richard Allen‘s work 
Projecting Illusion (1995). Here, I will focus particularly on his critique of ideological 
theory in relation to cinema and his notion that the cinematic illusion requires an 
active spectator that participates in the illusion. Similar to the previous writers he 
states the importance of the narrative in the creation of convincing cinematic 
illusions. His ideas about illusion, cinema and its role in our life link all theories to 
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the concepts of Nietzsche developed in the first part of this chapter. I will thus 
show how the storytelling function links cinema with myth and religion as well as 
demonstrate the redemptive qualities that can result from artistic creation. 
 
 
1.1 Why we need illusions - Nietzsche‘s philosophy of art 
 
Unlike the other theorists discussed in this thesis, Friedrich Nietzsche did not 
have the possibilities to discuss cinema directly. Nevertheless I shall demonstrate, 
why I consider his theories not just relevant but crucial for my analysis of the 
illusive power of cinema. Although the main focus will be on Nietzsche‘s first 
work The Birth of Tragedy, I will also introduce several ideas he discusses in later 
writings. Despite finding a variety of references to Nietzsche in writings on 
cinema, for example in Deleuze‘s work, this first work on ancient Greek art and 
culture remains largely ignored by scholars discussing Nietzsche in relation to 
cinema.  
 
Even though Nietzsche studied classical philology and had a profound knowledge 
of ancient Greek culture, he never seemed to be interested in simply theorising 
historical facts and writings. It was rather the fascination of what he perceived as 
the Ancient Greek life style, which was strongly influenced by Romanticism. His 
concept of Greek culture also becomes the counterpart to his perception of 
Christian culture, which he increasingly condemns throughout his entire work. 
Yet Nietzsche‘s discussion of Greek culture is not just interesting as symbolic 
antithesis to Christianity. Moreover, it is the strong link between society and 
belief, between everyday life and mythology, which makes it so relevant for this 
thesis. 
 
Reading The Birth of Tragedy, it soon becomes clear that this study is not primarily a 
philological examination of the genealogy of Attic tragedy, but rather a 
philosophical discourse about the origins and reasons of art in general. 
Throughout the book, questions about the reasons and justifications of artistic 
practice are developed into questions about the way we can justify our life. In his 
Attempt at Self-Criticism, an introductory chapter that Nietzsche added to a later 
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edition ofThe Birth of Tragedy, he describes his writings as an Artists-Metaphysic. 
More specifically, Nietzsche (1999) explains that the purpose of this work was not 
only ―to look at science through the prism of the artist,‖ but also to look ―at art 
through the prism of life.‖(p.5). This connection he draws between art and life 
will be crucial for my further examinations.   
 
Moreover, ideas of belief and ideology are separated from the area of morality and 
ethics and discussed in aesthetic terms, which do not automatically involve a value 
judgement. This is highlighted in the aforementioned introduction, where 
Nietzsche emphasises the anti-moral aspect of his work. Nietzsche (1999) claims 
that ―art and not morality – is the true metaphysical activity of man‖ and further 
notes ―that the existence of the world is justified […] only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon‖ (p.8), a statement that appears several times in his book. This point 
is important for my analysis as it may help us to understand aspects of Hollywood 
cinema independently from evocations of the manipulative and immoral character 
of films. In Nietzsche‘s later theories on judgement, for example in Beyond Good 
and Evil, the concept of art as an alternative perspective towards life will also 
become ever more relevant. 
 
As Judith E. Bernstock (1993) has shown in her essay on twentieth century visual 
art, painters such as Francis Bacon, Giorgio de Chirico and Mark Rothko were 
strongly influenced by their reading of Nietzsche‘s The Birth of Tragedy and his 
interpretation of the subject of myth and redemption. Bernstock argues that many 
artists of that time used mythological imagery and ideas to provide a common 
ground of understanding, which is accessible to everybody and that the painters 
named above have been influenced by Nietzsche‘s description of a worldview that 
is based on the artistic forces of the Apollonian and Dionysian. This further 
supports my ideas about the relevance of mythic concepts in the interpretation of 
our world, which I will discuss in this thesis. Moreover, Bernstock also writes that 
mythological themes seem to become especially relevant in times of social and 
political disorder; that is in times of crisis as I have suggested in my initial 
hypothesis.As mentioned in the introduction, these crises can take place on 
various levels – political, social or personal – as well as differ in scope. As social 
crises are often not unique, mythic narratives often help to put emphasise 
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reoccurring themes in our experience of crises. According to Bernstock, artists 
often use mythic themes to demonstrate a continuum in human experience, 
representing primordial elements, such as grief, fear and violence. Bernstock 
(1993) writes that for artists the ―timeless tragic subject matter of the myth has 
been the means through which they can express universal and eternal concerns.‖ 
(p.156). This idea of universal experiences that can be understood throughout 
history will be particularly evident in the representation of the Trojan War in 
cinema, which I will analyse in chapter five. There I will demonstrate how strong 
an ancient myth can be influenced by the times in which it is told. 
 
In general, The Birth of Tragedy can be divided in three parts or themes. In the first 
part, Nietzsche examines the two antipodal concepts in art that are represented by 
the Greek deities Apollo and Dionysos. Here, he looks at the interaction of the 
Dionysian with the Apollonian as well as the development of Greek culture and 
more specifically the attic tragedy as a result of this duality. The second part 
investigates the reasons for the decline of Greek tragedy, which for Nietzsche 
coincides with the decline of Greek culture and mythology in general. Nietzsche 
holds the emergence of optimistic science, symbolised by the figure of Socrates, 
responsible for this waning of mythic concepts. His idea is that the substitution of 
myth and tragic culture by enlightenment and optimistic science brings about a 
variety of negative consequences. This notion returns later, in the writings of 
Kracauer and Deleuze, albeit in different forms.The third part of The Birth of 
Tragedy discusses the options for a rebirth of tragic art through a new form of 
music theatre, represented essentially by Richard Wagner. After Nietzsche‘s break 
with Wagner, he became sceptical of this possibility, but there are several ideas 
about the way in which tragic art could be revived, which I consider relevant in 
relation to cinema. My analysis of The Birth of Tragedy will roughly follow this 
structure and aims to link each aspect to our discourse on cinema and illusion. 
 
To begin with, the term Dionysian is very significant for Nietzsche‘s entire 
philosophy, as he uses the name rather as a metaphor than in its strict sense 
related to the Greek god Dionysos. More precisely, Nietzsche unites a variety of 
themes from Greek mythology under this name, such as the barbaricand titanic. 
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(See: Birth of Tragedy, section 4). At this point, his main aim is to express the wild, 
natural, free spirited, but also brutal connotations of these terms.  
 
Moreover, Nietzsche also employs the name Dionysos to express other aspects of 
his theories, especially to create a contrast to Christian culture and morality. As 
already noted, Nietzsche largely uses Greek culture and myth as an antithesis to 
Christianity. This is manifest in a statement from the above mentioned self-
criticism that prefaces The Birth of Tragedy. Here, Nietzsche (1967) describes his 
choice of terminology as follows:  
 
―It was against morality that my instinct turned with this questionable book, 
long ago; it was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that discovered for 
itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and valuation of life – purely artistic 
and anti-Christian. What to call it? As a philologist and man of words I 
baptized it, not without taking some liberty – for who could claim to know 
the rightful name of the Antichrist? – in the name of a Greek god: I called it 
Dionysian.‖ (p.24, emphasis in original). 
 
It is therefore important to keep this metaphorical approach in mind when 
discussing Nietzsche‘s theories on Greek tragedy. The advantage of this liberal use 
of terminology is, however, that it can be discussed beyond its historical, 
philological applications as metaphors for a distinct characteristic of artistic 
practice that not only applies to ancient Greek culture, but to art in general. As a 
consequence, it can similarly be applied to cinema.  
 
In addition, he also draws the connection between art and illusion by stating 
that―Enchantment is the precondition of all dramatic art.‖ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.44). 
Nietzsche thus begins his analysis of Greek tragedy with a general study on our 
relationship with art. According to him, every human being has artistic powers 
which we show for example while dreaming. The connection with dream also 
frequently occurs in cinema, which of all art forms seems to come closest to our 
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experience of dream.8 For Nietzsche dream becomes the model for all visual arts. 
He further states – contentiously - that even when we are dreaming, we are always 
able to decide if it is a dream or not. The interesting point about this aspect is that 
Nietzsche here emphasises the conscious aspect of image creation. Images are not 
simply brought upon us by some external source, but we actively and creatively 
participate in their creation. This view also applies to my claim that illusions in 
general are something that people actively create, or at least participate in their 
creation. In this way we can argue that cinema cannot simply be seen as a medium 
that dupes the audience with an illusion based on its own ideology, but it always 
needs the active participation of the viewer. I will return to this point at the end of 
the chapter when discussing the theories by Richard Allen.  
 
For Nietzsche, myths and some works of art, such as the Attic tragedy, function 
in nearly the same way as dreams. Like dreams, they are not intended to entertain 
us but have a ―healing‖ function. Even though Nietzsche does not explicitly use 
the term ―healing‖ at this point, he describes artistic illusions as something that 
saves us from the recognition of the deficiencies of everyday life. Moreover, 
similar to his description of dreams he also points out that the activity of creating 
illusions is not a naïve one, where people are duped by illusion, but a pro-active 
and conscious process of creating illusions.  
 
Based on this link with dream, Nietzsche deduces that, all artistic tendencies have 
their origin directly in nature, that is to say are instinctive and elementary to our 
life. He further emphasises that we are just a part of nature, which is constantly 
creating an incredible amount of images. Our main activity is to discover or use 
the images nature provides, and eventually we realise that we are just one of them. 
In other words, ―we may well assume we are already images and artistic 
projections for the true creator of art, and that our highest dignity lies in our 
                                            
8 For example, Jean-Louis Baudry has argued that watching a film is similar to dreaming 
as it provides an experience of regression in which the spectator finds the self reflected in 
the primitive, infantile state. See his essay Ideological effects of the Basic Cinematic Apparatus in 
Braudy, L. & Cohen, M. (eds.), 1999. Film Theory and Criticism. New York: Oxford 
University Press.In addition, Cinema Dreams.Projection.Imagination. Vision,2009, a collection 
of essays edited by W.Pauleit, et al, discusses a wide variety of aspects in the discourse of 
the dreamlike qualities of cinema. German edition. CD-ROM with English version and 
film clips. Berlin: Bertz and Fischer.  
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significance as works of art‖ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.32). When we assume that we are 
all part of a universal artwork then it is easy to understand how artistic creation as 
natural impulse can develop various outlets. In that sense art, mythology and even 
religion are not entirely different, but are all in a way systems of complex images 
and ideas that are embedded in compelling stories or illusions. The difference 
between them is in the details and messages, but not in their essence. Therefore, it 
is also important that for Nietzsche art is not something that is added to our life 
through civilisation but an essential part of it.  
 
The ideas about dream and illusion are not only relevant for our interpretation of 
art. What is more, they also have a direct implication for our view of the world. As 
Nietzsche (1956) writes, the reflections about dreams and art have led many 
thinkers to the assumption that ―our everyday reality, too, is an illusion, hiding 
another, totally different kind of reality.‖ (p.20). Nevertheless, for Nietzsche this is 
not automatically a criticism of our perception of reality. On the contrary, both 
levels are essential to human life. On the one hand, the acknowledgement of this 
other, darker reality is important for our understanding that there is a need to 
create another, lighter illusion of reality. In relation to ancient Greek culture 
Nietzsche (1999) describes that phenomenon as follows: 
 
―The Greeks knew and felt the terrors and horrors of existence; in order to 
live at all they had to place in front of these things the resplendent, dream-
born figures of the Olympians. That enormous distrust of the Titanic forces 
of nature, that moira9 which throned, unpitying, above all knowledge […] all 
this was constantly and repeatedly overcome by the Greeks, or at least veiled 
and withdrawn from view, by means of the artistic middle world of the 
Olympians. In order to be able to live, the Greeks were obliged, by the most 
profound compulsion, to create these gods.‖ (p.23). 
 
Nietzsche‘s claim that illusions and myths are not only something that has been 
added to society because people did not know better, but a necessity that was 
created out of a profound understanding, is a thought, which may help us 
understand why so many people in our modern enlightened times feel a longing 
                                            
9 In Greek mythology, Moira is ‗fate‘ or ‗necessity‘, a power to which even the Olympic 
gods have to submit. See: Brewer‟s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable. 1996. London: Cassell 
Publishers. 
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for illusion, even when this illusion is ‗only‘ a film. I will explore this concept 
further throughout the following chapters. 
 
The cruel and unpredictable world, which is reflected in Greek mythology, is also 
the basis for the rise of the Attic tragedy. According to Nietzsche, the latter is 
neither created out of a desire to present a copy of everyday reality nor merely 
fantastical. His claim is that the mythological background was as real to the 
ancient Greeks as the physical reality they perceived around them, so there was no 
need to make a distinction between the two. In other words, the boundaries 
between myth, reality and fiction were much more fluent.  
 
In addition, Nietzsche claims that mythology like art is created by man and for the 
same reasons, namely to explain, deal with and structure everyday reality to 
provide us with a reason to live. He writes that the ―same drive which calls art 
into being to complete and perfect existence and thus to seduce us into 
continuing to live, also gave rise to the world of the Olympians in which the 
Hellenic ‗Will‘ held up a transfiguring mirror to itself.‖ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.24) 
This notion of transfiguration is important when Nietzsche claims that myth and 
tragedy – ancient storytelling – is not meant to be simply a way to create an 
account or image of reality, but to overcome it. Nevertheless, Nietzsche makes 
also clear that this transfiguration, through art or myth, does not delude our 
perception of reality. On the contrary, it points us towards the tragic aspects of 
life and makes us both see the cruelty of the world and realise the necessity for the 
world of illusion and appearances at the same time.  
 
This duality in the nature of myth is according to Nietzsche represented by the 
two opposing principles of the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Dionysian 
element refers to the unpredictability of nature and the suffering that manifests 
our reality, whereas the Apollonian presents the world of illusion and 
appearances. 
 
In The Birth of Tragedy, the Dionysian element is the one that unites us with nature 
and temporarily frees us from the restrictions of civilisation. ―Under the charm of 
the Dionysian not only is the union between man and man reaffirmed, but nature 
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which has become alienated, hostile, or subjugated, celebrates once more her 
reconciliation with her lost son, man.‖ (Nietzsche, 1967, p.37). However, the 
Dionysian aspect of culture also shows us the cruel, wild and unpredictable side of 
our life. Here, Nietzsche also unites ideas of older aspects of Greek mythology, 
such as the dark realm of the Titans, with the more recent notion of the Dionysos 
myth, which was initially not part of the Greek Pantheon10. According to 
Nietzsche, the Dionysos cult with its wild, orgiastic elements reintroduces the 
original ground of suffering that has been covered by the Olympic deities.  
 
In turn, this then requires the power of the Apollonian to maintain the balance. 
For Nietzsche, the artistic element personified in the god Apollo presents the 
antithesis to the figure of Dionysos and its wild cults. According to him, ―the 
power of the epic Apollonian spirit is such that it transfigures the most horrible 
deeds before our eyes by the charm of illusion, and redemption through illusion.‖ 
(Nietzsche, 1956, p.78, transl. by F. Golffing). 
 
[At this point I want briefly to draw attention to a significant problem I came 
across while reviewing Nietzsche‘s writings, namely the considerable differences 
in the translations. While these differences often are a matter of style, they 
become crucial for my analysis when Nietzsche speaks about the concepts of 
illusion and redemptions as in the quoted passage. In the original work Nietzsche 
uses the German expression ―Erlösung durch Schein‖(1994b, p.168), which is in 
the English versions translated with ―release through semblance‖ (1999, p.61, 
translation by R. Speirs), ―redemption through appearance‖ (1995, p.42, translated 
by C. P. Fadiman) or ―redemption through illusion‖ as above by Golffing and 
similarly by Walter Kaufmann (1967, p.45)11.  Especially the translation by Speirs 
loses the unique point of the statement, apparently trying to implement a 
                                            
10 There are several theories about the origin of Dionysos, but he is generally described as 
coming from Asia Minor, from Persia or even from as far as India. Therefore, Dionysos 
brings a variety of new philosophical concepts to Greece, which were previously 
unknown to Greek culture, such as orgiastic cults. For more information on this subject, 
see for example Grant, M., 1989. Myths of the Greeks & Romans. London: Weidenfels & 
Nicolson. 
11 Unfortunately, Kaufmann later shifts between the words redemption and release, even 
if the German term used in the text remains the same, which makes the reading even 
more confusing. 
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―neutral‖ translation. But Nietzsche uses the term Erlösung = Redemption very 
consciously with all its religious and moral connotations throughout his work, 
which the term ―release‖ does not reflect. Additionally, the German word 
―Schein‖ is even more difficult to translate or explain in English as it involves the 
terms appearance, illusion, semblance as well as shiny, bright and luminous, 
depending on the context but simultaneously implying the other nuances. 
Nietzsche (1999, p.16) for example plays with the latter meaning when he explains 
that the name Apollo is derived from the Greek origin as “the luminous one”. As the 
bright and shiny connotation also involves the element of superficiality and 
mirroring, he refers to Apollo simultaneously as the ―sun-like‖ god of beauty, 
appearances and illusion.I will thus use several translations throughout this paper, 
depending on which I perceive as the most suitable one in the particular instance.] 
 
The notion of redemption through illusion brings us to a crucial term in our debate 
about illusion and cinema, the notion of redemption. As described in The Birth of 
Tragedy, the soothing characteristics of artistic creation gives us reasons to live and 
prevents us from drowning in desperation. Nietzsche (1967) states that the more 
we become aware of the power of the two competing artistic drives and their 
longing for redemption through illusion, ―the more I feel myself impelled to the 
metaphysical assumption that the truly-existent and primal unity, eternally 
suffering and contradictory, also needs the rapturous vision, the pleasurable 
illusion, for its continuous redemption‖ (p.45). What Nietzsche describes here is 
the profound joy of and need for this redemption through illusion.  
 
In contrast to the Apollonian world of images and harmony, Dionysian music and 
dance symbolise for Nietzsche a kind of original language, in which nature can 
express itself freely. This ―language‖ is instinctive and universal, not individual. As 
a consequence, this expression of the Dionysian in its pure state will lead to the 
abolition of the individual by uniting man with the world. Only the power of the 
Apollonian and its emphasis on the principium individuationis saves us from fully 
losing ourselves in this Dionysian bond with nature. When discussing Deleuze in 
later chapters, we will link this idea about the unity between man and the world to 
cinema, and see how Hollywood cinema in particular aims at creating a universal 
worldview while still maintaining the role of the individual in it.  
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There are strong reasons for maintaining the significance of the individual and 
balancing the Dionysian insight into nature with the Apollonian world of 
harmony and illusions. The awareness of nature as an all-powerful unity also 
points to the irrelevance of our own existence in the greater scheme of things. 
This always bears the risk that we eventually fall into lethargy and lose our will to 
exist altogether, an idea that was developed by Schopenhauer in his pessimistic 
philosophy.  
 
According to Nietzsche, reflection about our own existence can paralyse us; only 
positive illusions encourage us to act. In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche (1999) 
compares Dionysian men with Shakespeare‘s Hamlet:  
 
―both have gazed into the true essence of things, they have acquired 
knowledge and they find action repulsive, for their actions can do nothing to 
change the eternal essence of things; they regard it as laughable or shameful 
that they should be expected to set to rights a world so out of joint. 
Knowledge kills action; action requires one to be shrouded in a veil of 
illusion‖ (1999, p.40).  
 
What distinguishes the Dionysian Greeks from Hamlet is that they had the 
Apollonian element of illusion as a redemptive power.  
 
It is important to note that not only does the Dionysian need the Apollonian 
element as a balance, the Apollonian world of illusions need the Dionysian world 
as its base and inspiration. In that sense, Nietzsche (1999) writes that the duality 
―shows us that the whole world of agony is needed in order to compel the 
individual to generate the releasing and redemptive vision and then, lost in 
contemplation of that vision, to sit calmly in his rocking boat in the midst of the 
sea.‖ (p.26). This shows that the illusions do not simply replace the more dire 
reality behind it, but that they can only be generated upon the awareness of the 
abysmal grounds of life. We are therefore not dealing with a naïve attitude of 
―not-wanting-to-know‖, but a conscious realisation of the necessity of illusions. 
So, both the Dionysian and the Apollonian are involved in an eternal circle of 
destruction and creation, eternal becoming. Our metaphysical solace is then ―that 
in the ground of things, and despite all changing appearances, life is indestructibly 
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mighty and pleasurable‖ and ―goes on ineradicably behind and beyond all 
civilization‖ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.39). This shows how Nietzsche applies his initial 
thoughts on art to a wider discussion about the importance of illusions for our 
life.  
 
According to Nietzsche, the Greeks were lucky insofar as they had their art as a 
healing influence, because art ―alone can re-direct those repulsive thoughts about 
the terrible or absurd nature of existence into representations with which man can 
live‖ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.40). Art thus redeems us from despair by means of the 
―sublime – the taming of horror through art; and the comedy – the artistic release 
from the repellence of the absurd.‖ (Nietzsche, 1993, p.40, emphasis in original). 
This might also help us to explain why both aspects – the epic-sublime and the 
comedy – are represented in the most popular genres of Hollywood cinema. 
Deleuze will discuss both aspects in relation to his action-image, as I will 
demonstrate in chapter three. 
 
Following his analysis of the duality of artistic powers, Nietzsche examines the 
reasons for the decline of the Attic tragedy, which he sees as symbolic for the 
decline of Greek culture and tragic myth in general. According to Nietzsche, this 
decline was essentially caused by the advent of optimistic science, represented by 
the figure of Socrates and brought into tragedy by the plays of Euripides. Both 
these characters represent for Nietzsche the demystification and rationalisation of 
life through science and logical thinking, which subsequently destroys not only 
myth but also art, which loses its power to enchant and thus to redeem us. This 
notion in particular also influences the later theories by Kracauer and Deleuze and 
it will therefore be present throughout this work. 
 
Whereas the antagonists of the first part of The Birth of Tragedy – Apollo and 
Dionysos – co-existed in a harmonious unity, the opposition between tragic spirit 
and optimistic rationalism, represented by Socrates, is exclusive. Nietzsche claims 
that the downfall of tragic Greek myth is exemplary for the destiny of all religions 
– they are doomed as soon as people try to theorise them. More specifically, he 
argues that religions die when their mythical premises are systematised, which in 
turn means that people lose their intuitive sense and understanding of a myth and 
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replace it by claiming a historic, i.e. ―rational‖, foundation for their religion. The 
problem with this shift is that without myth ―all cultures lose their healthy, 
creative, natural energy; only a horizon surrounded by myths encloses and unifies 
a cultural movement. Only by myth can all energies of fantasy and Apolline dream 
be saved from aimless meandering.‖ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.108).  
 
What is more, the loss of mythological concepts also results in the loss of positive 
illusions about the future and the existence of mankind. Nietzsche (1999) states 
that along with tragic myth ―the Hellene had given up his belief in his immortality, 
not only his belief in an ideal past, but also his belief in an ideal future.‖ (p.56). If 
we can no longer believe in our world and have hopes for the future, this also has 
an effect on our happiness and inspiration. We may well get on with our life, but 
we will not have any higher ideals to aspire to. This secularisation of myth is 
represented in an interesting way in the modern epic Troy (2004, dir. W. Petersen), 
which I will discuss in chapter 5. The main problem Nietzsche sees here is that 
although science tries to explain the world to us by destroying the ‗false beliefs‘ of 
the mythological foundation, it is not able to provide us with a consoling 
explanation for the unpredictability and cruelty of life, which would compensate 
the positive illusions myth gave us. As Nietzsche (1999) writes: 
 
―one also finds a profound delusion which first appeared in the person of 
Socrates, namely the imperturbable belief that thought, as it follows the 
thread of causality, reaches down into the deepest abysses of being, and that 
it is capable, not simply of understanding existence, but even of correcting it. 
This sublime metaphysical illusion is an instinct which belongs inseparably to 
science, and leads it to its limits time after time, at which point it must 
transform itself into art‖. (p.73). 
 
What we can draw from this quote is Nietzsche‘s observation that certain areas of 
life are inaccessible from a scientific point of view and can only be explained by 
more elusive means. Therefore art will be our final saviour that provides us with 
universal, spiritual concepts for our life – by creating them. 
 
The shift from feelings and experiences to abstract thinking and logical models is 
another aspect of this new rationalism. The loss of sensual experiences and 
intuitive wisdom, however, also means that we are losing our connection with 
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nature. The tragic human is replaced by the theoretical human. Yet, whereas the 
Apollonian art of illusion saved the Dionysian man from agony, the theoretical 
man, e.g. Hamlet, does not have this solace. It is, however, not the case that this 
idea about redemption and solace condemns knowledge per se. Rather, the contrast 
is made between rationality as scientific-logical knowledge and wisdom as tragic-
spiritual knowledge. According to Nietzsche (1993) there always comes a point 
where we ought to ask, ―Is that which is unintelligible to me necessarily 
unintelligent? Might there be a realm of wisdom from which the logician is 
excluded? Might art even be a necessary correlative and supplement to science?‖ 
(p.71). The crucial idea that I derive from this statement, is that spiritual wisdom 
that includes art and illusion is not simply asubtraction of knowledge, something 
that is less real, but could also be seen as an addition, a form of deeper knowledge 
that provides more profound insights. This deeper insight – tragic knowledge – 
can be terrifying at times and therefore art is needed ―both as protection and 
remedy, if we are to bear it.‖ (Nietzsche, 1993, p.75). The contrast between 
wisdom and knowledge will also play a significant part in the Lord of the Rings 
trilogy as we will see in chapter four. 
 
The advantage of wisdom is further that it does not contradict mythological ideas 
or tries to rationalise them, but respects these stories as symbolic ways of 
interpreting life. Therefore wisdom or tragic knowledge can provide us with 
models for the aspects of life that cannot be explained by science. In this sense, 
wisdom and art are closely related and not oppositions, as both are based on 
intuition and creativity and are looking for a deeper meaning behind the rational 
categories and explanations. This is why for Nietzsche one of the most significant 
achievements of ancient Greek culture was that it declared wisdom and not 
knowledge as its highest purpose.  
 
Another aspect of wisdom is that in contrast to scientific knowledge, wisdom 
takes a more universal approach to describe the world,thus avoiding a fragmented 
– and limited – view of the world. The notion of fragmentation is further 
developed by Kracauer and I will discuss this subject in more detail in the next 
chapter.  
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Wisdom, however, is not concerned with the examination of details and singular 
effects, but regards the world and its creatures as a whole. As Nietzsche (1999) 
expresses it, ―wisdom is not deceived by the seductive distractions of the sciences; 
instead it turns its unmoved gaze on the total image of the world‖ (p.87). This 
perspective is also important for both Kracauer and Deleuze in their discussion of 
cinema, as we shall see in the rest of this thesis.  
 
A statement that is particularly suitable to be applied to cinema is Nietzsche‘s 
notion that our ―metaphysical delight in the tragic translates instinctive, 
unconscious Dionysiac wisdom into the language of images: we take pleasure in 
the negation of the hero, the supreme appearance of the Will, because he is, after 
all, mere appearance, and because the eternal life of the Will is not affected by his 
annihilation‖ (Nietzsche, 1999, p.80). We not only take pleasure in Happy 
Endings, but also in tragedies, especially when they provide us with a sense that 
even though these tragic things happen, life goes on and people live to tell the 
story. Besides, this further reflects the previous argument that both the deeper 
understanding of Dionysian wisdom and the superficiality created by Apollonian 
illusion, is necessary to give life balance.  
 
In Nietzsche‘s later writings, the aspect of illusions as an essential part of our life 
becomes increasingly relevant, even though the focus shifts from aesthetic 
considerations to a critique of morality and judgement. Greek culture, however, 
remains the model for Nietzsche‘s philosophy in general. The notion of 
superficiality plays an essential part in his thought. Nietzsche interprets this 
superficiality not as trivial and ignorant, but as a superficiality resulting from a 
deeper knowledge of the world. In his preface to The Gay Science, Nietzsche (2001) 
summarises this thought as follows: ―Oh, those Greeks! They knew how to live: 
what is needed for that is to stop bravely at the surface, the fold, the skin; to 
worship appearance, to believe in shapes, tones, words – in the whole Olympus of 
appearance! Those Greeks were superficial – out of profundity!‖ (p.8). To our 
common understanding of superficiality, this seems absurd, but it becomes clearer 
when we recall the interdependence between Dionysian wisdom and Apollonian 
illusion, where not only the world of appearances is needed to redeem us from 
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suffering, but also the profound knowledge of suffering is needed to inspire and 
create the illusions.  
 
Nietzsche subsequently applieshis belief in the importance or even necessity of 
illusions to his critique of a system of judgement. He claims that our problem is 
not so much the erroneous assumption that we are able to decide between true 
and false but the fact that we derive ethical judgements from this presumption, 
such as ―right‖ and ―wrong‖. Since Nietzsche here supports the assumption that 
there are no absolute truths and everything is open to interpretation, our moral 
judgements have no foundation. He denies the idea that there exists an 
independent and objective structure in the world and that there are corresponding 
relations between the world and our description of it.  
 
In his work Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche questions the conditions under which 
we decide what is true or false. He poses the question, what ―compels us to 
assume there exists any essential antithesis between ‗true‘ and ‗false‘? Is it not 
enough to suppose grades of apparentness and as it were lighter and darker shades 
and tones of appearance […]? Why could the world which is of any concern to us 
– not be a fiction?‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, p.65-66). Even though he does not link this 
statement directly to his earlier aesthetic works, it is easy to see how the notion of 
our world as fictional yet nevertheless useful relates to his previous theories about 
art as a necessary part in the creation of our perception of the world.  
 
According to Nietzsche, the only criteria for making judgements about our world 
are in which way they are useful and life-affirming. This perspectivist conception 
of truth has always been present in what we call common knowledge, which is 
usually developed under functional aspects. In Nietzsche‘s (1990) words, he ―who 
has seen deeply into the world knows what wisdom there is in the fact that men 
are superficial. It is their instinct for preservation which teaches them to be fickle, 
light and false.‖ (p.84). Therefore, we can well discuss illusions in terms where 
they are positive and inspirational or negative and manipulative. The argument is 
therefore that illusions are not necessarily negative in contrast to a reality that is 
positive, but can be interpreted in various ways. As outlined in my introduction, I 
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aim to focus on the positive aspects of illusion throughout this thesis although 
more critical aspects will also be introduced towards the end in chapter six.  
 
Nietzsche not only criticises the way in which society has treated illusion as 
something that needs to be overcome. He also claims that as soon as we destroy 
the world of illusions, we consequently also destroy our ideal of reality. This in 
turn abolishes the possibility for any form of judgement as we have no ideal 
concept to which we can refer. This is exactly what optimistic science has done, 
and as a result people have lost their unconditioned belief in the world. However, 
belief seems to be the only possible way to deal with our world. Nietzsche (1990) 
points out that:  
 
―for the purpose of preserving beings such as ourselves, such judgements 
must be believed to be true; although they might of course still be false 
judgements! Or more clearly, crudely and basically: synthetic judgements a 
priori should not ‗be possible‘ at all: we have no right to them, in our mouths 
they are nothing but false judgements. But belief in their truth is, of course, 
necessary as foreground belief and ocular evidence belonging to the 
perspective optics of life.‖ (p.42)  
 
A century later, Deleuze will claim that people have lost their belief in the world 
and it is the role of cinema to reinstate this belief. Before discussing Deleuze‘s 
theories more in-depth in the third chapter, I will look at several contemporary 
writers that link cinema to other belief systems, such as myth, religion and 
ideology. 
 
 
1.2. Cinema as modern myth – contemporary approaches towards the relationship 
between art and faith 
 
As we have seen, the connection between art and belief has been noticed long 
before the invention of cinema. Yet the power of the cinematic illusion, the cult 
surrounding individual films and the experience of going to the cinema has 
subsequently also drawn the attention not only of film scholars but also of 
researchers in the fields of philosophy, cultural studies and theology. The aspects 
of this discourse range from religious symbolism in films to the ritual acts of 
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cinema going. For my examination, I want to focus on three works that all 
contribute to the debate from different angles. By connecting these studies to 
Nietzsche‘s theories in the first part of this chapter, we will gain a deeper insight 
into the religious and mythic qualities of cinema, supporting my hypothesis about 
the importance of illusions. The first two works discussed will look at the links 
between cinema and religious studies, whereas Richard Allen‘s book, discussed at 
the end, looks at cinema from the perspective of ideology and philosophy. 
 
One of the most interesting studies that have contributed to the current debate is 
Screening the Sacred. Religion, Myth and Ideology in Popular American Cinema(1995).12 
Even though the book includes a very wide range of topics, the general approach 
to cinema is from the perspective of film studies. Nevertheless, in his introduction 
to the volume Martin criticises the fact that both film scholars and theologians 
have largely ignored the connection between the two domains. The result is that 
so far little research in this field has been carried out. In addition, the studies that 
deal with the subject have mainly focussed on art films as if to say that only 
‗intellectual‘ cinema can have religious elements. In line with my reasoning to look 
at mainstream Hollywood cinema, Martin suggests that popular culture most 
immediately reflects the tendencies in modern society and gives us an idea about 
what the majority of people is interested in. Thus, it is not only interesting but 
also important to look at popular mainstream cinema and take Hollywood‘s 
impact on modern culture seriously. More specifically Martin argues that since 
Western religious traditions, ―have had a tremendous impact upon Western 
culture and all of its art forms, theological scholars are positioned to make many 
valuable insights about the modern Western art of Hollywood film.‖ (Martin & 
Ostwalt, 1995, p.6). In that way he argues for a more interdisciplinary approach to 
the field that sees cinema as a cultural phenomenon alongside religion, myth and 
ideology, which inspires a debate that brings scholars from various disciplines 
together.  
 
Following these three aspects, the book divides the current debate in 
mythological, theological, and ideological approaches towards cinema. Martin and 
                                            
12 A collection of essays published by Joel W. Martin and Conrad E. Ostwalt Jr. 
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Ostwalt suggest that analysing both the convincing and problematic aspects of 
each approach might enable us to find a fourth way, which brings all these aspects 
together. However, they leave this task for other scholars to do. I hope that my 
research might contribute a valuable step in this direction. 
 
According to the definition given by Martin and Ostwalt, myth exposes both the 
ideas and ideals of a culture. After creating the myth, the original story, we develop 
rites to keep our attention focussed on the sacred, such as systems of purity to 
help us deal with negative aspects of life and superior beings to which humans can 
relate. Cinema has continued this practice and ―Hollywood has filled these basic 
forms with a tremendous variety of contents, projecting onto screens a rich 
diversity of myths, rituals, systems of purity, and gods for us to contemplate.‖ 
(Martin & Ostwalt, 1995, p.6). Based on that, we can say that mythological 
approaches to cinema define religion and religious activity in a very broad sense 
and mainly focus on universal archetypes and stories.  
 
Mythological approaches have been very popular in film analysis as well as 
filmmaking. In particular, the theorist of myth Joseph Campbell has had a 
significant impact on various filmmakers, such as George Lucas, who used his 
ideas as a basis for his Star Wars (1977-2005) films. I will come back to his 
theories in the fourth chapter when talking about mythic representations in The 
Lord of the Rings (dir. P. Jackson, 2001-2003). Martin & Ostwalt claim that when 
discussing cinema and religion in this very broad sense, ―religion can be defined in 
a nontheological manner as the quest of humanity for contact with the sacred.‖ 
(1995, p.9). Somewhat like Nietzsche‘s notion of myth, the book argues that 
mythic stories enable people to explain the powers that create and rule their world 
and they provide societies with foundational prototypes that function as eternal 
models for life.  
 
Nevertheless, Martin and Ostwalt also criticise this approach as often ignoring the 
historic and social influences on individual subjects and meanings and thus 
reducing religion and myth to its archetypal essence. Despite that criticism, 
however, it is emphasised that ―Popular movies are cultural standard-bearers; they 
carry with them the values, beliefs, dreams, desires, longings, and needs of a 
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society and, thus, can function mythologically.‖ (Martin & Ostwalt, 1995, p.68). 
We will see in the second part of this thesis how films can not only reflect 
tendencies and values of a society, but in turn also influence the audience‘s 
understanding of universal values. 
 
Unlike mythological approaches and their broad interpretation of religious 
activities, theological approaches in film studies mostly examine the influence of 
specific religious traditions on cinema. This reaches beyond simply spotting 
religious symbols in a given film. Theological criticism also draws on general 
religious themes, such as good and evil, hope and redemption, and the way these 
themes are implemented in films. Martin and Ostwalt (1995) even go so far as to 
claim that one could argue that the very nature of a narrative is religious as it 
―contains within itself a structure that confronts the reader with that which is 
transcendent and beyond mundane experience and grants meaning to human 
experience by exposing it to the sacred realm, the realm of realities beyond human 
control.‖ (p.16). Although I do not fully agree with this claim as it is dubious if 
that can really be applied to all types of narrative, it is nevertheless interesting to 
consider the claim that since religion requires stories and cinema is a form of 
storytelling the link between religion and cinema can be a potentially fruitful one.  
 
The statement also points to a significant development in the way we perceive 
religion. According to Martin and Ostwalt, cinema allows us to see and experience 
things that were previously inaccessible for people. They suggest that cinema may 
undermine traditional structures of formal religious practice, but at the same time 
it can also enhance other aspects of religion, such as providing general worldviews 
and ideas that structure our life as Nietzsche had suggested in relation to ancient 
myth. In consequence we could claim that even though ―theistic theology has 
been called into question, archetypal myth thrives as never before, appearing on 
screens everywhere, reaching millions in major motion pictures.‖ (Martin & 
Ostwalt, 1995, p.66). Here, the focus seems to shift from the ritual practices and 
theological interpretations towards the foundational myths and stories.  
 
These archetypal myths are by no means exclusively the domain of scholars 
choosing explicitly mythological approaches, but also an important domain of 
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theological studies. The argument is here that films can present universal ―truths‖ 
and stories, which are intended to present the values and beliefs of a specific 
religious tradition. These films do not need to present these narratives in an 
obvious way, such as the Bible epics of the 1950s. Films can also have a religious 
function when they interpret these religious themes in a modern, everyday context 
and in a less explicit manner. Martin and Ostwalt (1995) want to demonstrate 
―that religion, thanks in part to cinema, is reaching more people than ever. As 
viewers look towards the screen, they are ―seeing‖ religious themes, theologies, 
morals, myths, and archetypes represented in a visually compelling medium their 
ancestors never experienced.‖ (p.68) Their assumption is that religious symbols 
and values are a crucial part of popular culture and in this way continuously 
influence contemporary debates.  
 
Finally, ideological criticism of cinema discusses religion in relation to its effects 
on politics and society. This can be seen in Marxist film theory, which is largely 
based on the theories of Louis Althusser as well as in discourses in social studies 
that refer to criticism of mass culture, such as Theodor Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer among others.13 As far as ideological criticism in general is 
concerned, the study criticises that religion has actually moved out of focus for 
most critics in postmodern society. The main focus of film theory that takes this 
approach has moved towards consumerist, capitalist ideology and its manipulative 
nature. Hollywood‘s dominant system is here seen as the archetype of this 
ideology, and has often led to a dismissal of mainstream films from the outset, on 
the ground that they are simply created to make money. Yet according to Martin 
and Ostwalt this approachignored the potential positive impact those films may 
have on a number of people.  
 
In his concluding chapter, Ostwalt argues that since films seem to present a 
combination of archetypal myths and ideological implications, they might be a 
very effective tool to express specific values and beliefs, because cinema can affect 
the audience both consciously and unconsciously. He notes that it ―is not the case 
that religion is fading with the secularization of society; rather, religion is being 
                                            
13 See for example: Adorno, T., 1991. The Culture Industry. London: Routledge. 
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popularized, scattered, and secularized through extra-ecclesiastical institutions.‖ 
(Martin & Ostwalt, 1995, p.157). This argument suggests that cinema as a secular 
and popular tool might help in bringing back religion to everyday life, in a more 
diffused, but also more omnipresent way. Nietzsche had claimed in relation to 
founding myths that they must be omnipresent but unnoticed, to be truly able to 
benefit our life and cinema‘s power of creating these omnipresent illusions seems 
to be the medium to reconnect us with these founding myths.  
 
This idea is further developed inFilm as Religion by John C. Lyden (2003). In this 
work, he analyses the relationship between cinema and faith from the perspective 
of a theologian. Similarly to Martin and Ostwalt, he states that film theorists as 
well as theologians have long failed to notice just how much people draw their 
ideas and worldviews from sources that we would not commonly call ―religious‖. 
Moreover, religion has often been discussed in opposition to culture and art. 
Lyden, however, suggests a different approach. Although art and religion are not 
identical they are both equally part of culture. Despite that claim, Lyden is not 
satisfied with simply examining religious tendencies in films, but wants to put 
cinema itself alongside other religions and mythological systems. 
 
Moreover, his book aims to show in which ways cinema performs religious 
functions, but he does not want to substitute religion by cinema. In this context 
he looks at ways in which film can offer ―methods for dealing with suffering and 
injustice, and how it presents an alternate reality in which we participate during 
the viewing experience. The viewer may be well aware of the artificial nature of 
this filmic reality, and yet it still has the power to affect the way we think and act 
in the reality that exists outside the cinema.‖ (Lyden, 2003, p.4). This notion of a 
conscious awareness of an illusion has been present throughout this chapter and 
Lyden continues this line of thought by suggesting that just because we know that 
a story is fictional, this does not imply that it cannot inspire us in any way, quite 
the contrary. 
 
As a basis for his theory, Lyden provides an extensive overview of research 
related to the question of cinema and religion. For example, he draws interesting 
parallels between the concept of a belief-ful realism which tries to find the ultimate in 
 48 
the concrete developed by religious scholar Paul Tillich and the cinematic concept of 
realism in the works of Andre Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer. What these film 
theorists have in common with Tillich‘s notion of realism is that ―they viewed the 
task of film to be the disclosure of ‗reality‘ rather than the creation of an alternate 
world of fantasy to which the viewer retreats to escape the real.‖ (Lyden, 2003, p. 
24). This is true in parts, but neither Kracauer nor Bazin fully deny cinema its 
capacity to create alternative worlds. How this creative aspect relates to the 
perception of realism in these writers will be discussed in the following chapter.  
 
Again like Martin and Ostwalt, Lyden also looks at Joseph Campbell as well as 
Clifford Geertz‘s theories on myths. Lyden aims to encourage a view of myth and 
cinema that does not simply regard mythology as an irrational idea promoted by 
the dominant authority to maintain its power, but as narratives that present the 
ideas and values of a community. He argues for a more qualified discourse of the 
relevance of Hollywood cinema and supports the Nietzschean notion that myths 
are the basis and background of our culture.  
 
Lyden criticises scholars such as Geertz that define religion in opposition to art as 
a practice that simply creates alternative worlds of fantasy, whereas religion on the 
other hand tries to explain our world as it is. In contrast to Geertz, Lyden (2003) 
argues that religion ―does not simply describe the world, and art does not simply 
provide imaginary illusions – both are involved in the complex relationship 
between the ideal and the real, in that both offer a worldview as well as an ethos.‖ 
(p.48). Although he recognises that the spiritual world provided by religion may 
create a stronger sense of ―reality‖ than the fictional world of films, he suggests 
that in both cases the audience enters a ritual space to experience an alternate 
reality. In addition, Lyden believes that neither cinema nor religion simply present 
an alternative reality, but also draw a connection to our everyday reality. He notes 
that we ―desire alternate worlds because we find our own imperfect; but such 
desires to flee also entail a desire to return, renewed and refreshed, to the 
everyday.‖(Lyden, 2003, p.53). Thus he claims that even though cinema is not 
structured in the same way as ―official religions‖, it may function like religion and 
can so be regarded as a religion. The connection Lyden draws here is that cinema 
like religion offers a link between our world and another world by ―offering both 
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models for and models of reality. These two aspects – worldview or mythology, 
and ethos – together express a vision of what the world really is, and what it 
should be.‖ (Lyden, 2003, p.54). 
 
Lyden suggests that the primary purpose of religion is to help us deal with the 
chaos of life and provides meaning and measures to structure and explain our 
reality. That again recalls Nietzsche‘s theories on the importance of mythology in 
providing illusions that give life meaning and hope despite suffering and injustice. 
Lyden (2003) claims that religion recognises ―the inescapability of ignorance, pain, 
and injustice on the human plane while simultaneously denying that these 
irrationalities are characteristic of the world as a whole.‖ (p.42). While this 
resembles Nietzsche‘s characterisation of the tragic myth insofar as it relates to 
the idea of simultaneously acknowledging and overcoming of the tragic elements 
of life, it differs by implying that these tragic elements are not a necessary and 
universal part of life.  
 
Based on this depiction of religion, Lyden argues that films give us a set of 
symbols and values that may fulfil the same function. In that sense cinema 
simultaneously provides models for and models of reality. Especially in relation to 
Hollywood cinema, Lyden argues that films generally present a world in which 
good defeats evil, which does not necessary mean that we always get a perfect 
happy ending, but that it leaves us with the general feeling that justice and order 
do exist. In other words, the ―world presented by films tends to be neater, more 
orderly, and has satisfactory endings (usually) in which vice is punished and virtue 
rewarded, families are reunited, and lovers mate for life.‖ (Lyden, 2003, p.45). 
Nevertheless, Lyden acknowledges that the variety of topics and genres of 
popular film suggest that there exist not just one specific set of religious ideas and 
structures, which is then employed by cinema, but a broad spectrum of ideas, 
values and rituals.  
 
Discussing several genres and films, Lyden comes to the conclusion that a strong 
degree of realism is not always necessary for an audience in order to connect with 
the illusion on screen. The ―alternative reality‖ can well be an exaggerated and 
idealised version of our world. In his analysis of Spielberg‘s work, especially his 
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children‘s films, Lyden argues that we must get away from an elitist thinking that 
assumes films only have quality if they leave the audience confused and 
unsatisfied. He states that we all like “images of hope and ideality, even though we 
know they are fantasies, because they inspire us with the idea that things could be 
better.‖ (Lyden, 2003, p.201).  
 
This can also be seen in the Star Wars films, which promoted values such as 
resisting fear and hate, cherishing friendship, faith and loyalty, as well as aspects of 
redemption through love and forgiveness. Even though these portrayals may 
seem like prosaic versions of ‗true‘ religious values, they can provide a value 
system that affects many viewers far beyond the cinematic experience. Lyden also 
notes that these films have often been talked about as simply promoting 
consumerism but he suggests an original reading in which the films may in 
contrast imply a critique of selfish materialism, for example inthe Star Warsseries, 
where the values of friendship and self-sacrifice overcome the imperialistic 
ambitions driven by power and commercial interests. He further argues that 
although ―cultural criticism may point out to the immense profits derived from 
associated toy sales as the real motivating values for the filmmakers, this does not 
reduce the film‘s message to materialism any more than the greed of a hypocritical 
televangelist can reduce his Christian message to materialism.‖ (Lyden, 2003, 
p.225). This emphasises the general value of Lyden‘s book: it challenges the 
assumption that all commercially successful mainstream films are simply outputs 
of Hollywood‘s machinery, whose primary concern is to make money and 
therefore not worth a serious study about the possibilities of creating profound 
meanings. Thus, Lyden inspires a fresh discourse on the relevance of mainstream 
cinema and the illusions it creates for our life.  
 
Finally, Richard Allen‘s book Projecting Illusion: Film Spectatorship and the impression of 
reality discusses the various aspects of illusion, from optical tricks to ideological 
criticism. Here I will focus on the latter aspect. The most relevant claim in relation 
to this project is Allen‘s demonstration of the conscious participation of the 
spectator in the process of creating the cinematic illusion.  
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In general, Allen argues that the discourse on illusion and reality in film theory is 
not just logically incoherent, but also based on false assumptions. His twofold 
criticism follows Nietzsche‘s model of illusion, although Allen does not draw this 
connection. On the one hand he challenges the hypothesis that the audience is a 
passive object on which ideology is imposed and on the other hand he questions 
if we are able to perceive an objective reality that is not influenced by those 
ideologies. Allen then argues - somewhat like Nietzsche –that first, all our 
knowledge of the world is based on certain illusions about reality and second, 
people are no naïve victims of those illusions, but actively participate in producing 
them.  
 
Allen challenges various discourses in film theory, such as auteur theory and 
ideological criticism, and argues that they are often based on false premises. In 
relation to ideological criticism, he states that film theory often failed to 
acknowledge that even though all cultural and social exchange is based on values 
and norms, this does not necessarily mean that people lose their freedom to 
decide or that their entire life is dominated by those ideologies. In addition, Allen 
criticises the assumption that ideological beliefs are ipso facto false beliefs. Allen 
argues that although this might be true, it is not necessarily true and therefore this 
assumption is not a valid basis for criticising ideology in general.  
 
He further evaluates the concept that the audience does identify itself with the 
camera and becomes the eye of the camera, which leads to the strong connection 
between the spectator and the objects of the film. Allen argues that this 
identification is not necessary for the experience of the cinematic illusion and an 
emotional response to it. Therefore, none of those theories provides a sufficient 
explanation for how individual viewers react on a film.  
 
Finally, Allen examines psychoanalytical models that compare the cinematic 
illusion to dream. Allen suggests that since we are awake while watching a film, 
these illusions function rather like daydreams or fantasy. Their impact on us may 
be less intense than dreams and requires a greater amount of active participation 
from the ego. He emphasises that our emotional engagement with a film is 
independent of the degree in which we believe the illusion or identify with the 
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events on screen. For Allen this misconception is the most significant letdown of 
psychoanalytic film theory. Nevertheless, he does not want to dismiss 
psychoanalytic concepts in film theory in general, but he insists that there has to 
be the acknowledgement of a conscious and active element when discussing the 
experience of cinematic illusion.  
 
Subsequently, Allen develops his own theories to interpret the role of illusions in 
cinema. For him, the audience deliberately enters the filmic experience, which in 
turn provides him with what Allen calls ‗Projective Illusion‘. He characterises this 
form of illusion as follows: ―while we know that what we are seeing is only a film, 
we nevertheless experience that film as a fully realized world.‖ (Allen, 1995, p.4). 
Allen further describes projective illusions as a form of sensory illusion as it 
entails a variety of parameters that are not limited to the visual, but also include 
sound-track, movement and our awareness of off-screen space. If all those 
elements are perfectly balanced, we will create an optimal illusion. He points out, 
however, that this ―experience of projective illusion remains a voluntary activity in 
a crucial sense, for it still involves looking, and looking – in contrast to merely 
seeing – is something that we actively do‖ (Allen, 1995, p.106). Here, Allen 
emphasises the active participation of the audience in the creation of the illusion, 
which I suggest closely resembles the way in which Nietzsche describes the role of 
the audience in relation to Ancient tragedy as well as in the creation of myths in 
general.  
 
It may thus not surprise us that narration plays a crucial role for Allen in the 
creation of cinematic illusions. He argues that the strict subordination of space 
and time to the causality of the story in Hollywood narration is a perfect example 
for a perfect illusion. The use of genre conventions further maximises the 
projective illusion, as these conventions present a framework of themes, images 
and conventions that are easily understandable. The audience can thus directly and 
instantly engage with the film instead of having first to decode the message and 
the environment. The main advantage of Hollywood cinema is thus the ―relatively 
impersonal systematic, formulaic character of Hollywood narration, whose 
rationale is to maximize the spectator‘s experience of illusion.‖(Allen, 1995, p.38). 
Nevertheless, Allen acknowledges that even though the notion of illusion is 
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strongly related to Hollywood cinema, it also accounts for films that define 
themselves as artistic or experimental. The influence of the narration on the 
illusion is that it usually helps to sustain the illusion over time, such as in 
mainstream cinema, but other factors such as sound and images can still create a 
projective illusion of their own.  
 
Crucially, however, Allen emphasises that although cinema presents us with 
strong illusions which can affect us emotionally and ideologically, he also 
concludes that when ―we experience projective illusion in the cinema, we may 
believe that the experience is real, or suspend our disbelief, but we do not believe 
that the illusion is real.‖ (Allen, 1995, p.139). Thus he makes clear that we are 
always consciously aware of the fiction and never mistake it for reality. The realism 
of a film does not automatically relate to our perception of reality and we do not 
need to believe that something is real to find it realistic. Nevertheless, realism is an 
important notion in relation to belief, which I will explore in more detail in the 
following chapter. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter I initially discussed the role of artistic practice in our life and the 
way in which universal myths and stories influence our culture. As Nietzsche has 
shown, these stories, which are presented in art and mythology, are not simply 
manipulative or pure entertainment; they are an essential part of our life.  
 
Following Nietzsche‘s idea that we are active participants in the creation of 
illusions, the contemporary theories analysed in the second part of the chapter 
also challenge the notion of a naïve and passive audience, as well as the 
assumption that mainstream cinema merely manipulates us with false beliefs.As 
the works by Martin and Ostwalt, Lyden and Allen have shown, when talking 
about modern culture it is important to take mainstream Hollywood cinema 
seriously and consider the impact it has on our culture and our belief systems. 
Each of these works has emphasised different aspects of the current debate on 
belief, cinema and illusions. Based on these theories I argue that the approach I 
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develop throughout this thesis unites the mythological perspective that reads 
myths as universal stories and archetypes, with the theological approach, which 
looks at the ways in which films discuss religious themes, as well as the ideological 
approach that links cinema with social and political developments in our society. 
All these different aspects will be relevant for the films discussed in the second 
part, for example the Christian themes and Nordic myths that underline The Lord 
of the Rings, Greek mythology and the belief in fate, which is so crucial for the 
narrative of Troy and the fusion of naturalistic myths with contemporary social 
and political ideologies, which we find in Avatar. As this chapter has shown, 
notions of belief are significant when discussing the influence of cinematic 
illusions on our life. In the next chapter I will analyse the role of realism in the 
creation of believable illusions. 
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Chapter Two:  
The realm of the real – Concepts of reality, perception and cinematic 
Realism 
 
After having discussed cinema and its relationship with belief in the previous 
chapter, I will now continue to explore the connection between reality and 
cinematic realism. This subject is related to the previous one insofar as theorists 
such as Richard Allen and Gilles Deleuze have pointed out that a certain degree of 
realism, particularly in Hollywood cinema, is crucial in supporting the narrative 
and thus the believability of the illusion.  
 
Moreover, the debate on illusions is also linked to the debate about our 
perception of reality as we have seen in Nietzsche‘s above mentioned writings. 
With regard to cinema, it is important to note the difference between realism and 
reality. I will discuss throughout this chapter, in which way we can argue that 
cinema either reflects our everyday reality or presents us with a fictional world 
that can nevertheless be realistic. It can be argued that the question of realistic 
representation has occupied filmmakers as well as theorists since the very 
beginnings of the medium. From the outset, cinema developed in two directions, 
Lumière‘s attempt to use cinema as a great tool to document real life events, and 
Méliès on the other hand, who saw cinema as a chance to create new and exciting 
artistic illusions. As we shall see, contemporary cinema aims to combine both 
aspects. 
 
The term ‗realism‘ itself poses problems, as Richard Armstrong (2005) points out 
in his book Understanding Realism. He argues that the term implies a connection 
with reality, when in fact it is simply a mode of artistic representation, similar to 
impressionism or expressionism. Thus, although the visual component of realistic 
cinema bears a closer resemblance with the images we are familiar with from our 
reality; neither the story nor the context of the images has to be necessarily related 
to our reality. This crucial point will be further discussed throughout this chapter. 
Based on this assumption, we must keep in mind that the so called realistic 
cinema is as artistic or artificial as other forms of cinematic representation.  
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In film theory, many theorists have talked about the problem of cinematic realism, 
most notably André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer, both of whom will be analysed 
in this paper. Yet, whereas most of Bazin‘s theories are widely known and 
discussed among film scholars, I think that Kracauer‘s writings have not received 
the attention they deserve. In this chapter, I will therefore focus on Kracauer and 
aim to review his theories on cinematic realism with regard to their relevance for 
our exploration of the importance of illusion. Kracauer‘s writings are particularly 
interesting with regard to the latter aspect as he not only examined the connection 
between cinematic images and reality, but also discussed cinema in a wider context 
of ideologies and as a reflection of general tendencies in society. Besides 
examining Kracauer‘s final work Theory of Film (1961), I will also use several texts 
by contemporary film scholars, such as Miriam Hansen and Heide Schlüpmann 
and Jeremy Gaines, which have also tried to bring Kracauer‘s works back into 
focus.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the connection Kracauer draws between 
cinema and illusion is not unproblematic and I will take certain liberties in 
applying his theories to my idea of a revival of cinematic myths. It is particularly 
the notion of myth that is for Kracauer linked to a negative – and manipulative 
ideology – which according to his earlier writings supported the rise of Fascist 
ideology.14Yet, as I hope to show throughout this chapter, there are aspects of his 
theories that lend themselves to a new discussion of illusions in a positive sense as 
a utopian idea that can inspire hope in the individual rather than deceive the 
masses. What interests me most is the very idea prevalentin Kracauer‘s writing 
that cinema – in particular mainstream cinema – reflects moods and tendencies in 
society.Thus, I will try to analyse in the first part of this chapter, what it is that 
makes cinema so unique and how – despite Kracauer‘s critique of myth as 
ideology – there may be a scope for defending a revival of Hollywood cinema that 
takes a more critical approach e.g. by integrating more aspects of realism and 
individualism into its portrayal of historic plots as I will show in chapter five. 
                                            
14 References can be found – implicit and explicit – throughout his earlier work From 
Caligary to Hitler (1941), most notably in his analyses of historic plots such as the 
portrayals of King Frederic the Great; as well as his discussions of Fritz Lang‘s Nibelungen 
(1924) and Metropolis (1927). I will briefly return to the latter film later in this chapter.  
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In the second part of this chapter I shall briefly look at Bazin‘s theories of realism 
as they will also be relevant for chapter three. Here, I will pay particular attention 
to Bazin‘s notions, which softenthe common conception of his theories as being 
purely focussed on realism. Following this analysis, the final paragraph will 
examine a more recent work on cinematographic realism by Dirk Baecker. In this 
essay, the author looks at cinema as a form of communication and discusses how 
cinematic realism influences the way we communicate. Moreover, Baecker also 
links Kracauer‘s theories to those of Gilles Deleuze, which will be discussed in 
chapter three. 
 
 
2.1 Seeing is Believing – Kracauer and the redemption of physical reality 
 
Siegfried Kracauer‘s general theories are hard to summarise since he produced an 
extraordinarily varied oeuvre. Born on the 8th of February 1889 in Frankfurt, 
Germany, he published his first article in the arts section of Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung at the age of 18. In the same year he started his studies in architecture, 
concluding with a PhD on smithery and worked subsequently in various fields, 
such as journalism, architecture, social studies as well as in film theory. This short 
biographical note shows that Kracauer can be considered more as a generalist 
than a specialist when it comes to film studies. This is reflected in his writings, as 
his methods are sometimes inconsistent and he looks at a variety of aspects and 
speculations about society when discussing film. This point has often been the 
main criticism brought up in relation to Kracauer‘s theories, e.g. from his former 
Frankfurt colleague Theodor Adorno, but I would like to show the value of his 
thoughts despite his sometimes sloppy methodology.  
 
Kracauer also worked as a film critic in the 1920s, which is relevant insofar as 
many of his later analyses of specific films are largely based on the knowledge he 
gathered at this time. After his emigration to the USA in 1941, Kracauer 
published his first study on film, From Caligari to Hitler, a work which describes the 
psychological situation in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s as they are reflected in 
German cinema. According to Kracauer, the German cinema of this period 
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foreshadows the rise of the Nazi regime. The problem with this work is that many 
films Kracauer analyses in this work were not actually available to him at that 
time, so that he solely relied on old notes and reviews he wrote earlier as a critic. 
This distance makes his film analyses vague and speculative at times, a problem 
that continues in Theory of Film. Yet despite having its limits with regard to an in-
depth analysis of the individual films, Kracauer‘s work here already shows an 
extraordinary sensitivity toward the ways in which films reflect their social context 
– consciously and more so unconsciously.  As Thomas Y. Levin (2005) pointed 
out in his introduction to The Mass Ornament, a collection of essays written by 
Kracauer during the 1920s and 1930s, rather than focussing on the aesthetic 
values of cinema (and photography), ―Kracauer focused instead on their 
diagnostic value as social facts, reading photography and film (prior to any specific 
content) as material expressions of a particular historical condition‖ (p.20).  
 
Scholars have struggled with Theory of Film and it has often been dismissed as 
focussing on a naive concept of realism. Miriam Hansen (1993), describes Theory of 
Film as ―an irritating book-with its pretence of academic systematicity, its liberal-
humanist sentiment and bland universalism, and its grandfatherly and 
assimilationist diction, to say nothing of the disagreements one might have with 
its approach to film‖ (p.438). Her main point of criticism is that his writing is 
inconsistent and contradictory in part, yet Hansen argues that the main reason for 
this is not Kracauer‘s lack of qualification but the historic background against 
which the book was developed. Therefore, she strongly defends the value of 
Kracauer‘s writings despite her introductory critique and I will introduce her 
thoughts more in detail later in this chapter. 
 
Similarly, Schlüpmann and Gaines argue that Kracauer‘s writings received such a 
negative overall reception within film theory, that valuable points in his analysis 
remain largely ignored. They state that before ―it even had a chance to have a full 
impact, the […] Theory of Film became the object of a systematic misunderstanding 
that studiously ignored the criticism the book itself levelled against ‗naive 
realism.‘‖ (Schlüpmann & Gaines, 1991, p.111). This aspect of Kracauer‘s notion 
of realism will be crucial throughout this chapter and also play a significant role in 
chapter five. In their essay Schlüpmann and Gaines, like Hansen, emphasise the 
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historical context of Kracauer‘s writings. I will return to this point later in the 
chapter.  
 
The title of Kracauer‘s major work Theory of Film: the redemption of physical 
realityalready implies the role Kracauer assigns to cinema. By using achallenging 
term such as ‗redemption‘ it is clear that Kracauer chooses an unusual perspective 
to analyse cinema. Unlike other classic film theorists, Kracauer evaluates cinema 
philosophically, as a medium suitable to explain the relationship between man and 
the universe. This approach is no doubt influenced by his background in social 
studies and continental philosophy. In Kracauer‘s (1961) words: the ―cinema itself 
is set in the perspective of something more general – an approach to the world, a 
mode of human existence.‖ (p.xi). Based on this initial statement, we can already 
see that Kracauer does not treat cinema simply as a form of artistic expression or 
―mere‖ entertainment, but as a medium to express philosophical and ethical ideas 
about the world. In this way, his concepts can be easily linked to the theories 
developed in the first chapter, which aimed to present cinema as a system that 
reflects the ideas and anxieties of a society, similar to religion and mythology.  
 
Crucially, Kracauer does not only focus on ―artistic cinema‖ but appreciates the 
value of mass art and its role in society. This is in stark contrast to many of his 
former Frankfurt colleagues, such as Adorno, Horkheimer and Benjamin. 
Althoughhe shares many of their criticism of modern society and its ideology, his 
overall outlook is more optimistic. Levin argues that  
 
―Adorno and Horkheimer, confronted with the threat of Fascism, see only 
the bleak prospects of historical regression. Kracauer, while in no way naively 
utopian, still holds open the possibility that the enlightenment could 
overcome its own paralysis and rescue itself from the petrification of Ratio. 
Unlike some of his Frankfurt colleagues who insisted that autonomousart 
offered the sole remaining preserve forthe enlightenment project, Kracauer 
held almost exactly the opposite position, insisting that ‗the path leads 
directly through the center of the mass ornament, not away front it‖. (2005, 
p.19) 
 
This shows the attempt in Kracauer‘s earlier writings to take mass culture serious 
and to find a solution to society‘s problems within its possibilities not outside it. 
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This thought continues in Theory of Film and may help us in understanding the 
importance of cinema in ―redeeming the world‖. Nevertheless, Kracauer‘s 
approach to analysis shifts significantly between his earlier and later works. Levin 
(2005) describes the development from Kracauer‘s earlier writings to the film 
theories of From Caligary to Hitler as a shift from an initially ―theologico-messianic 
and philosophical reading of mass media‖ to ―an analysis centered on their 
ideological function‖, which was motivated by the ―increasingly problematic 
political function‖ of the latter. (p.23) One could argue that in Theory of Film, he in 
many ways returns to this earlier approach, focusing not so much on the aspects 
of propaganda and manipulation, but rather tries to discuss cinema in more 
general, philosophical terms.  
 
Despite the preliminary connections Kracauer draws between cinema and 
photography, he acknowledges that cinema has a unique ability to recreate reality. 
For Kracauer, the extraordinary position of film lies in its power to record the 
physical world around us, which as a consequence makes it possible to reveal this 
world to us. This, however, does not only relate to worlds that we would not 
always be able to access, like foreign places or different milieus, but also includes 
our own everyday life. According to Kracauer our own daily reality consists of 
endless phenomena which we would hardly be able to perceive, because they are 
either too small or too irrelevant for us to notice. Yet, captured on film they 
suddenly become apparent to us. Kracauer argues that as a medium, the constant 
movement of the images and their ephemeral nature best reflects the 
characteristics of material life itself. This emphasis on everyday life is also 
important in relation to a notion of crisis in Kracauer‘s work. For him, the 
problems we face are mostly unconscious and rather linked to continuous 
developments in our society than major global events. He writes that we ―must rid 
ourselves of the delusion that it is the major events which have the most decisive 
influence on us. We are much more deeply and continuously influenced by the 
tiny catastrophes that make up daily life.‖‘ (Kracauer, 1998, p.62)This is in 
contrast for example to Deleuze‘s theory discussed in chapter three, when a 
spiritual and ideological crisis is clearly linked to the events of the Second World 
War, as we will see in the next chapter. 
 
 61 
In relation to my hypothesis, the most interesting part of Kracauer's book is 
probably its epilogue, Film in Our Time. In this final chapter Kracauer summarises 
his ideas and develops his argumentation further towards the more general 
concepts of art and life. Here, he also departs from his initial discussion of realism 
based on photographic referentiality and proceeds to a more universal concept of 
film as a way of understanding our world. More precisely, Kracauer describes the 
people of the twentieth century captured in a universe that has lost its ideological 
coherence. Kracauer here uses the term ideology in a very broad sense, including 
any form of belief system or universal idea, in contrast to his earlier works, in 
which he uses ideology in its explicit socio-political sense. 
 
Not unlike Nietzsche Kracauer blames the encroachment of modern science for 
this loss of meaning. As we have seen in the previous chapter, rationality and 
science are blamed for destroying spiritual art as well as illusion and in doing so, 
destroying our connection with nature. Kracauer similarly moans the loss of 
unifying concepts, his ideal society being medieval rather than the Greeks 
Nietzsche refers to. Levin (2005) writes that ―Kracauer‘s highly romanticized 
vision of a utopian Middle Ages, which he describes as a ‗unified culture‘ that was 
‗saturated with meaning.‘ forms a striking contrast to his reading of modernity, 
which he considers above all in terms of its spiritual lack, indicting it for its 
estrangement from the absolute and its want of a master narrative.‖ (p.13) This 
search for master narratives will be a key argument of this thesis, although I will 
depart from Kracauer‘s criticism and in many ways in order to explore a more 
positive route this might take.  
 
In the final chapter of Theory of Film, Kracauer places himself within a 
philosophical tradition of continental philosophy which looks at life itself as a 
powerful entity, an idea that according to Kracauer derives from the Romantic 
Movement and is then revived by thinkers such as Nietzsche and Bergson. In this 
passage, he directly links his theories with those of Nietzsche, and talks about the 
flow of life portrayed in cinema, not just in the story but also due to the medium 
itself. Another aspect that unites the two thinkers to a certain degree is Kracauer‘s 
notion of the surface reality and the superficiality of the medium, which I will 
discuss further down. 
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Kracauer describes the state of modern people as being cut off from both the 
spiritual and the physical world. In short, the reasons for the first are the general 
loss of ideologies and universal concepts, the second aspect is based on what he 
calls abstractness. This dual loss means that we are ever more desperate in 
looking for something to make sense of our existence. In addition, cinema seems 
to be the way out of both dilemmas, at least temporarily. More precisely, 
Kracauer (1961) states, there is no doubt that ―many among us suffer, 
consciously or not, from being exposed, helplessly, to these influences. So we 
look for compensations. And film, it appears, is apt to afford temporary relief 
[…] There the frustrated may turn into kings of creation.‖ (p.171). This 
statement could be interpreted as a pure escapism function of cinema, but I want 
to show that for Kracauer the connection is more profound. Therefore, I will 
next look more closely at both aspects – the loss of binding norms and 
abstractness – and their connection with cinema. 
 
As said, Kracauer notes two different causes for the lack of meaning in modern 
life. The first reason is that modern society is at risk of losing, or has already lost, 
its cultural traditions, which established a set of norms and values according to 
which people lived. Kracauer argues that our beliefs, ideas and values no longer 
have the same authority they had in the past. The relations between our ―inner 
universe‖ and the physical reality are no longer as self-evident, real and powerful 
as they used to be in earlier times. He claims that ideology is no longer integrating 
and religion and myths lost not only their relevance for our belief system but also 
their authority to structure our everyday reality. 
 
The second point Kracauer makes is that we live in an ―age of analysis‖,which 
means that we tend to prefer abstract thinking instead of concrete physical and 
mental experience. He describes this state as abstractness. Abstractness in 
Kracauer‘s sense is opposed to concreteness and refers to the inability of modern 
people to perceive things in their wider context. For him, our life is split in 
fragments, we are alienated from nature, and we consume effects without any 
awareness of their causes.  
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This concept can also be linked to Nietzsche‘s notions of knowledge versus 
wisdom.  The difference is that abstract thinking does not allow for the same kind 
of ―deeper knowledge‖ of the world that other concepts based on belief can 
provide. Here, Kracauer (1961) notes that we have not just lost our ancient beliefs 
but have ―at best a shadowy awareness of things in their fullness‖(p.291). That 
means that we no longer perceive the world as a whole but only in fragments and 
pieces. The idea of the perception of a whole is also crucial for Deleuze‘s 
understanding of mainstream cinema and I will return to this point in the next 
chapter. Whereas Kracauer criticises the false concreteness of myth in his earlier 
writings15, he is much less explicit about this in Theory of Film and his concept and 
criticism of myth is much vaguer.  
 
Rather than just blaming the rise of rationalism and science in general, as 
Nietzsche had done, Kracauer points out two specific causes for our state of 
abstractness. One is the emergence of psychology and the other is relativistic 
reduction. According to Kracauer, psychology takes life into its pieces by 
describing it as a system of various attitudes combined with behaviour patterns. 
He claims that ―the specific content of the values surrounding us is psychologized 
away and the realm to which they belong sinks into limbo‖ (Kracauer, 1961, 
p.293). In other words, psychoanalysis for Kracauer splits human beings in their 
fragment, analyses every layer on its own and loses the perspective of the whole. 
It can be objected that this is a rather reductionist view of psychology as well, 
excluding more contemporary holistic approaches to psychology. Nevertheless, 
we can draw from this statement a certain tendency to focus on specific aspects of 
a problem rather than looking at the complex social environment, which is a point 
that deserves further discussion.  
 
The second reason – relativistic reduction – is for Kracauer the result of our 
increased social mobility and a permanent input of information, which has been 
                                            
15 See Levin‘s introduction to The Mass Ornament and Kracauer‘s essays in the book itself 
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made possible by the mass media.16 As a consequence, people realise that every 
aspect of their life can always be seen from a different angle. The problem with 
this approach is that by doing so, we tend to question everything we perceive and 
find it increasingly hard to believe in any stability in our life. According to Kracauer 
(1961), the result of this relativism is that people‘s ―confidence in absolutes is 
wavering. At the same time the broadening of their horizon challenges them to try 
to compare the different views and perspectives pressed home to them.‖ (p.293-
294).  
 
Of course it can be argued that the fact that people are now more likely to 
question things and view their theories from different angles does not need to 
have a negative outcome per se. However, the positive aspects of challenging one‘s 
own perspectives and the possibility of making informed choices instead of simply 
assimilating inherited views – aspects that Kracauer would find encouraging for 
most parts, bear the problem that the sheer mass of possible choices disables us 
finally to make any choice at all.  
 
What is more problematic is that in addition to simply being overwhelmed by the 
number of options, there is also the risk of missing the point when we eventually 
find a spiritual, religious or ideological concept we can relate to. Kracauer (1961) 
notes that we may not actually capture ―the very essences of the diverse value 
systems to which we are exposed […] The wider the range of values and entities 
we are able to pass in review, the greater the chances that their unique features 
will withdraw from the scene.‖ (p.294). That means in practice that when we 
finally engage with an ideology or spiritual concept we tend to understand this 
system only in a rather superficial way. This in turn means that the comfort and 
support it can provide us with is also only superficial and can thus vanish in an 
instant.  
 
                                            
16 Kracauer‘s notion here virtually demands to be reviewed in the light of globalisation 
and the World Wide Web, because the situation of constant information overload by 
mass media, the internet and global mobility has without doubt dramatically increased 
since the fifties, when Kracauer was writing. 
 
 65 
From the two preliminary characteristics of modern society – loss of unifying 
concepts and abstractness – Kracauer deduces a third symptom of the current 
situation of our society. He states that our circumstances are not just defined by a 
loss of binding norms and increasing abstractness, but also by the fact that it 
subsequently becomes increasingly difficult for us to explain and understand the 
mechanisms and processes that constitute both our modern world and our own 
life. Kracauer (1961) suggests that our ―world has grown so complex, politically 
and otherwise, that it can no longer be simplified. Any effect seems separated 
from its manifold possible causes; any attempt at a synthesis, a unifying image, 
falls short. Hence a widespread feeling of impotence in the face of influences 
becomes uncontrollable for eluding definition.‖(p.171). What Kracauer describes 
here is that people feel lost in the world, because they are lacking not just unifying 
belief systems but also concepts which allow them to outline their situation and 
their world within a wider context that offers some orientation.  
 
In this context it is important to note that Kracauer makes clear that we cannot 
simply replace a belief system with something else, something more ―rational‖, 
e.g. humanist ethics. He argues that if the influence of religion becomes weaker, 
that of ethical concepts or even customs becomes weaker, too. In other words, 
the fading influence of religion and mythology also jeopardises the power of other 
normative systems, which were thought to be a ―replacement‖ for the first. 
Kracauer here argues that because non-religious normative systems follow similar 
structures as religious beliefs in the way they provide structuring ideas and 
unifying concepts, the weakening of religious value systems also means that 
people may lose their faith in the possibility of universal concepts in general.  
 
This general loss of all forms of (ideological or spiritual) orientation leads 
Kracauer to the assertion that our society has lost its ideological cover. More 
significantly, we seem to be aware of it, at least subconsciously. Kracauer writes 
that it ―is indeed, as if the atmosphere were impregnated with a feeling of 
uneasiness about the absence of unifying incentives that would set meaningful 
goals and thus contour the horizon.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.290). This is for him the 
reason why so many people are desperately looking for alternatives. Yet this 
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desperate search eventually causes the next problem, because there are so many 
different ones, which brings us back to our problem of relativism.  
 
The interesting part about Kracauer‘s analysis is his claim that the more people 
lose their belief, their will to believe seems to grow stronger. This drives them 
towards experimenting with all kinds of alternative ideological systems. Kracauer 
(1961) also notes that many of the modern ideologies or spiritual movements ―are 
regressive in the sense that they revert to fashions of thought and argument 
preceding the scientific revolution‖ (p.291), such as archaic myths and pre-
capitalist ideas of community. This seems to show a longing for something that 
has long been lost. Whereas this criticism of society‘s need for illusion is strongly 
criticised in earlier works, e.g. in From Caligary to Hitler and The Salaried Masses, one 
now has the impression that Kracauer seems to accept this more as a general 
condition of human nature and reflects upon the possibilities of reinstating some 
sort of belief, if not in grand unifying concepts than at least in the world around 
us.  
 
As mentioned before, most ―substitute ideologies‖ do not offer the same 
normative power as the former belief systems. The problem is that the two factors 
– lack of binding norms and abstractness – are interwoven. So as long as we focus 
on abstract thinking we will never be able to recreate and truly re-establish belief 
in our life. Thus Kracauer concludes that the actual problem is not so much our 
relationship with unifying concepts but the conditions under which we can access 
those concepts or beliefs. Kracauer (1961) notes that we ―would on principle have 
free access to them were it not for the abstractness of our approach to things in 
and about us. It is this characteristic of modern man‘s mentality which frustrates 
his attempts to escape from spiritual nakedness.‖ (p.296).This is the point where 
Kracauer links his general philosophical ideas on our society to his notions of 
cinema as a medium to redeem physical reality as the subtitle of his final book 
suggests. Kracauer‘s material concept of redemption as outlined here is very 
different from the spiritual-individual concept of redemption Nietzsche talks 
about, yet the ultimate consequences are similar. Both aim at liberating us from 
―the spiritual nakedness‖ and providing concepts to understand the world around 
us.  
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The important aspect of abstractness is that abstractness is not only destructive 
towards our belief systems but also influences our perception of reality. Kracauer 
(1961) argues that ―our way of thinking and our whole attitude toward reality are 
conditioned by the principles from which science proceeds. Conspicuous among 
these principles is that of abstraction‖; and further down he adds that while 
―scientific operations become more and more esoteric, the abstractness inherent 
in them cannot but influence our habits of thought.‖ (p.292). Our whole thinking 
is so influenced by science that we similarly perceive everyday reality just as 
processes and not as life as such, as a whole, organic entity, which I briefly 
mentioned above. In other words, we care much more about the methods than 
about the causes and meanings, as we have no longer a perspective on the whole. 
 
In relation to cinema this aspect is the most relevant insofar as it gives us an 
opportunity to explain how cinema might be able to reinstate ―belief‖. More than 
simply providing us with an ―alternative‖ ideology, myth or story, in which we can 
believe, cinema changes the conditions under which we access these unifying 
concepts. In other words, Kracauer assigns cinema the power to reunite us with 
the world we are living in. Similar to Nietzsche‘s notion of the superficial illusion 
created by art, Kracauer sees the way out of the dilemma of modern existence not 
in digging even deeper into the fragments and layers of our life, but in returning to 
a unifying illusion that allows us to engage with our life as a whole. He suggests 
that maybe the way to rediscover the shadowy contents of inner life ―leads 
through the experience of surface reality? Perhaps film is a gate rather than a dead 
end or a mere diversion?‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.287).  
 
As we have seen before, this is a similar idea to Nietzsche‘s, especially when he 
speaks about Ancient Greek society and the role of art, in particular the Greek 
tragedy, in creating this ―surface reality‖. Kracauer assumes that although true 
belief may be irreversibly gone, we can still establish an immediate contact with 
the surface of things rather than relying solely on abstract statements made by 
science. The question Kracauer poses is how can we gain access to this reality if 
we are not normally able to perceive them? According to him, film has enabled us 
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to regain this access because it has the ability to ―not only isolate physical data but 
reach their climax in representing it‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.298). 
 
In Kracauer‘s view, cinema has two different purposes to fulfil. The first is to 
actually help us to see the world we live in. For Kracauer the cure against 
abstractness is actual experience of concrete things. As described above, our 
common view of the world consists of a series of fragments rather than a 
meaningful continuity. Here, cinema has the unique capacity to present a world to 
us that we would otherwise not be able to see and so it ―redeems‖ physical reality 
for us. More specifically, Kracauer (1961) notes that cinema‘s ―imagery permits us, 
for the first time, to take away with us the objects and occurrences that comprise 
the flow of material life.‖ (p.300).  
 
This is closely related to the ―surface reality‖ mentioned above, because the 
majority of films present us with an overview by ―reducing‖ a story or an event to 
its essence, instead of showing us every unimportant detail that would normally 
occur in everyday life. By doing so, we can see things in a wider perspective and 
focus on general ideas rather than individual details. Film, and in particular 
mainstream cinema, is about universal concepts, even when these concepts are 
reflected in individual destinies. Even banal mainstream films are able to expose 
―the reality of the world as a metaphysical void.‖ (Levin, 2005, p.20). They can be 
even more successful in doing so than so called artistic films as they portray the 
tendencies in society mostly unconsciously and thus more unmediated. Kracauer 
therefore does not regard cinema as a provider of a new kind of ideology or 
religion, but rather as a medium in its very basic sense,which helps us to liberate 
ourselves from the conditions of abstractness. Although he acknowledges that 
―we may still not be able to cast anchor in ideological certainties, yet at least we 
stand a chance of finding something we did not look for, something tremendously 
important in its own right – the world that is ours.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.296).  
 
Moreover, Kracauer (1961) believes that in ―recording and exploring physical 
reality, film exposes to view a world never seen before […] which cannot be 
found because it is within everybody‘s reach.‖(p.299). What he suggests here is 
that all the details of everyday life, such as streets, people, places, etc. become so 
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common to us that we no longer consciously notice them, so that they remain 
practically invisible to us. Here, we need cinema to assist us, because ―were it not 
for the invention of the film camera, it would cost us an enormous effort to 
surmount the barriers which separate us from our everyday 
surroundings.‖(Kracauer, 1961, p.300). Thus, film enables us to see things that we 
did not, or even could not, see before. More precisely, Kracauer (1961) states that 
film ―effectively assists us in discovering the material world with its 
psychophysical correspondences. We literally redeem this world from its dormant 
state, its state of virtual nonexistence, by endeavouring to experience it through 
the camera.‖ (p.300). The notion of experience is crucial here, as film allows us to 
perceive the world on screen with a variety of senses, emotionally as well as 
rationally and gives us a concrete experience of wholeness which goes beyond a 
rational perception of a story told on screen. The film viewer ―finds himself in a 
situation in which he cannot ask questions and grope for answers unless he is 
saturated physiologically.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.300).  
 
However, all the above mentioned aspects of film do not apply to all styles and 
genres with the same intensity. Therefore, Kracauer also specifies the basic criteria 
cinema has to fulfil to give us the experience of physical reality. I now turn to the 
specific requirements and images Kracauer suggests in order to answer the 
question: what makes a film particularly ―cinematic‖? 
 
One of the most problematic parts in Kracauer‘s writing is his interpretation of 
what is the ―true art‖ of filmmaking. One can easily get the impression that for 
Kracauer film is first and foremost a ―documentary‖ medium, which limits the 
artistic influence by filmmakers. More precisely, he claims that film is not a 
creation of an artist in the same way other arts are, e.g. paintings. The role of the 
filmmaker is primarily to document and represent the material he finds and not to 
create them. Whereas other works of art only ―consume‖ the raw material and then 
transform it into whatever they want to express, films are―bound to exhibit it. 
However purposefully directed, the motion picture camera would cease to be a 
camera if it did not record visible phenomena for their own sake‖ (Kracauer, 
1961, p.x). Even if that is the case it is not evident why this would exclude the 
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artistic perspective per se. It only seems to suggest that visible phenomena can in 
some way subvert the intentions of the filmmaker. 
 
Kracauer (1961) further argues that along―with photography, film is the only art 
which leaves its raw material more or less intact. In consequences, such art as goes 
into films results from their creator‘s capacity to read the book of nature.‖ 
(p.x).That means that the role of the filmmaker in its closest sense is limited to 
―reading‖ nature, of exploring and making visible what nature presents to him. If 
a filmmaker tries to transform the raw material nature provides and turns it into a 
piece of art he runs the risk of destroying cinema‘s unique ability to show us the 
world as a whole and free us from the abstractness of our everyday reality.  
 
Kracauer‘s criticism of artistic influences in film is not entirely clear cut 
throughout hisTheory of Film as there seem to be contradictions between the 
individual chapters and the epilogue. Thus his arguments can be best understood 
when including ideas from his earlier works. What Kracauer mostly objects to is 
not so much the fact that a filmmaker makes certain creative choices. He is, for 
example, an admirer of Eisenstein‘s Potemkin (1925), which can be argued to be 
very stylistic. Nevertheless, Kracauer calls this cinema truly progressive because 
montage techniques and other artistic features are here used to emphasise social 
realities rather than distracting from them. (Compare: Levin, 2005) In contrast, he 
criticises Fritz Lang‘s style (most notably in his analysis of Metropolis but also in his 
critique of Nibelungen) for distorting social problems by turning the masses into 
merely ornamental figures, the aesthetic thus superseding theethical-human. 
(Kracauer, 1947). The interesting aspect in Kracauer‘s criticism of Lang‘s 
ornamental style and other parts of German pre-war cinema is that he claims by 
portraying workers, soldiers etc. simply as a mass, these people are losing every 
trait of individuality. While this is a valid point regarding this type of cinema, the 
question will be how this criticism can be applied to the modern cinematic epics 
and their emphasis on the individual.  
 
 
Another aspect in Kracauer‘s criticism on artistic influencesis that he argues at this 
point, art is not primarily problematic because of its style and interpretation but 
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because it presents us with the impression of a whole, which is false. As Kracauer 
(1961) writes, ―Art in film is reactionary because it symbolises wholeness and thus 
pretends to the continued existence of beliefs which ―cover‖ physical reality in 
both senses of the word. The result is films which sustain the prevailing 
abstractness.‖ (p.301). This point conforms to his conception of myth outlined in 
The Mass Ornament. However, towards the end of Theory of Film, Kracauer seems to 
mitigate his argument by claiming that the crucial thing is for cinema to create 
simply an impression of reality by whatever means necessary. He now seems content 
with cinema to redeem a ―notion of wholeness‖, even if this is only a superficial 
one.  
 
Apart from this, his major objection to artistic tendencies in cinema is when films 
trying too hard to imitate another medium, e.g. theatre and literature, rather than 
using its own unique capabilities. This becomes evident in Kracauer‘s distinction 
between cinematic and theatrical films. For him, only the first is really able to 
discover and productively use the new possibilities cinema provides, such as 
crowds, street scenes, everyday occurrences and movements in space and time. 
Theatrical cinema on the other hand is still caught up in the traditional concepts 
of theatre, which Kracauer perceives as too abstract. It is important to note that 
Kracauer‘s distinction between truly cinematic and ―artistic‖ or theatrical films is 
not related to a division between documentary and fictional film. It refers to both, 
although the problem might be more obvious in the latter. Fictional films as well 
as documentary films are influenced by both realistic and formalistic tendencies. 
Kracauer, however, suggests that the less a fictional film tries to emancipate itself 
from the realist tendency, the more ―cinematic‖ it is and thus the more true to the 
medium. We will see in chapter five, how contemporary Hollywood epics seem to 
aim in this direction, even when dealing with classic literary and historic 
narratives. 
 
As mentioned above, Kracauer regards film as a medium that can provide us with 
the experience of physical reality and enables us to see our world by 
reconstructing the wholeness of reality. This idea of the redemption of physical 
reality is not dependent on the question of whether the content of a story is real 
or fictional, but refers to a variety of stylistic elements. According to Kracauer 
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there are certain elements in all stories that do not just belong to the individual 
film itself, but also refer to a more universal concept or idea. These elements  
 
―may try to reconstruct the past, indulge in fantasies, champion a belief, or 
picture an individual conflict, a strange adventure [...] No doubt it is intended 
to advance the story to which it belongs, but it also affects us strongly, or 
even primarily, as just a fragmentary moment of visible reality, surrounded 
[…] by a fringe of indeterminate visible meanings. And in this capacity the 
moment disengages itself from the conflict, the belief, the adventure, toward 
which the whole of the story converges. A face on the screen may attract us 
as a singular manifestation of fear or happiness regardless of the events which 
motivate its expression.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.303).  
 
Kracauer calls these specific elements or images moments of everyday life and argues 
that they have more power the more subtle and ―true‖ they are. He further argues 
that films in general have two ways of confronting our perception with the visible 
material reality. Images either confirm our notions of reality or they do not. For 
Kracauer, the problem lies in the latter, because even though there might be an 
inconsistency between the represented reality and our idea of it, film sometimes 
uses what Kracauer calls ―confirmative images‖. The problem with those images 
is that they ―are as a rule called upon not to authenticate the truth to reality of an 
idea but to persuade us into accepting it unquestioningly.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, 
p.306). That means that these films are first and foremost trying to make us believe, 
not enabling us to see. The problem here is the order. In Kracauer‘s understanding, 
the belief we lost a long time ago can only be recovered if we first recover our 
connection with the world surrounding us. Belief should be the result of seeing, of 
a deep understanding; otherwise belief remains random and superficial. 
 
This is where Kracauer‘s theories can be linked to our discussion in the previous 
chapter. Belief systems should not simply be created out of a naive not-wanting-to 
know attitude but out of a profound insight in the world as a whole. This is the 
concept of wisdom Nietzsche talks about and which will also be relevant for the 
films discussed in Part II. Films which are in Kracauer‘s sense true to the medium 
will not try to move from a set idea to the material world to then implement that 
idea but rather―set out to explore physical data and, taking their cue from them, 
work their way up to some problem or belief. The cinema is materialistically 
minded; it proceeds from ‗below‘ to ‗above‘.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.309). Thus, film 
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should not simply provide us with ready-made ideas but give us the material to 
create and discover them for ourselves.  
 
Despite Kracauer‘s preference for realistic tendencies in film he also analyses a 
range of other topics. Of particular interest here are Kracauer‘s theories about 
fantasy and history as cinematic subjects. His analysis here refers both to the 
content and the style of the films. Originally Kracauer dismisses history and 
fantasy as truly cinematic subjects, because he argues that as soon as a filmmaker 
works in these areas the focus shifts away from the basic realistic properties of the 
medium. In other words, a filmmaker ―seems no longer concerned with physical 
reality but bent on incorporating worlds which to all appearance lie outside the 
orbit of actuality.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.77). Interestingly, the problem is less with 
the realistic representation, but with the actuality of the story. Thus, the problem 
is more apparent in historic films than in fantasy films. Kracauer‘s argument is 
that films dealing with historical topics enter a world that is per se completely 
artificial since it is outside our actual reality, whereas at least some fantasy could 
be imagined to take place in the here and now and could thus be part of our actual 
reality. Therefore, they must appear staged and theatrical. However, Kracauer 
(1961) also admits at an earlier stage in his book that―strangely enough, it is 
entirely possible that a staged real-life event evokes a stronger illusion of reality on 
the screen than would the original event if it had been captured directly by the 
camera.‖ (p.35). This statement shows that the realism of the imaginary world is in fact 
of higher importance than the reality of the story itself. 
 
Apart from this, we can also find aspects in historical films, which Kracauer 
describes as typically cinematic, such as the representation of crowds, violence or 
chases. As Kracauer (1961) notes, we just need to think ―of the mass movements 
and chases in the historical part of Intolerance or the superb chariot-race in […] 
Ben Hur. The spectator may be so thrilled by the chariot race that he forgets 
history in his actual sensations.‖ (p.80). What Kracauer suspects is that while the 
real historic events must have been hard to perceive in their wholeness, because 
the spectators were paralysed by the cruelty or greatness of the event, the 
representation of the event on screen provides a chance for a better experience of 
the whole. However, he criticises that all ―these episodes are plainly intended to 
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overshadow the artificiality of the pictorial reconstructions and re-establish a 
maximum of immediate physical existence‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.80). But is this not 
exactly what film should intend to do if it tries to be as realistic as Kracauer wants 
cinema to be? I will further discuss this point in particular in chapter five when 
looking at contemporary versions of historic epics. I will argue that the tendency 
to present historical films not just as episodes from the past but as events relating 
to our life is strongly increased by the modern technologies used in the 
production of recent historical epics, so that the actuality of the on-screen events 
is more significant than the historicity of the plot.  
 
Surprisingly, Kracauer has a more positive attitude towards fantasy in film, despite 
his preference for realism. His point is that unlike historical films, fantasy films do 
not necessarily have the problem of actuality and may as well pretend to take place 
here and now, even though this here and now takes place in a parallel universe. 
Kracauer (1961) argues that if films are ―mainly built from ‗realistic material‘, the 
‗relational‘ factor ceases to be a decisive issue. In other words, it no longer matters 
much whether or not fantasies lay claim to the same validity as physical reality; 
provided they concentrate on real-life shots, they conform to the basic properties 
of the medium.‖ (p.90). This notion will be particularly relevant in chapter four, 
when analysing the representation and impact of the Lord of the Rings-trilogy on 
people‘s belief in fictional worlds.  
 
In summary, Kracauer‘s theories raise a variety of interesting questions regarding 
cinema‘s potential to redeem our connection with the world and our belief in it. 
He also shows the connection between realism and belief and the unique potential 
of cinema to reflect the spirit of its time. Next I shall look more closely at several 
theorists who discuss Kracauer‘s theories in relation to its historical and social 
development. 
 
Miriam Hansen‘s essay ‗With Skin and Hair: Kracauer‘s Theory of Film, Marseille 
1940‘ (1993) has a very positive attitude towards his theories on cinema,despite 
the aforementioned criticism about Kracauer‘s writing style. She tries to read the 
Theory of Film in relation to its earlier drafts and points out that Kracauer‘s 
concepts of film are by no means simply grounded on a naïve conception of 
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realism for which he was so often criticised. Hansen (1993) suggests that 
Kracauer‘s film theory ―approaches the cinema from the problematic of the 
subject, as both a practical critique of bourgeois fictions of self-identity and a 
discourse for articulating the historical state of human self-alienation‖ (p.444). 
This suggests that the general dismissal of Kracauer‘s theories on the grounds of 
his notions of realism is missing the more important point, an argument I have 
supported in my analysis above.  
 
Despite looking at various genres and elements of cinema, his theories should be 
read less as a traditional contribution to film theory and more as a philosophical 
study that acknowledges the unique power of cinema to contribute ideas to a 
social and philosophical discourse. Hansen also discusses Kracauer‘s concept of 
redemption, which for her points to the motif of discovery that is linked ―to the 
recording and inventory function of film, the messianic motif of gathering and 
carrying along […] the material world in all its fragments and elements‖ (Hansen, 
1993, p.448). This notion of the material world is crucial in our understanding of 
Kracauer‘s concept of the cinematic. As I have pointed out above Kracauer is not 
as obsessed with photo-reality as commonly assumed. Hansen adds that for 
Kracauer the question is not so much ―reality or realism, but rather materiality‖, 
particularly a process of materialisation that ―presumes a cognitive interest 
directed, paradoxically, against the imposition of conscious, intentional structures 
on the material world‖ (Hansen, 1993, p.453). 
 
Hansen suggests that the emphasis for Kracauer in comparing film and 
photography is not because of the referentiality or indexicality of the 
photographic image, but rather its temporality, its snapshot character. Our reality 
is not untouched and objective; it is an alienated historical reality, especially after the 
Second World War. According to Hansen (1993)―the materialist gaze reveals a 
historical state of alienation and disintegration‖ for Kracauer, and gives ―the lie to 
any belated humanist efforts to cover it up and thus promoting the process of 
demythologization.‖ (p.453). Despite this bleak statement, Kracauer has not given 
up hope in the possibilities of cinemaeven after the catastrophe of the Second 
World War, although the ―utopian motif of the last-minute rescue‖, which 
Kracauer discusses in his earlier writings on film, is ―generalized into a more 
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modest project of redemption, of film's task to pick up the pieces in the petrified 
landscape of ‗physical reality‘.‖ (Hansen, 1993, p.468). I will argue in the second 
part that even modern Hollywood epics tend to be more critical towards their 
own myths, although this may not in all cases supersede the influence of a 
Hollywood ideology that still believes in the idea of last-minute rescues.  
 
For Hansen, one of the key elements in Kracauer‘s theory is the concept of 
immediate experience, which also includes shock experience. Hansen points out 
that people‘s longing to communicate with the depths of their body and soul 
through suffering and shock, has a long history in human society. It is a concept 
we discussed in the previous chapter in relation to the Ancient tragedy. According 
to Hansen (1993), Kracauer now ―relates the cinema to the historical proliferation 
of the shock experience with modern technology and the emergence of the urban 
masses, and the erosion of traditions that used to protect people against shock.‖ 
(p.459). In that sense, film can go beyond the protective cover of Apollonian 
appearances and present us with the abyss of a Dionysian worldview. Yet film also 
returns to a concept of redemption that does not ignore the dark background, but 
still enables some belief in the future.  
 
This concept can also be found in Schlüpmann and Gaines‘s essay ‗The Subject of 
Survival: On Kracauer's Theory of Film‘ (1991). Here they argue that seen in 
historical context, Kracauer‘s Theory of Film presents a new form of perception that 
refers to the ambivalence of nature itself, which is on one side destructive and on 
the other survival and recreation, a notion that strongly recalls Nietzsche‘s 
concept of nature particularly when discussing the elements of the Dionysian.   
Referring to an earlier essay, which Kracauer wrote on photography, Schlüpmann 
and Gaines analyse Kracauer‘s comparison between film and dream. They suggest 
that the latter‘s notion of dream is not those of psychoanalysis based on Freud, 
but rather based on Kafka. It is a play with the fragments of nature or everyday 
reality and it involves a claim for realism. Whereas the Freudian dream concept 
only claims that dreams are made up of the remains of a reality, Kracauer sees the 
dreamlike quality of film in mediating between two realities, the dream reality on 
one hand and the everyday reality on the other. ―Film fuses the real fragmented 
quality of nature exposed in photography with the real distractedness of human 
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society that is revealed in the cinema audience.‖ (Schlüpmann & Gaines, 1991, 
p.117).  
 
Schlüpmann and Gaines further note that in Kracauer‘s later theory, he departs 
from the concepts of fragmentation and distraction and instead focuses on its 
opposite – continuity. This can be seen in the fact that Kracauer asserts that film 
has the ability to show life in motion, present the world as a whole and thus 
redeem ―reality‖ for us. Thus, film is particularly equipped to represent what he 
calls ―the flow of life‖ (p.273), the most cinematic of all contents. Fragmentation, 
however, is still the element that best describes our situation and which demands 
a new continuity. Schlüpmann and Gaines (1991) state that it was only after the 
war that Kracauer‘s theory ―regarded film […] as the new signature of an age in 
which it is no longer the experience of the remoteness of meaning that is 
significant, but rather the remoteness of ‗physical reality‘.‖(p.122). However, this 
focus on physical reality can according to Schlüpmann and Gaines also be read as 
a sign of resignation. In that sense, although cinema is able to lead history out of 
contemplation, it can only do so by leading it into a present that denies history. 
Thus they argue that the basis for Kracauer‘s materialistic aesthetics is ambivalent.  
 
 
2.2 Realism, not Reality – Kracauer, Bazin and contemporary film theory 
 
In his famous essays on film, published as an anthology titled What is Cinema? 
(1967),French film scholar André Bazin discusses a variety of objects related to 
cinema, the majority with regard to cinematic realism. However, Bazin‘s concept 
of realism is not solely based on the idea of the camera as a medium to record 
everyday reality thus reducing the artistic impact. On the contrary, Bazin 
emphasises from the outset that creating the impression of realism is a very artistic 
and therefore artificial process that goes beyond simply ―reading the book of 
nature‖ as Kracauer had claimed.  
 
In one of his first essays Bazin characterises cinema as ―the creation of an ideal 
world in the likeness of the real, with its own temporal destiny.‖ (Bazin, 1971a, 
p.10). He notes that the myth surrounding the invention of the cinema as well as 
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other technical media in the 19th century is based on a trend towards a 
reproduction of reality, or what Bazin (1971a) calls an integral realism, ―a 
recreation of the world in its own image, an image unburdened by the freedom of 
interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time.‖ (p.21). 
 
In this essay, he also distinguishes the early days of cinema from its later 
development, arguing that whereas in the beginning, films largely reflected what 
the director intended to say, modern filmmaking has an increasingly higher degree 
of realism (through sound and colour) so that the image itself ―has at its disposal 
more means of manipulating reality and of modifying it from within.‖ (Bazin, 
1971a, p.40). This statement suggests that despite the efforts of filmmakers, 
cinematic representation tends to subvert the intentions of the filmmaker by 
developing a ‗life of their own‘. This statement also shows that by making the 
images more realistic, they also become more believable and as a consequence 
more able to influence our perception of reality.  
 
In the second volume of his writings, Bazin explicitly criticises a realism that is 
purely recording ―real‖ images. He describes it as one of the merits of Italian 
Neorealism that ―it has demonstrated that all realism in art was first profoundly 
aesthetic.‖ (Bazin, 1971b, p.25). In addition, he also emphasises that it is just as 
challenging to capture a representation of our reality as it is to create an entirely 
illusionary world. The amount of creative work that has to go into it is the same.  
In general, film tries to give the audience a perfect illusion of reality, within the 
limits of its story, style and technical capacities. According to Bazin, this is the 
aspect that divides cinema from other art forms, such as painting and poetry, 
which put the emphasis on the artistic style and aesthetic and the way they alter 
reality. Of course there are exceptions in certain films, which equally focus on 
style rather than creating an illusion of reality. The majority of cinema, however, 
aims at realism. Nevertheless, Bazin (1971b) clearly states that ―realism in art can 
only be achieved in one way—through artifice.‖ (p.26). This statement points out 
a fundamental contradiction within the medium cinema. Bazin writes that the 
creation of reality is always based on choice, which is at the same time necessary and 
unacceptable. The first is the case because film as an art always presumes an 
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artistic choice, unacceptable because it is always done by sacrificing a certain 
amount of reality.  
 
Not surprisingly, the level of reality that is conveyed by the film image depends on 
the genre and style. The result is that at the end of a process of subtraction ―the 
initial reality there has been substituted with an illusion of reality composed of a 
complex of abstraction […], of conventions […], and of authentic reality.‖ (Bazin, 
1971b, p.27). This illusion is necessary, but it also carries the risk for the audience 
to lose its awareness of an actual reality, so that everyday reality becomes an 
element of cinematic representation in their mind. Here Bazin warns that we 
perceive reality more and more as a mediated reality, and similar to Kracauer‘s 
previous notions regarding art in film, it then becomes increasingly difficult to 
perceive a ―pure‖ reality. However, as Nietzsche had argued, there has never been 
such a thing as pure reality or truth, as our conception of reality has always been 
based on necessary and profound illusions.  
 
In a more recent essay discussing cinematic realism, Dirk Baecker follows this line 
of thought and suggests a new approach to realism – as a form of communication. 
By shifting the problem of reality to the level of communication, Baecker argues 
that there are certain limitations to capacity of films to communicate reality and 
these limits then produce a very specific kind of reality.  
 
Baecker refers to Kracauer as one of the theorists who have described cinema as a 
tool to both register and reveal realities that were previously out of focus. When 
communicated, this process alters reality and it ―becomes a different reality, 
consisting of itself plus its registration and revelation.‖ (Baecker, 1996, p.561). He 
further argues that one of these realities revealed by films is the reality of 
communication. Cinema exposes human emotions by translating them into 
behaviour, which produces a unique cognitive, behavioural psychology. This 
preference of behaviour is a tendency of cinema that Gilles Deleuze describes as 
particular to American cinema and which I will further discuss in the next chapter. 
 
After introducing the reality of cinema as a form of communication, Baecker 
qualifies this communication in so far as it is not actually communication proper. 
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That means that the communication of films is at best a delayed communication 
as it is a one-sided presentation of images to the audience. And while films are not 
―communication but awaiting communication, they produce their ‗impression of 
reality‘.‖ (Baecker, 1996, p.564). According to Baecker, cinema fictionalises reality 
and consequently dismisses the question of the unreal. In this way, the 
―impression of reality dissolves into the communication of reality‖ (Baecker, 1996, 
p.565).  
 
Accordingly, cinema can be described as a picture of the world that is at once 
perceived and mass-communicated. Even though we are aware and cautious 
towards the fact that the world presented to us by mass media such as cinema is a 
communicated world and therefore selected and modified, we are still willing to 
accept it as it is. Baecker (1996) writes that we ―observe how perceptions that 
translate into behavior deeply both trust and mistrust the mass-communicated 
reality they experience, and yet you are prepared to go ahead with your own 
experiences received by mass communications, your disbelief in experiences 
included.‖ (p.566).  
 
Different kinds of films may employ different strategies in dealing with cinematic 
reality; for example Hollywood blockbusters try to emphasise belief by suspending 
disbelief whereas art films might opt to address the problem of disbelief directly. 
Yet, despite this, none of these films can get away from the images. Baecker 
(1996) states that ―the faster the world changes, the more chances there are to 
select a reality one can, for just a moment, believe in.‖ (p.568). He further suggests 
that the essential process of selection actually makes the images more ―realistic‖, 
as the editing of a film usually does not destroy the impression of reality but 
rather adds ―more reality‖ to the images.  
 
In that sense the ―cut does not function by cancelling the reality of the shot 
before, but by adding some more reality, some different aspect, to it.‖ (Baecker, 
1996, p.571). As a consequence, we finally experience a reality of which we know 
that it is unreal, but still cannot help but accepting it as real while watching. 
Beacker here refers to Deleuze and his concept of a spiritual automaton, which I 
will discuss in chapter three as well as in the second part of the thesis, by 
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suggesting that our ability to link images and sounds do not allow us to dispose of 
the reality a film creates.  
 
On the other side, Baecker turns to Kracauer, who characterises film as a 
combination of determinate sequences of images and indeterminate structure of 
the image itself. Baecker (1996) writes that a film can ―tell a rather tight story, thus 
conveying the impression of an unavoidable fate; yet any of the episodes of the 
movie has to be permeable with respect to a surrounding world.‖ (p.572). 
 
In conclusion, Baecker notes that all the aforementioned elements describe film as 
a medium that is produced by communication, a medium that stages and 
encourages communication, yet actually is no communication itself. According to 
Baecker, cinema shows communication but it does not communicate. In his words, it 
―is only insofar as they are shown that movies communicate a reality, which 
consists of their own fading into the making of a temporal, if not timely, 
distinction between reality and fiction.‖ (Baecker, 1996, p.576). Baecker finally 
states that analysing cinema from the perspective of communication also means 
emphasising their reality as a fictional product, and for him this is the only 
possible way of looking at our actual world. 
 
 
Summary 
 
As we said at the beginning, Kracauer claims that we live in an age characterised 
by a decline of normative systems as well as the abstractness and fragmentation 
of everyday reality. Cinema can provide compensation for this state not only by 
stimulating our imagination or providing us with a substitute reality, but by 
reuniting us with material reality. More precisely, Kracauer (1961) believes that 
film can affect the way we perceive our environment by bringing the material 
world to us, because cinema ―not only records physical reality but reveals 
otherwise hidden provinces of it‖ (p. 158). 
 
However, to enable us to rediscover and experience physical reality and thus 
regain belief in our world, film has to focus on showing us the material world as 
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raw as possible and avoid an explicit discourse of issues of morality or belief, 
which would be artificial. Yet, although Kracauer favours realistic tendencies in 
film, he also acknowledges that ―cinematic‖ images can be found in other genres, 
such as fantasy or historic films. In addition, several scholars discussing 
Kracauer‘s work point out that the primary value of Kracauer‘s writings is not so 
much his description of cinematic realism, but his discussion of cinema in a wider 
social and historic background. In this way, I consider Kracauer‘s theories a 
worthwhile contribution to our question if illusions are a necessary part of our life 
and the way cinema contributes in their creation. 
 
Bazin‘s theories further acknowledge that despite favouring realism in film, this 
does not contradict the idea of fiction and artistic creation as all cinematic 
representation will always be just an illusion of reality.  
 
Finally, Baecker suggests that by communicating an impression of reality, cinema 
dissolves the boundaries of our reality and thus dissolves the boundaries between 
reality and fiction. This corresponds to Nietzsche‘s dictum that the world can only 
be understood as an aesthetic phenomenon.  
 
In the next chapter, I will look at the ways in which Gilles Deleuze discusses both 
Nietzsche‘s ideas and the role of cinematic realism in the creation of a system of 
belief. Analysing his theories regarding cinema, realism and belief, we will also 
expand our exploration on cinema towards recent tendencies in contemporary 
Hollywood films by considering the influence of modern digital technology. 
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Chapter Three: 
Back to the future? – Contemporary cinema and the new challenges for 
theorists 
 
After discussing the relationship between cinema and belief as well as its role in 
representing reality, this chapter will extend these aspects towards contemporary 
cinema and look at the most recent challenges for film theory and philosophy. In 
this context, I will also discuss how the increasing use of computer generated 
images (CGI) and other digital technologies not only advance the practical aspects 
of the medium, but also challenge previous theoretical concepts of image creation, 
realism and illusion within cinema. 
 
To start with, I will examine Gilles Deleuze‘s cinema books, which inspired an 
ongoing debate about cinema and its images. Subsequently, I will discuss Daniel 
Frampton‘s Filmosophy, a philosophical work that develops Deleuze‘s ideas further, 
particularly with regard to contemporary digital cinema. Finally, I will introduce 
several essays that explore digital cinema and CGI technologies with regard to 
their power in (re)creating the illusion of reality. 
 
 
3.1 Cinema as philosophy - Deleuze and beyond  
 
Looking at the key writers of this thesis, Deleuze‘s cinema books present the most 
recent philosophical contribution to the art-life-illusion correlation discussed in 
the previous chapters and will direct us towards the contemporary epics discussed 
in the second part of this thesis.  
 
Coming from a background of continental philosophy, Gilles Deleuze publishes 
his two volume writings on cinema in the mid-Eighties. In these books – Cinema I: 
The Movement-Image and Cinema II: The Time-Image – he develops his rather unique 
history and theory of cinema. Loosely inspired by Charles Sanders Peirce‘s 
semiotics, he aims to produce a taxonomy of cinematic signs. However, his 
writing goes well beyond a simple definition and classification of cinematic 
images, it is infused with historic, social, cultural and philosophical aspects relating 
 84 
to cinema. It is thus not surprising that the attempts from academia to discuss and 
understand his complex theories are as varied as Deleuze‘s cinematic examples 
throughout his book.  
 
R. W. Cook, for example, compares in his essay ‗Deterritorialisation and the 
Object: Deleuze across cinema‘ Deleuze‘s concepts of signs and images with 
Roland Barthes and other linguistic approaches; and Donato Totaro discusses 
Bergson‘s influence on the cinema books in his essay ‗Gilles Deleuze‘s Bergsonian 
Film Project‘. In a review of Cinema I: The Movement-Image, Dale Jamieson and 
Barbara James (1988) compare reading Deleuze‘s book to  
 
―being in a cinematic funhouse, where extravagant prose and orthogonal 
distinctions dizzy one into a new conception of the image. Although we may 
have a difficult time finding our feet in this new world, the thrills and spills 
may well be worthwhile. Yet at some point, we are bound to wonder whether 
relations with the external world can be regained.‖ (1988, p.436) 
 
This clearly refers to Deleuze‘s often difficult and confusing description of the 
increasingly endless number of new terms he coins in relation to the new images. 
This is particularly true about the second cinema book. However, I want to argue 
that the more interesting philosophical ideas behind the ‗taxonomy‘ are accessible 
without an in-depth understanding about the distinctions between octo- and 
chrono-signs and the like. Deleuze seems to attempt to find a balance between an 
in-depth analysis of cinematic fragments and an examination of cinema as a 
whole. As outlined in the previous chapter when discussing Kracauer‘s notions of 
fragmentation, this focus on individual pieces, e.g. certain directors, is exactly 
what we as theorists should aim to overcome and I will therefore try and focus as 
much as possible on the aspects of the cinema books that deal with the wider 
perspectives relating to cinema as such.  
 
In his book Gilles Deleuze‟s Time-Machine, David N. Rodowick (1997) demonstrates 
the value of Deleuze‘s notions on cinema for contemporary theory and states that 
it is worth making the effort to fight ones way through the intellectual neologisms 
and discover the consistency and significance of Deleuze‘s writing. However, 
Rodowick also criticises that particularly the concept of the time-image is rather 
vague.  
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This might be one reason why few theorists have considered the more ambiguous 
theories Deleuze develops towards the end of The Time-Image, e.g. his notions 
about cinema‘s function to reinstate our belief in the world, which will play a 
crucial role in my reading of his work.  
 
One of the few scholars who attempt to comment on these more spiritual-
aesthetic aspects of the cinema books is Barbara Kennedy. In her book Deleuze and 
Cinema - The Aesthetics of Sensationshe calls for a new debate across art, sciences and 
philosophy, which includes a rethinking of aesthetics in a post-millenial culture. 
Kennedy suggests that the key to a reunification with our modern world, which 
struggles to find answers to the negative impact of global economy, ecological 
catastrophes and political depression, might be found in aesthetics. Here, her 
ideas link Deleuze‘s writings to Nietzsche‘s previously discussed concept of the 
importance of artwith regard to our life as well as Kracauer‘s notion about 
cinema‘s power to reunite us with the world around us. Kennedy suggests that if  
 
―we cannot conceive of solutions in a macro-political sense, maybe there is a 
micro-political way which through a mutation of mentalities might promote a 
new sense of being in the world, through a neo-aesthetics? From Apollonian 
law to Dionysian spirit, the line between the two domains of science and art 
can easily be crossed back and forth. And so it is with Nietzschean 
resonations that we can begin to work towards an integrational bio-aesthetic 
which commingles the material world with the aesthetics of film 
theory.‖(Kennedy, 2000, p.85)  
 
So, to better understand Deleuze‘s ideas about cinema and its connections with 
belief and reality, I want to briefly introduce his general conception of philosophy. 
This insight in his philosophical approach will help to clarify Deleuze‘s 
understanding of both cinema and philosophy as a means to create concepts. 
 
Philosophy is according to Deleuze not essentially a theory to explain or analyse 
processes of thought and concepts of life, but rather an active practice of creating 
ideas. Moreover, concepts and ideas in his sense aren‘t just concepts of something, 
but in themselves images –thought images. Philosophy is therefore not opposed 
to art – one being an abstract theoretical framework and the other a creative 
practice – but both are equally practical and involved in the process of creation.  
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It is useful to read Deleuze‘s writings on cinema in the context of this notion, as it 
allows us better to understand how he assigns both philosophy and cinema alike 
the power to reflect and create universal concepts and ideas for our life. In this 
way, his cinema books can be described as a philosophical journey through 
cinema, as reading a theory about cinema as philosophical practice. Deleuze does 
not just employ philosophical concepts to speak about cinema, but describes 
cinema and philosophy as two powers which give rise to ideas that interact and 
connect with each other. Equally, cinema is not simply an art form that creates 
images and stories; it also develops wider concepts, concepts of life.  
 
As a consequence, Deleuze describes cinema as being privileged among the arts, a 
notion we similarly found in Kracauer‘s writings. Deleuze (1986) argues that 
unlike the other arts, which make ―the world itself something unreal or a tale‖, in 
cinema it is ―the world which becomes its own image, and not an image which 
becomes world.‖ (p.59). Here, he goes beyond the realist Kracauer, who saw 
cinema rather as a tool to present the material world to us. Deleuze, however, 
describes cinema as creating our world. 
 
In principle, Deleuze proceeds chronologically through his cinema books, 
meaning that he starts roughly in the early days of cinema with D. W. Griffith, 
works his way through the various schools of the 1920s and 1930s up to the 
Second World War, marking a distinct break, after which the new cinema of 
Italian Neorealism and then Nouvelle Vague are discussed. Nevertheless Deleuze 
does not deliver a history of cinema, but takes a variety of detours and diversions. 
The cinematic examples used to underline his arguments are interesting, although 
not always essential to the understanding of his philosophical theories. In his 
article ‗On Deleuze‘s Cinema‘, Daniel Frampton (1991) proposes that in the 
cinema books ―there are actually two writers, the philosopher realising film in all 
its intricate workings, and the film lover, puncturing the text with loving synopses 
of the great and the obscure of film history, each having tentative reference to the 
argument at hand.‖ (p.15). 
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Jamieson and James also criticise Deleuze‘s excessive use of filmic examples, 
which are often only known to a very small intellectual circle and even they will 
probably only have seen a small amount of the films he discusses. Nevertheless, 
they compliment him for being one of the few theorists of that era to take film 
seriously and not merely analyse it in the shadow of ―more serious‖ studies of 
literature and theatre. (Jamieson & James, 1988). 
 
Whereas the first cinema book and parts of the second book largely evolve 
around the historic developments of cinema as well as an analysis of the different 
kinds of images produced by cinema, the emphasis in the final chapters shifts to 
more philosophical considerations on life and art. Frampton (1991) observes that 
it is ―in the last four chapters that Deleuze moves on from his classification of 
images, of cinematic movement, to a general consideration of the relationship 
between thought and film.‖(p.13). Towards the end of The Time-Image Deleuze 
even proclaims that cinema is the medium that can – and should – reinstate our 
belief in the world. This is one of the important aspects that link Deleuze‘s 
cinema books to Nietzsche‘s and Kracauer‘s ideas about the redemptive power of 
art and I will thus have a closer look at Deleuze‘s idea later in this chapter. Firstly, 
however, I will discuss his preceding theories on cinema to give us a basis for 
understanding his later – more elusive – concepts.  
 
At the beginning of Cinema I: The Movement-Image Deleuze bases his analysis of 
cinematic images on Bergsonian theories on movement. His main argument in 
relation to Bergson is that in contrast to the latter‘s claim, cinema does not simply 
give us a succession of photographic images to which abstract movement is 
added, but instead gives us immediately a movement-image. Referring to Zeno‘s 
paradox,17 Deleuze (1986) thinks that this way of looking at cinema suggests that 
                                            
17 Zeno‘s Paradox of the arrow describes the theory that all movement is nothing but an 
illusion, an argument developed by the Ancient Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea. See: 
Huggett, N., ‗Zeno's Paradoxes‘, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2010 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta(ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2010/entries/paradox-
zeno/>. [Accessed 23 January 2011] 
Bergson uses this example to criticise cinema, which to him perfectly reflects Zeno‘s idea 
as it consist of still images, which are moved by an apparatus to create the illusion of 
moving images. See: Bergson, H., 1907. L'Evolution créatrice. (First published in English in 
1910 as Creative Evolution). 
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it is no longer ―just the perfected apparatus of the oldest illusion, but, on the 
contrary, the organ for perfecting the new reality.‖ (p.8). Unlike Bergson, Deleuze 
sees cinema as a medium that does not just rely on recreating an abstract 
combination of images and movements but actively creates an undivided idea of 
reality, a whole to which movement is an essential aspect. In fact, these images 
could not exist in the same way as still images and it is only the movement that 
gives them meaning and life.  
 
According to Deleuze, the movement-image, despite having a variety of forms, is 
always based on three essential criteria. These are ―the determination of closed 
systems, […] the movement which is established between the parts of a system, 
and […] the changing whole which is expressed in movement‖ (Deleuze, 1986, 
p.30). In other words, the movement-image defines a system of a whole, by 
establishing a closed cosmos in which movement takes place that modifies the 
whole. The crucial instrument to determine this system is montage. However, this 
determination of the whole through montage can take different routes. When 
discussing the early stages of cinema, Deleuze describes four initial montage 
styles, each with a different emphasis and technique, but all operating according to 
the three criteria mentioned above.  
 
Deleuze further defines four different approaches or schools of montage present 
in classical cinema, namely the organic-active montage of the Americans, the 
dialectical montage of the Soviet school, quantitative-psychic montage represented 
by the French school and the intensive-spiritual montage of German 
Expressionism. The most relevant form of montage for the context of this thesis 
is the organic-active montage style of the American school. Not only is it the most 
universally successful style, it also still informs contemporary mainstream cinema. 
In the broadest sense Deleuze‘s conception of organic montage allows the 
audience to fully indulge in the cinematic experience without having the attention 
drawn towards the creative processes of the medium. Developed by D. W. 
Griffith, the American school is characterised by an organic composition of the 
images. This means that the images are composed like a big organism, in which all 
elements are causally linked together and balance each other. By doing so, they 
form an organic unity – a whole. According to Deleuze, this organism is a unity in 
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diversity that is differentiated into binary relationships, such as good/evil, 
man/woman, rich/poor and so on. This characteristic of the organic montage 
style is emphasised on the technical level by the parallel montage and on the 
narrative level by the duel of forces. In the second part of this thesis I will discuss 
several examples of these binary relationships in contemporary Hollywood films. 
In addition to the differentiation into binary relationships, every part of this 
organic system must act and react on each other, join the conflict, which is 
threatening the organic unity, and then resolve the conflict to restore the whole.  
 
This organic concept of montage is juxtaposed by the other montage styles, e.g. 
the dialectical montage of the Soviet school, mainly represented by Sergei 
Eisenstein, who favours a montage of opposition. Unlike in the organic concept, the 
development here is dialectic; the two opposing powers interact until they clash, 
which does not lead to a restoration of the organic set, but its destruction in order 
to reach an entirely new, a higher unity. The pre-war French school emphasises 
the quantitative aspects of movement, montage here takes the form of a 
mechanical composition. It is characterised by chain reactions and automata that 
illustrate ―a clear mechanical movement [...] which brings together things and 
living beings, the inanimate and the animate, by making them the same.‖ 
(Deleuze, 1986, p.43). Automata also play a role in the intensive-spiritual school 
of German Expressionism, but here they are no longer―mechanisms which 
validate or ‗major‘ a quantity of movement, but somnambulists, zombies or 
golems who express the intensity of this non-organic life‖ (Deleuze, 1986, p.53). 
Diagonals and cross-diagonals are the symbols of Expressionism in opposition to 
the horizontal and vertical orientations of the organic montage. Stark contrasts 
and sharp angles dominate in favour of a stylisation that eliminates every 
impression of realism aimed at by the American school. The idea of automata will 
return in the concluding chapters of his cinema books. More importantly, it will 
also be relevant for my discussion of recent digital cinema in the second part of 
the thesis, particularly in relation to my analysis of Avatar (2009, dir. J. Cameron) 
in chapter six.  
 
Besides the different montage styles that establish the connections between the 
images and the whole, the movement-image itself has a variety of forms. 
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According to Deleuze, the main forms are the perception-image, the affection-
image and the action-image. For our study, the latter will be the most relevant and 
Deleuze tends to use it synonymously with the movement-image in the later parts 
of his writings. However, I want to briefly introduce the perception- and the 
affection-image in order to be able clearly to distinguish the action-image.  
 
Deleuze‘s notion of the perception-image is largely based on concepts by 
Bergson, who claimed that human perception of a thing is always less than the 
actual thing, a filtered subjective perspective. In other words, it ―is the unicentred 
subjective perception that is called perception strictly speaking.‖ (Deleuze, 1986, 
p.66). This aspect is the reason for Deleuze to suggest that we cannot simply 
compare cinema to human perception as some theorists have done as cinema per 
se does not have a specific centre of perception. In the objective, variable 
representation of the movement-image the perspective of the audience can shift 
around and perceive things from all kinds of angles. Particularly in the majority of 
mainstream Hollywood cinema, the perspective is not normally limited to a 
subjective view that follows the perception of one individual. An exception to this 
objective view is the perception-image, which presents the subjective point of 
view of the character in the film. The affection-image presents an ―in between‖ 
perception and action. The most noticeable version of this image is the close-up 
of a face. It marks a break in the action, the moment between perceiving and re-
acting that re-establishes their relation. Both the perception-image and the 
affection-image can be found across all genres and types of cinema, but only 
rarely they are the dominant, defining image of cinema.  
 
The most popular variation of the movement-image is clearly the action-image. 
For Deleuze it is the movement-image par excellence and the image that is 
exemplified in classical American cinema. The action-image, though, is not to be 
confused with action films, but can be realised in a variety of genres. The term 
action-image expresses the premise that there is always a direct relation between an 
action and the situation into which it is introduced. The action-image is 
characterised by distinct milieus and individuals that act and react in clearly 
defined relations. Affects and impulses are replaced by behaviour, because – 
unlike the affect that marks a break in the action – behaviour is an action, a distinct 
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pattern, where people proceed from one instance to another and respond to 
situations in order to modify them.  
 
However, this action-reaction exchange does not take place immediately. There 
has to be a gap between a situation and the subsequent action, a gap that needs to 
be filled with drawbacks and progressions during the course of the film in order 
to justify the action. In summary, Deleuze (1986) describes the action-image as 
follows:  
 
―derived millieux assert their independence and start to become valid for 
themselves. Qualities and powers are […] actualised directly in determinate, 
geographical, historical and social space-times. Affects and impulses now only 
appear as embodied in behaviour, in the form of emotions or passions which 
order and disorder it. This is Realism.‖ (p. 145). 
 
The last point of this statement in particular is relevant as it suggests not only a 
specific type of image, but a whole style of cinema, Deleuze‘s idea of realism. Yet 
this is different from the realism other writers other writers have proclaimed with 
regard to cinema, e.g. Kracauer, especially in relation to post-war tendencies in 
cinema, such as Italian Neorealism. When Deleuze equals his concept of the 
action-image with Realism, this also implies an essential connection between 
Hollywood cinema – as the ultimate action-image – and realism, which is closer to 
Bazin and his theories about invisible cuts and continuity editing.  
 
Again, realism is nothing that is opposed to fiction, on the contrary. It does not 
just include fictional narration, but also dream, fantasy and exaggeration, as long 
as they are consistent with the criteria of milieus that actualise and specific modes 
of behaviour. Unlike impulses and affections, behaviour for Deleuze refers to 
clearly defined and causally related patterns. Thus, when Deleuze suggests that 
this realism includes elements such as fantasy and dream, he implies that similar to 
behaviour and milieu these aspects have a clear structure and relation to the 
overall story. This relation with the whole is accessible and easily understandable 
to the audience. With the action-image on one hand and the organic 
representation that aims at an objective, natural correlation of the images, the 
American cinema achieves a form of cinema that Deleuze later calls ―truth as 
totalisation‖. It presents stories that we can (and want to) believe in.  
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After the trauma of the Second World War, however,dramatic changes occur in 
the development of cinema. Deleuze argues that post-war Europe is suddenly 
confronted with situations to which people no longer know how to react and find 
themselves in places and surroundings too confusing to understand or to describe, 
which is reflected in new movements in cinema. He claims that in ―everyday 
banality, action-image and even the movement-image tend to disappear in favour 
of pure optical situations, but these reveal connections of a new type, which are 
no longer sensory-motor18 and which bring the emancipated senses into direct 
relation with time and thought.‖(Deleuze, 1989, p.17).In other words, situations 
are no longer translated in actions and the believability of the movement-image 
collapses into clichés. This calls for new aesthetical models. 
 
Similarly to Kracauer, Deleuze here draws clear connections between a social-
cultural and historical development and the aesthetic development of cinema. 
Jamieson and James describe Deleuze‘s deconstruction of the movement-image as 
a metaphor for our postmodern ideological crisis. They argue that we ―can no 
longer be confident that biology or culture, whether through its effects on our 
perception or our reason, will manage to keep our world together. It is this anxiety 
that gives this book its postmodernist spin.‖ (Jamieson & James, 1988, 
p.437)What follows from that is the notion that Deleuze‘s shift from the 
movement-image to the time-image takes place not only on the level of visual 
representation but more importantly on the level of thinking. De Gaetano 
describes it as a transition from illusion to belief. (Gaetano, 1997) 
 
Even though the Second World War roughly marks the historic split between the 
two cinema books, one can argue that the distinction becomes not so much one 
of timelines but rather a distinction between European art cinema and mainstream 
American cinema. Deleuze (1989) indicates that the time-image might have been a 
chance of breaking out of the limitations of the action-image and ―reaching a 
mystery of time, of uniting image, thought and camera in a single ‗automatic 
                                            
18 Perception that is then translated into movement – Deleuze adopts this term from 
Henri Bergson. For a detailed description, see: Bergson, H., 2004. Matter and Memory. 
Mineola (NY): Dover. p.225.  
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subjectivity‘, in contrast to the over-objective conception of the 
Americans.‖(p.53).Thus the film analyses of theTime-Image largely ignore 
mainstream productions, which, at least occasionally, found their way in Deleuze‘s 
Movement-Image. This increasingly selective approach makes the analysis particularly 
of his second cinema book a bit problematic as it is difficult to see how certain 
theories on the time-image can be applied to a broader scope of cinema. 
Frampton states that Deleuze reckons the―power of the false to be the new style 
of cinema, and, watching such films as Resnais and Godard, this would seem to 
be a viable argument. But we must also keep in mind that Deleuze is only 
referring to a select number of film-makers, and thus the application of these 
classifications to other cinemas is limited – though certainly not untenable.‖ 
(Frampton, 1986, p.12) Despite his criticism, Frampton also suggests that there 
might be a scope for a wider interpretation of Deleuze‘s ideas within mainstream 
Hollywood, and I will attempt to show in how far specific aspects of the time-
image have influenced and modified the contemporary movement-image. 
 
It is important to note that Deleuze emphasises that there is no hierarchy between 
the two types of cinema. He writes in his preface to the English edition of the 
cinema-books that it is not a ―matter of saying that the modern cinema of the 
time-image is ‗more valuable‘ than the classical cinema of the movement image. 
[...] The cinema is always as perfect as it can be, taking into account the images 
and signs which it invents and which it has at its disposal at a given moment.‖ 
(Deleuze, 1986, p.xii). Despite that, it can be criticised that his analysis of modern 
post-war cinema largely ignores a significant proportion of cinema. For example, 
while talking at length about the emergence of Italian Neorealism immediately 
after the war, he gives no account of the significant output of historical and 
religious epics that came not only from Hollywood but also from Italy, France 
and other European countries.19 Thus one might ask, as this thesis does, if the 
audience, despite feeling disillusioned and lost, wasactually longing for these grand 
                                            
19 For examples on post-war Hollywood epics, refer to footnote at the beginning of 
chapter five. European epics from that period include the Bible epics La Regina di Saba 
(dir. Pietro Francisci, 1952, IT), La Spada e la Croce (dir. Carlo Ludovico Bragaglia, 1958, 
IT), Giuditta e Oloferne (dir. Fernando Cerchio, 1959, IT/France), Erode il Grande (dir. 
Viktor Tourjansky, 1958), Bethsabée (dir. Léonide Moguy, 1947, France) and Le chemin de 
Damas (dir. Max Glass, 1952, France) 
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narratives that may reinstate a lost connection with the shattered world around 
them. As we will see, the movement-image presents this connection and will thus 
always remain the standard for mainstream cinema as Deleuze 
acknowledges(1986, p.210) 
 
As the focus of this thesis is on Hollywood cinema, I will largely focus on the 
movement-image and aim to look at how this image continued to develop after 
the Second World War. Nevertheless, the emergence of the time-image has also 
influenced the movement-image, which makes it indispensable to look at some 
specific aspects of the new images in more detail. Particularly when talking about 
contemporary digital cinema, a concept of film that involves both images seems 
most fruitful as I will argue later in this chapter as well as throughout Part Two.  
 
On the most basic level, Deleuze defines the difference between movement-image 
and time-image in relation to the representation of time. Whereas in the classical 
cinema time is subordinate to movement, meaning that time only appears as 
duration in clearly structured units that present the development of the narrative, 
i.e. the movement of the story, this hierarchy is reversed in modern cinema. 
According to Deleuze, the time-image succeeds in presenting time in its own 
terms, by making it visible. Characteristics are breaks in movement, purely optical 
situations where seeing is not translated in movement, where no action takes 
place. Even in films where there is an apparent action, this is often in form of 
aimless meandering, so that the passing timebecomes more important than any 
purpose or destination. 
 
Yet, apart from its representation of time, Deleuze also links the time-image to 
new concepts of reality. Here, one of the aspects in the relationship between 
movement-image and time-image is the distinction between actual and virtual. 
Deleuze argues that rather than challenging the above outlinedrealism of the 
movement-image, the time-image opposes its actuality. As Deleuze (1989) writes, 
the ―time-image [...] is virtual, in opposition to the actuality of the movement-
image. But, if virtual is opposed to actual, it is not opposed to real, far from it.‖ 
(p.40). This distinction between actual and virtual connects the time-image to new 
space-time relationships where various layers of reality and thought can co-exist. 
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This notion will be particularly interesting for my discussion of Avatar in chapter 
six. Yet, it is important to emphasise that both the time-image and the movement-
image can be similarly realistic or un-realistic, although they represent their reality 
in a very different form. Whereas the organic representation of the movement-
image is aimed at truthfulness by presenting it as a whole in which everything is 
ordered, the time-image gives rise to a new form of storytelling, where boundaries 
are pushed and binary oppositions disappear. Deleuze calls this falsifying narration 
and while he bases his ideas of the movement-image on Bergson‘s theories of 
perception and movement, he now refers to Nietzsche‘s writings on judgement. 
His analysis thus shifts gradually from aesthetic considerations of the different 
images to ethical ideas about the truthfulness and believability of the two types of 
cinema connected to these images. His focus also moves from the images to the 
narration. 
 
With the departure from the classical organic representation that represents a 
believable realism the narration of the time-image, the ―ceases to be truthful, that 
is, to claim to be true, and becomes fundamentally falsifying. […] It is a power of 
the false which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because it poses the 
simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the coexistence of not-necessarily true 
pasts.‖(Deleuze, 1989, p.127). Unlike in the classical movement-image, causal 
relations now no longer allow us to draw universal conclusions about the 
situations and the characters and we are presented with a variety of options that 
can all be true or false, or both at the same time. 
 
In the classical cinema, the narrative structure of cinema plays an essential role in 
creating the believability of the film. As discussed in the first chapter, storytelling 
is an important factor in relation to belief and fundamental to religion and 
mythology. Deleuze further argues that classical narration is almost inevitably 
linked to a system of judgement, ―even when acquittal takes place due to the 
benefit of the doubt, or when the guilty is so only because of fate.‖ (Deleuze 
1989, p.129) In contrast to this, the falsifying narration of the time-image destroys 
this system of judgement. This means that whereas in the cinema of the 
movement-image moral judgements – explicitly or implied – were a crucial part of 
the story, these values lose their validity in the time-image and are no longer 
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justified, because the conditions that validated them have become obsolete. As a 
consequence, it becomes difficult for these stories to provide us with guiding and 
consoling ideas about our world and our future, which is likely to be one of the 
reasons why mainstream cinema never went down this route as Deleuze had 
emphasised.  
 
Nevertheless, there is potential to reconcile our longing for universal ideas with 
the post-modern scepticism of the time-image. We can achieve this by reminiscing 
Nietzsche‘s theories discussed in chapter one. As I have outlined, Nietzsche‘s 
notion of myth and illusion has a strong creative component, rather than just 
being duped the audience actively participates in the creation of the illusion. 
Deleuze follows this idea to a certain extent, although he does not explicitly refer 
to the theories developed in The Birth of Tragedy. Based on Nietzsche, Deleuze 
argues that the truthfulness of the old cinema is replaced with the creative power 
of the artist, as the creator of truth. Only the creative power of the artist can make 
a real change to cinema by overcoming purely aesthetic changes to the visual 
representation and transforming the truthfulness of cinema. Deleuze (1989) 
claims that we then reach the point, where there  
 
―is no longer either truth or appearance. There is no longer either invariable 
form or variable point of view on to a form. There is a point of view which 
belongs so much to the thing that the thing is constantly transformed in a 
becoming identical to point of view. Metamorphosis of the true. What the 
artist is, is creator of truth, because truth is not to be achieved, formed, or 
reproduced, it has to be created.‖(p.142). 
 
In my understanding this is not as far away from the original creation of myth 
related to the organic representation, the difference is that the apparent 
truthfulness of the former is replaced by the notion of belief in the latter, yet the 
distinction remains vague. Similarly to Kracauer‘s approach, Deleuze states in the 
second part of his work, the crucial problem of our modern society is that we 
have lost our belief in the world around us. As portrayed at the beginning of The 
Time-Image, the problem for people in the post-war period is that their connection 
with the world is shattered; they have lost their belief and hope in the future. 
Deleuze describes modern man as a spiritual automaton, who sees more than he is 
able to think, incapable of action, because thinking is already a form of action. 
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The ultimate question is how people can get out of this paralysed state. For 
Deleuze the answer it seems is simple, we have to ―believe, not in a different 
world, but in a link between man and the world, in love or life, to believe in this as 
in the impossible, the unthinkable, which none the less cannot but be thought: 
‗something possible, otherwise I will suffocate‘.‖(Deleuze, 1989, p.164). 
Confronted with a reality impossible to be captured rationally, belief becomes the 
only possible reaction. It is the leap of faith required for survival.Here, Deleuze 
again comes close to Nietzsche, who claimed that when rationality finally reaches 
its boundaries, it can only be belief – illusion – that saves us from drowning in 
despair. In addition, these ideas also link Deleuze to Kracauer, who argued that 
only cinema can reinstate our connection with our world and in that sense 
Deleuze‘s concepts brings the two previous theorists together.  
 
The power of cinema to create a link with the world we can believe in is one of 
the key ideas of this thesis and Deleuze‘s theories largely support this claim. The 
major flaw in Deleuze‘s thinking is that he first moves away from the cinema of 
the movement-image that constituted a convincing system of truthfulness and 
then asks modern cinema, which has disposed of this system, to reinstate the 
belief. Although it is valid to note that certain old ideas and ideals presented by 
the movement image may have lost their legitimacy for an increasingly critical 
audience, but this does not explain why this classical cinema continues to be 
successful. I therefore argue that in the same way that the movement-image was 
inspired by the time-image, the development of the time-image is equally 
influenced by the organic concept of the movement-image from which it tries to 
escape. Disappointingly, Deleuze‘s theories here become increasingly vague as he 
struggles to justify how the falsifying narration can create a model of truth that is 
different from the old one. Deleuze suggests that cinema should no longer create 
the perfect illusion of a world but simply belief in our own world and be the creator 
of truth.I argue, however, that this is exactly what the old cinema has done. Its 
truthfulness and realism is by no means a natural given, even though the organic 
style of its representation suggests this. Rather, it created the illusion of truthfulness – 
of being true or real – by creating a world we want to believe in. 
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I further argue that by having another look at the development of the movement-
image particularly in the post-war period, we can see why it is so powerful. One 
argument here is that it seems that reinstating belief also restores people‘s ability 
to think as thinking is a reaction – an action. We can compare this notion to 
Nietzsche‘s example of Hamlet (Birth of Tragedy, chapter VII), who is so 
overwhelmed by what he sees that he is unable to react. Nietzsche claims that 
only artistic illusion can save us from this state – and creating compelling artistic 
illusions is the domain of the movement-image.In fact Deleuze himself seems to 
realise that he cannot get away from the movement-image when discussing belief. 
He writes that it is ―as if cinema were telling us: with me, with the movement-
image, you can‘t escape the shock which arouses the thinker in you. A subjective 
and collective automaton for an automatic movement: the art of the ‗masses‘.‖ 
(Deleuze, 1989, p.151).  
 
Here, Deleuze refers to the notion of the spiritual automaton, a kind of thinking 
machine, pure thought. He describes cinema as a big mechanism that forces us to 
believe and thus enables us to move on. Even though the mechanical, collective 
automata of the movement-image have been substituted by the spiritual automata 
of the time-image, the concept itself seems to be essential to cinema, or more 
precisely essential to the movement-image. Deleuze (1989) states that if ―cinema is 
automatisms become spiritual art – that is, initially movement-image – it 
confronts automata, not accidentally, but fundamentally.‖(p.252). Deleuze 
suggests at the end of The Time-Image that automata take increasingly complex 
forms in contemporary cinema, as computer, networks and cybernetic automata – 
automata of thought. Whereas the automata of the classical cinema of the 
movement-image were still ruled by a single, sometimes mysterious, power behind 
them, this power is now diverted and becomes ever more diffuse. This already 
points towards a digital future of cinema, as I will further discuss in the final 
chapter. 
 
In addition, there is another aspect in Deleuze‘s ideas on spiritual automata that 
link his theories to the films I will analyse in the second part of the thesis. Deleuze 
claims that these new automata also bring back the chance of grand mise-en-
scenes, which are a characteristic of the movement-image. Connecting his notion 
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of the spiritual automata to his previous thoughts on belief towards the end of The 
Time-Image, he assigns cinema a catholic quality, comparing Catholicism as ―a grand 
mise-en-scène‖ with cinema, which produces ―a cult which takes over the circuit 
of the cathedrals‖ (Deleuze, 1989, p.165).This idea is evident in the revival of 
grand epics that I will discuss later on. Continuing Deleuze‘s line of thought from 
the 1980s towards the new millennium, I will show that the use of computer 
generated images endorses this classical style of the movement-image, as can be 
seen in the breathtaking mise-en-scène in Lord of the Rings (dir. P. Jackson, 2001-
03), the mass movements in Troy (dir. W. Petersen, 2004) and the quite literal 
spiritual and physical automata found in Avatar (dir. J. Cameron, 2009).  
 
Deleuze finally acknowledges that with the increasing influence of electronic 
images, the time-image has reached a point where its criteria are no longer 
sufficient to explain these new types of images. He suggests that we may need yet 
another type of image to explain these new forms, yet my claim is that the way to 
understand these new images is by revisiting the movement-image and examining 
its intersection with the time-image in contemporary cinema as I will demonstrate 
in the second part of this thesis. 
 
There are several other theorists that have attempted to develop Deleuze‘s ideas 
further into the twenty-first century. In his book FilmosophyDaniel Frampton 
(2006) he envisions films as a form of thinking, a system of thoughts, ideas and 
memories. Frampton claims that cinema ―believes in its objects just as we have a 
belief about our past. Film can thus possibly help us understand our own forms of 
memory and recollection.‖ (Frampton, 2006, p.19). Yet Frampton insists that he 
does not simply use film to illustrate thought processes, but that cinema itself is a 
form of thinking.  
 
There are several problems with understanding this theory, especially since he 
proceeds by saying that the basic and most obvious elements that show us 
thought processes in film are metaphors and illustrations, whereas he 
simultaneously criticises theorists that use cinema as illustration for philosophical 
concepts. The more interesting argument is that Frampton suggests that a simple 
analogy between film and thinking is far too limiting. Thus he proposes a new 
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concept of particularly filmic thinking, a more poetical, non-linear concept of 
thinking in, of and about film. Similar to Martin & Ostwalt‘s notion in chapter 
one, he objects that theorists don‘t ―seem confident enough to allow ‗thinking‘ 
into the plainest of films. The reason most writers hold this view is that they are 
not able to get past the idea of thinking as ‗obvious‘ or ‗ostensibly intentional‘.‖ 
(Frampton, 2006, p.32). He argues that it is well worth taking mainstream cinema 
into account when talking about film and thinking.  
 
Frampton further criticises the idea that film is similar to human perception. Like 
Kracauer and Deleuze before him, he states that film works quite differently and 
enables us to see things we could not naturally perceive. He claims that cinema 
goes beyond our perception and it differs from it, by directly showing us „film-
thinking‟.Each film reproduces cinema via references and homages to other films 
and by the way it influences the lives of the audience. Referring to Deleuze, 
Frampton (2006) states that the film image is always different from what it 
represents, ―cinema is beyond the bounds of representation; it is the image that is 
the real ‗thing‘ present to the filmgoer.‖ (p.61).  
 
Frampton claims that both the movement-image and the time-image present their 
own kind of thinking, that influence the audience in different ways. Whereas the 
movement-image presents naturally structured narratives that conceal the actual 
process of film making and therefore deliver a realistic image, the time-image 
presents the deconstruction of ―representability‖ and finally only allows the leap 
to transcendent belief. Frampton (2006) describes the different systems of 
thinking which these images inspire as follows: 
 
―A basic metaphorical sequence will cause the filmgoer to think, cause them 
to receive a fairly distinct idea. A somewhat more irrational sequence will 
cause the filmgoer to think and receive (a less exact) idea, and the shock of 
this ‗new idea‘ will cause the filmgoer to go back to the images, re-experience 
them, and see within them a belief or interpretation that caused the idea. In 
other words, the shock effect of false movement and irrational cuts (forms of 
the time-image) provokes the filmgoer‘s ‗new‘ thought, which brings them 
back to the image, and the interpretation or belief within the image itself.‖ 
(p.63-64) 
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Frampton sees the interesting aspect of Deleuze‘s theory, particularly in TheTime-
Image, as being the inevitable connection between film thinking and believing. He 
argues that by claiming that cinema reinstates our belief in the world, Deleuze 
promotes a unique filmic thinking about our world. This thinking interprets and 
changes our world, creating a film-world to which we relate not only rationally but 
intuitively and emotionally.  
 
Frampton points out that especially the latest developments in cinema demand 
new concepts of thinking as new technologies of image creation free narration 
from traditional concepts of referentiality and authorship. He emphasises that 
cinema has always created its own world and the audience has always been 
prepared to accept the world cinema creates. With contemporary digital cinema 
we are leaving the last connections to physical laws and photo-real references 
behind, while still creating worlds that are as compelling and realistic as never 
before. Drawing on Deleuze, Frampton characterises his own concept of 
‗filmosophical thinking‘ as an organic concept, where each image also reflects the 
thinking of the whole. Frampton suggests that what we see is not only an image or 
a character, but also the film‘s own ‗belief‘ in and about this image or character.  
 
There are various extents to which the film thinking is present in cinema. It can 
either aim at a neutral presentation of its images and objects or apply a strong 
judgement or perspective towards its objects. Nevertheless, Frampton argues that 
the audience does not want the film to explain itself, but to illuminate the story and 
images, it wants cinema to provide the rhetoric tools that allows it to experience 
and engage with the film, both consciously and subconsciously. He writes that 
―Filmosophers want to believe the film, want to be swept into the film, want to 
engage with the drama as fully as possible. They want the horror to scare us, the 
comedy to make us laugh, the drama to make us cry.‖ (Frampton, 2006, p.154). 
This suggests that Frampton claims film theorist should not shy away from 
engaging with film in the way the rest of the audience does, being moved and 
amused by cinema instead of taking a simply analytical perspective that loses the 
aspect of enchantment, which is often crucial for understanding cinema. 
Frampton points out that our engagement with a film might be a conscious 
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process when we start watching the film, but as soon the film develops we rather 
feel the film directly. 
 
Especially recent cinema, that seamlessly mixes digital and photo-real images, 
provides us with a new form of reality, which provokes new experiences and as a 
consequence new thinking and emotions. In other words, cinema ―seems to 
engender a new kind of belief – we recognise its reality as being like ours, but we 
do not expect its reality to always act like ours (in fact we like it to differ quite a 
bit).‖ (Frampton, 2006, p.155).  
 
Frampton further argues that a good film theory should take this into 
consideration by looking at cinema as a whole and not destroy a film by taking it 
to pieces in order to analyse individual theoretical and technical aspects. This 
approach is not able to capture the essence of a film, the thinking of the film. 
Here, Frampton is in line with the previously discussed theorists, who favour a 
more inclusive, universal approach to an in-depth, analytical one. Frampton 
evokes a development of ideas starting from reflexive, poetic philosophical 
concepts by Nietzsche and later Derrida via the images of thought in Deleuze, 
towards a new philosophical film thinking. He asserts that his concept of film-
thinking reveals the content beyond dialectics and truth, which is based on an 
open judgement and creates a unique filmic truth. As the engagement with film 
thinking is not just a rational one, the audience connects with cinema on a deeper 
level. Film thus can show us abstract concepts such as space, time and identity not 
through reason, but through images and sounds. 
 
In the final chapter Frampton discusses digital cinema and the way it influences 
and alters concepts of filmic thinking in more detail. He argues that purely digital 
cinema is less interesting as it presents a world that visually differs significantly 
from our own. Therefore viewers rather connect with it on a rational, aesthetic 
level. At the beginning of chapter six I will discuss several digital epics that seem 
to be consistent with this claim. Nevertheless, Frampton also acknowledges that 
technical developments may likely proceed to a stage where computer generated 
images really become indistinguishable from photographed ones. ―Cinema will 
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then truly become its own new world – able to show anything, be anything, go 
anywhere, think anything...‖ (Frampton, 2006, p.205).  
 
However, currently more relevant for contemporary cinema is what Frampton 
calls fluid film-thinking, the blending of traditionally photographed and computer 
generated images. Like purely digital cinema, it gives the filmmaker full creative 
freedom, which allows him to completely alter images, but these images have the 
additional advantage of having an apparent photo-real referent. According to 
Frampton, contemporary digital cinema is not primarily about creating entirely 
new worlds, but altering the image of our own world by adding fresh perspectives 
and variables. This still provides the audience with familiar elements, so that we 
engage with the new images and thoughts on a more immediate, intuitive, 
emotional level and not just on an abstract, aesthetical level, where we appreciate 
the art and craft without being moved or drawn in the story. 
 
In conclusion, Frampton (2006) states that ―to see films as thinking is to credit 
them with power and creative intention.‖ (p.211). He argues that since our world 
is undoubtedly shaped by the various forms of media we are consuming daily, it is 
crucial to understand them in order to understand our world. In the second part 
of this thesis, and particularly in the final chapter, I will discuss these new 
thoughts and images presented in digital cinema in more detail. To gain a better 
insight into the debate surrounding recent developments in digital cinema I will 
review several essays on this topic in the following part of this chapter.  
 
 
3.2 Brave new worlds – computer generated images and a new aesthetics 
 
In the 1990s, computer generated images started to gain widespread influence in 
mainstream Hollywood cinema. Films such as Jurassic Park (dir. S. Spielberg, 1993) 
and its sequels made use of increasingly sophisticated CGI creatures that acted on 
screen convincingly with real-life actors. This new development also posed new 
questions for film theorists and in the concluding part of this chapter I will 
discuss several articles that illustrate the various debates.  
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The general problem the following theorists are fighting with is the idea that 
cinematic realism is based on the fact that the camera image has a referent in 
reality, similar to the photographic image. As I have shown in the previous 
chapters, shifting the focus to storytelling and myth allows us to move away from 
discussing the images as such and focussing on the overall illusion cinema creates. 
Nevertheless, by looking at alternative ways to interpret these new cinematic 
images, the following articles will contribute towards the discussion of 
contemporary Hollywood films in the second part of this thesis 
 
One of the earliest articles discussing the aesthetic consequences of computer 
generated images is ‗Film theory in the Digital World‘ (1990). In this paper, John 
Andrew Berton, Jr. revisits classical texts from the early stages of film theory, such 
as Kuleshov, Bazin and Arnheim. This interesting approach is grounded in his 
argument that the arrival of digital technologies can be compared to the arrival of 
cinema as a new medium, when theorists were searching for new concepts to 
explain a significantly different type of medium.  
 
Berton claims that similar to the invention of the film camera, the computer was 
not intentionally created as an artistic tool. As a consequence, technological 
aspects often supersede the aesthetic and artistic aspects of the medium, in early 
cinema as well as in early digital cinema. The process of image creation seems to be 
more important than the content and meaning carried by those images. Thus, 
Berton suggests that both theorists and practitioners should put more emphasis 
on how digital technology can be used in a creative way.  
 
He further suggests that the way digital artists and film makers approach the new 
technology is comparable to the works of Méliès in the early days of cinema. 
Méliès tried to explore the extent to which time and space can be manipulated by 
cinema and then used it creatively. 
 
Discussing Russian filmmaker and early film theorist Lev Kuleshov, who was the 
first to develop aesthetic concepts of montage, Berton points out that according 
to Kuleshov, a filmmaker must pay close attention to the organisation of images in 
order to give the audience an image that is easily and efficiently understood. This 
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is exactly the aspect where Kuleshov seem to be perfectly applicable to modern 
digital cinema. Berton (1990) states that in all his ideas ―Kuleshov seems to call 
for exactly what digital cinema offers: complete control over every structural 
element in both the world space and screen space of the shot.‖ (p.8).  
 
Kuleshov had bemoaned that there are often elements of reality in filmic images 
that are beyond the control of the filmmaker which might distract and confuse the 
spectator. These elements, however, do not naturally exist in digital cinema, 
because a digital image only entails those elements that are specifically and 
individually created to be in this image. Strangely enough, as Berton points out, 
digital artists in practice often include these ‗meaningless‘ elements, often simply 
because they are technologically available and can thus show off the technology. 
This notion supports his claim that the current emphasis lies on technological 
aspects rather than aesthetical ones. This aspect is rather important for digital 
cinema, especially films such as Avatar (2009, dir. by J. Cameron), where images 
often appear as too neat and controlled. The cyber jungle of the film may be 
beautiful, but is a far cry from the complexity of an existing rain forest. I will 
return to this aspect in chapter six.  
 
Berton then moves on to discuss André Bazin‘s concept of cinematic realism, 
whose theories seem to have a revival in the digital age. In contrast to the artistic 
approach of Méliès, who highlighted the ability of cinema to extend and 
reinterpret reality, Bazin emphasises cinema‘s ability to recreate reality accurately 
with a minimum of reinterpretation, although there are modifications to this view 
as I have shown in the last chapter.  
 
Berton notes that although the current state of technological development still 
only produces incomplete substitutes of photo-real reality, it is very possible that 
future technology will be able to produce digital images that cannot easily be 
divided from photographic images. For Berton, the present lack of realism in 
digital cinema is mainly due to the lack of complexity within the images. The point 
of complexity relates on one hand to the richness of the image as mentioned 
above when discussing Kuleshov and ob the other to the links between the 
objects of an image. Bazin had argued that realism is largely based on complex 
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connections between the objects and the world within an image, as well as the 
other images. This is comparable to Deleuze‘s organic concept, where the whole 
is actualised in the individual and the individual in turn influences the whole.  
 
Berton argues that when following Bazin‘s notion of realism, a digital filmmaker 
has to build a film world that recreates the visual as well as the contextual 
complexity of reality by ―embracing the highest possible technology in image 
generation without allowing the technology itself to rule the work‖, in other 
words, the ―computer makes the viewer believe that an object exists, but the artist 
must make the viewer believe that the object‘s existence has meaning.‖ (Berton, 
1990, p.9). Berton concludes that Bazin‘s concepts of realism based on a complex 
reality provides digital cinema with an aesthetic concept that encourages 
filmmakers and theorists to discuss images based on the complexity of their 
reality, irrespective of the way these images were produced.  
 
Finally, Berton reviews Rudolf Arnheim, who described the cinematic space as a 
primarily artificial space. He claimed in contrast to Bazin that while filming, the 
camera already fundamentally changes the elements of reality that it captures. By 
choosing a camera angle or a specific point of view the filmmaker excludes 
elements of reality that would otherwise be visible to the spectator. Following on 
Arnheim‘s concepts, Berton (1990) argues that if ―photographic cinema has great 
artistic potential in part because its representations of reality are filtered, then 
digital cinema has the same potential because its filtering process is much more 
complex, and much more controllable.‖ (p.10). With digital technology then, the 
filmmaker has more facilities to create exactly the cinematic worlds he or she 
intends and has full control over the selection. 
 
Based on his examination of these three theorists, Berton suggests that the 
improvement in technologies might reduce the artist‘s concern with basic aspects 
of filmmaking by allowing him to fully focus on the content and aesthetic concepts 
used to realise his cinematic vision and thus liberates him creatively. This last 
aspect of Berton‘s paper suggests that the use of CGI and other forms of digital 
cinema, such as correcting and modifying images in post-production, might make 
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filmmaking not only more efficient but also sets it free from previous technical 
restrictions. 
 
Berton shows new ways of interpreting realism based on traditional film 
theoretical concepts. Stephen Prince suggests another approach to deal with the 
difficulty in describing the new cinematic images. In his article ‗True Lies: 
Perceptual Realism, Digital Images, and Film Theory‘, he proposes a concept of 
cinematic realism that is no longer based on its reference to physical reality but 
rather on our perception.At the beginning of his essay he poses the question of 
which influences new technologies will have on film theory, in particular those 
based on photographic realism. He sees this concept challenged by the fact that 
―viewers of Steven Spielberg‘s Jurassic Park watched photographic images of 
moving, breathing, and chomping dinosaurs, images which have no basis in any 
photographable reality but which nevertheless seemed realistic.‖ (Prince, 1996, 
p.28). Prince claims that film theory still has problems analysing these 
phenomena, whereas the audience seems much more willing to accept these 
images as ‗real‘. He claims that viewers make general judgements about the 
perceived realism of certain images or characters in a film, even if these images are 
obviously fictional.  
 
Based on this notion, we can easily accept the various creatures living in the jungle 
in Avatar. Despite being tall and blue, the local population acts and speaks and 
reacts quite similar to the humans and interacts with them naturally. Similarly, the 
Gollum in The Lord of the Rings (2001-03, dir. P. Jackson) still has human features 
and a human actor behind his making, and the Oliphants in the third part are only 
slightly different from the elephants we know.  
 
Prince initially looks at classical film theorists such as Bazin and Kracauer to 
explain the traditional concept of realism based on indexical references. Unlike 
paintings, photographic images are connected to a referent existing in physical 
reality. Because of the paradoxical nature of having credible ‗photographic‘ images 
of things impossible to photograph, Prince (1996) suggests a new model of 
realism ―based on perceptual and social correspondences, of how the cinema 
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communicates and is intelligible to viewers.‖ (p.28). He calls this new approach 
‗perceptual realism‘. 
 
Nevertheless, Prince acknowledges that despite the fact that computer generated 
images, such as the aforementioned dinosaurs, do not have a (living) reference in 
reality, they can still have certain references to physical reality. This means that the 
individual elements of the image, namely lighting, surface texture, movements etc. 
provide the audiences with clues that are familiar to them, so that they are easily 
able to refer the ‗unreal‘ images to their own physical world space.Prince admits 
that these referentially based conceptions of cinematographic realism have always 
been just one tendency in film theory and that there have been alternative models, 
such as the formalist school. These alternative models emphasised the ability of 
cinema to recognise, falsify and creatively alter physical reality. Yet Prince sees in 
these two concepts a bipolar tradition of film theory that only defines the two 
ends of the spectrum. This duality has been further nurtured by modern film 
theory.  
 
According to Prince (1996) ―classical film theory was organized by a dichotomy 
between realism and formalism, contemporary theory has preserved the 
dichotomy even while recasting one set of its terms. Today indexically based 
notions of cinema realism exist in tension with a semiotic view of the cinema as 
discourse and of realism as one discourse among others.‖ (p.31). 
 
Prince suggests that this constant tension in film theory can be overcome by 
employing his new correspondence based model for describing cinematic images. 
He writes that instead ―of asking whether a film is realistic or formalistic, we can 
ask about the kinds of linkages that connect the represented fictionalized reality of 
a given film to the visual and social coordinates of our own three-dimensional 
world, and this can be done for both ‗realist‘ and ‗fantasy‘ films alike.‖ (Prince, 
1996, p.32).  
 
This correspondence based model draws on the viewer‘s experiences of his own 
world. In this way, an image might be referentially fictional but still perceptually 
realistic, because it does structurally correspond with the viewer‘s audiovisual 
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experience. Moreover, those perceptually realistic images ―correspond to this 
experience because film-makers build them to do so. Such images display a nested 
hierarchy of cues which organize the display of light, colour, texture, movement, 
and sound in ways that correspond with the viewer‘s own understanding of these 
phenomena in daily life.‖ (Prince, 1996, p.32).Thus, Prince‘s perceptual realism is 
based on the relationship between the cinematic images and the viewer, and this 
relationship includes entirely artificial and fictional images as well as those based 
on reality. Prince (1996) even goes as far as to suggest that because ―computer-
generated images have been rendered with such attention to 3D spatial 
information, they acquire a very powerful perceptual realism, despite the obvious 
ontological problems in calling them ‗realistic‘.‖ (p.34). 
 
As a result, Prince concludes that the emphasis in contemporary film theory is 
shifting towards a cinematic discourse, which acknowledges the fact that the 
cinematographic image is not just either indexical recording of reality or artistic 
transfiguration, but (nearly) always both.This notion may help us in discussing 
films such as The Lord of the Rings and Troy (2004, W. Petersen) as realistic in the 
way they are perceived by the audience, which I will attempt in the following 
chapters. 
 
In a more recent article, published in 2004, Prince updates his ideas and argues 
that the major impact of digital technology is in areas where they are not often 
noticed as such by the audience, e.g. by enhancing lighting and colours in 
postproduction, editing out flaws and so on. Therefore, one has to ask whether 
new technologies alter cinema on a much deeper structural level than the obvious 
use of computer generated images suggests. Whereas special-effects might 
advertise CGI to the audience, they have always been part of cinema and created 
exciting and outstanding images throughout film history.  
 
Prince, however, wants to discuss how the more subtle use of digital imaging 
technology changes the audience‘s perception of cinema. Like other writers 
discussed here, Prince stresses the significant increase in artistic freedom through 
the use of digital filmmaking and compares this with the creative flexibility of 
painters. These new images nevertheless look ‗natural‘, maybe even more natural 
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in the way they help us to ‗understand‘ the images as related to the narrative. He 
also points out that from an aesthetic perspective ―the wide-angle look of digital 
video arguably fulfils the ideal for cinema that Bazin explicated, that of replicating 
the viewer‘s ontological experience of a rich, multi-plane visual world.‖ (Prince, 
2004, p.31). However, Prince notes that the ethical perspective of this conception 
of realism is yet to be discussed, but leaves that open for others to attempt.  
 
Prince finally proposes that cinema will continue to tell stories irrespective of the 
type of recording used. However, he claims that ―the quality and the character of 
light itself, and the perceptual experiences it induces in viewers, provides perhaps 
the most integral conception of the medium, and it is here – in the nature of the 
light-induced perceptual experience – that the medium is transforming most 
radically.‖(Prince, 2004, p.32). Yet, this might be simply a generational problem. 
Prince admits that it might simply be the old-fashioned perception of our 
generation who still notices the distinct qualities of celluloid film, whereas the new 
generation, influenced by digital TV and computer games may not actually 
perceive the sharpness, brightness and flawlessness of digital images as ‗unnatural‘. 
This is an aspect I will further review in relation to Avatar and contemporary 3D 
cinema in chapter six. 
 
Towards the end of the millennium, Screen dedicated a special edition to the 
impact of computer generated images on cinema. The three following essays 
derive from this edition and present different aspects of contemporary film theory 
in relation to digital cinema.  
 
In its short introduction, ‗Le réel, c‘est l‘impossible: The sublime time of special 
effects‘, Sean Cubitt discusses the use of special effects in connection with 
philosophical notions of the sublime and the spectacle. Like the aforementioned 
film scholars, he also compares digital technology to tendencies in early cinema, 
especially Méliès and his cinema of attractions. According to Cubitt (1999) the 
sublime ―points towards a time beyond the mundane, a post-mortem time, or a 
time of the gods. The different temporality which the special effect occupies vis-à-
vis the time of narrative indicates its extra-historical, extra-temporal status.‖ 
(p.128). In that sense, the sublime effect of CGI in cinema is an effect outside or 
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beyond the ‗ordinary‘ narration, it is no longer representational but illusionistic, 
thus it requires a unique temporality that differs from the rest of the film. I will 
discuss this aspect further in the second part of the thesis, when looking at the 
most recent digital epics. Particularly when looking at the Lord of the Rings-trilogy, 
the notion of the sublime is important in understanding the distinction between 
the film version and their literary predecessor. 
 
In the article ‗CGI effects in Hollywood science-fiction cinema 1989-95: the 
wonder years‘, Michele Pierson argues along a similar line when she proposes that 
science-fiction cinema in the early nineties presented the computer generated 
images as an event in itself rather than as an integral element of the story. The 
focus was on the technological novelty of digital images. Pierson claims that 
particularly in action focused science-fiction films, the presentation of a crucial 
CGI marks a distinct break in the action of the film. The eagerness of the 
audience to be carried along by the film is suspended for a short time in order to 
allow them to gaze at the digitally created object. She writes that  the “sequences 
featuring CGI commonly exhibit a mode of spectatorial address that – with its 
tableau-style framing, longer takes, and strategic intercutting between shots of the 
computer-generated object and reaction shots of characters – solicits a 
contemplative viewing of the computer-generated image.‖ (Pierson, 1999, p.169). 
However, not every appearance of a computer generated image is exposed in this 
way. Usually, there are various modes of presentation of digital special effects in 
one film as otherwise the event of first appearance would lose its uniqueness.  
 
Another interesting aspect Pierson points out is that the majority of CGI 
enhanced films that were successful with the audience, do not present an ‗as real 
as possible‘ cinematographic image, but rather a new ―hyperreal electronic 
aesthetic‖ that goes beyond. As Pierson (1999) writes, on one hand pulled 
―towards photographic realism and, on the other hand, towards a synthetic 
hyperrealism, the computer-generated imagery in this cinema exhibits an aesthetic 
that plays across these two poles.‖(p.172). This is especially true of most recent 
digital spectacles such as Avatar, as we will see in chapter six. 
 
 112 
Yet, Pierson notes that by the end of the millennium this tendency had already 
come to an end and the presentation of CGI is no longer a central aspect in the 
genre. Digital special effects are no longer mere objects of contemplation and 
become more integrated in the narrative and action of a film. She finally suggests 
that every now and then ―a CGI effect will pop up and again turn the imaging of a 
technological artefact into an occasion for contemplation and wonder. But for the 
moment, at least, the future has once more dropped out of sight in Hollywood 
science-fiction cinema.‖ (Pierson, 1999, p.176) 
 
In a second article, published in Wide Angle in the same year, called No longer State-
of-the-Art: Crafting a Future for CGI, Pierson further emphasises that the period of 
CGI described in her previous article was only temporary and that the implication 
of digital images shifted quickly from exposed presentation and contemplative 
viewing to a more integrated, subtle and indirect approach. Now focussing more 
on editing and the way it is influenced by digital technologies, Pierson (1999b) 
argues that today the ―editing of Hollywood films is much less obviously 
motivated by the desire to maintain visual and narrative continuity than it was 
even a decade ago‖ (p.34), an argument that remains to be proved. She also 
suggests that digital technologies in post-production allow and demand for new 
concepts of montage that create new modes of enchantment. Despite that, 
Pierson concludes that special-effects in general always favour a novelty effect 
over realism and they will lead the way in the development of digital images. The 
most recent 3-D-effects spectacles clearly support that claim. 
 
Warren Buckland‘s essay ‗Between science fact and science fiction: Spielberg‘s 
dinosaurs, possible worlds, and the new aesthetic realism‘, examines computer 
generated images from the perspective of analytic philosophy, more specifically 
modal logic. In contrast to the ideas presented in the previous paragraphs, 
Buckland argues that digital special effects have a function in a film, which goes 
well beyond the creation of spectacle. To analyse CGI and special effects 
independently from the narrative ignores the films capability of creating and 
presenting possible worlds. According to him, a ―possible world is a modal 
extension of the ‗actual world‘, whereas fiction on the other hand can be 
described ―as purely imaginary world that runs parallel to, but is autonomous 
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from, the actual world.‖ (Buckland, 1999, p.177). In this sense, the dinosaurs in 
Spielberg‘s Jurassic Park were so convincing, because they were not entirely 
fictional, but the product of an – however unlikely – scientific experiment, a ‗what 
if‘ scenario. 
 
Digital cinema has according to Buckland a unique capacity to present us with 
possible worlds and not just purely fictional ones, by seamlessly combining actual 
with virtual images through computer generated images. This does not only 
include visible special effects but more importantly invisible special effects, which 
are mainly used when a simulation of an event would be too expensive or 
complicated to produce in reality.  
 
This notion of possibility can also be found in the films discussed in part two of 
this thesis. The Lord of the Rings aims at presenting its universe as pre-prehistoric, 
but nevertheless part of human history, Troy has obvious historic links and Avatar 
presents the unique world of Pandora as simply another planet, which humans 
colonise just a few years from now. All three examples link actual and virtual 
images in the way described above to create a more convincing fictional world.  
 
In general, digital images are a combination of both visible and invisible effects 
and so they ―have the potential to replicate the realism and illusionism of the 
photographic image by conferring a perfect photographic credibility upon objects 
that do not exist in the actual world.‖ (Buckland, 1999, p.185).According to 
Buckland, the fusion of various types of images and effects is one of the key 
elements in establishing realism in contemporary digital cinema. In his analysis of 
Jurassic Park he argues that the composition of images as well as the choice of 
shots and perspectives is fully within the concept of realism developed by Bazin. 
Hollywood mainstream cinema thus creates its unique ‗illusionist realism‘ even 
more so within modern CGI films. More precisely, Buckland (1999) writes that 
the digital compositing used in Jurassic Park and The Lost World creates  
 
―all three types of realism identified by Bazin: ontological realism, in that the 
digital dinosaurs appear to have equal weight and density as the photographic 
background and live-action characters; dramatic realism, in that they are 
seamlessly blended into, and interact with, the photographic background and 
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live-action characters; and psychological realism, in that they are seen to 
occupy the same space as the photographic background and live-action 
characters.‖ (p.189). 
 
Even though these images may not be realistic in a strict ontological sense, 
Buckland argues that the audience does not usually make a high ontological 
commitment to the reality of cinematic objects. But nor does it simply regard 
them as purely imaginary during the film experience. In that way, the ―digital 
image can, by means of special effects, make the possible believable.‖ (Buckland, 
1999, p.191).Buckland describes the audience‘s ‗belief‘ in films, which present 
possible worlds, as a combination of modal propositions in the philosophical 
sense. He therefore sees the value of modal concepts for film theory in its ability 
to describe connections between film and social reality without falling into naïve 
traditional theories of mimeticism.  
 
So far, most articles on digital cinema emphasised the creative possibilities of the 
new medium. Yet, there are also more critical views on the new possibilities 
provided by digital imaging technologies. In his essay ‗Digital Cinema: A false 
revolution‘, John Belton argues that the so called digital revolution is by no means 
comparable with the significant impact of sound film or colour film, as it lacks the 
profound change in the user experience these previous ‗revolutions‘ in cinema 
had. First of all, the transition to digital cinema only takes place very gradually, 
starting with the use of CGI in special-effects production, followed by digital 
sound and finally the gradual arrival of digital projection. Although Belton may 
have a valid point in asserting that the most dramatic impact of digital technology 
takes place on the production level and is thus unnoticed by the spectator, this 
does not mean that new forms of image creation do not also influence the 
audience‘s perception of these new creations. 
 
In addition, Belton assumes that the development of digital cinema is more or less 
purely economically driven and rather directed towards the video and DVD 
market than towards a true revolution in cinema itself. He writes that ―the digital 
revolution is part of a new corporate synergy within Hollywood, driven by the 
lucrative home entertainment market.‖ (Belton, 2002, p.100). It could be similarly 
argued that the development of sound and colour was driven by commercial 
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interests, yet this argument does not per se negate the fact that these developments 
have a significant impact on our experience of cinema. 
 
Lastly, Belton sees a further negative impact of digital cinema by suggesting that 
its influence could lead to a dominance of certain genres specifically equipped to 
use CGI, such as fantasy and science-fiction. He suggests that an ―all-digital 
cinema might become an all-fantasy cinema.‖ (Berton, 2002, p.106). Although it 
can clearly be said that fantasy is a popular genre in contemporary cinema, the 
revival of historic epics in the last decade already contradicts Berton‘s theory.  
 
Despite his overall criticism, Berton acknowledges that the new technologies and 
their relatively cheap and easy availability can also open doors for independent 
filmmakers to fulfil their visions, and thus diversify and democratise filmmaking. 
This final statement would then outweigh his previous claims on the 
commercialist, fantasy-focussed nature of modern digital cinema. 
 
Finally, I will look at Daniel Rodowick‘s essay ‗Dr. Strange Media; Or, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Film Theory‘ (2001). Here, he examines the 
possible futureof film theory based on the assumption that the future of cinema 
itself is unclear in the digital era. 
 
Firstly, Rodowick notes that when digital technologies first entered modern 
cinema, the problem between classic (analogue) and modern (digital) technologies 
even became part of the narratives. Films such as Matrix, 13th Floor and eXistenZ 
discussed the – mostly frightening – impact of worlds created by a computer and 
showed how digital illusions could seamlessly replace our previous perception of 
reality. 
 
Moreover, Rodowick argues that when the discourse between digital and analogue 
takes place within the narrative, analogue images obtain an aesthetic function as 
being more real than the ‗other reality‘, thus the photograph ―becomes the sign of 
the vanishing referent, which is a way of camouflaging its own imaginary status‖ 
(Rodowick, 2001, p.1398). He further adds as an example that ―in the canny 
conclusion of The Matrix, we enjoy both the apotheosis of Nero, the digital 
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superhero, and the preservation of the last human city, Zion, which functions as 
the site of the ‗real,‘ hidden away at the earth's core as a distant utopia.‖ 
(Rodowick, 2001, p.1398).What we see here is also the classic conflict in film 
theory, between art and technology, between cinema as a recording medium and a 
creative configuration of images, which was previously mentioned by Prince.  
 
The paper emphasises that ‗photorealism‘ is still the non-plus-ultra in evaluating 
the quality of digital images. Yet, Rodowick also notes that film theory has since 
its beginnings struggled to find a clear definition of what cinema actually is and 
with digital cinema this question is renewed. Nevertheless, despite the problems 
of theorists in keeping up with the rapid changes in digital media, he has a positive 
view on the future of cinema and its theory. Unlike in the early days of cinema, 
when film history and theory only developed several decades later, ―digital culture 
is not emerging in a similar theoretical vacuum. For the same history positions us 
to better comprehend the complex genealogy defining the technological and 
aesthetic possibilities of computer-generated imagery as well as its commercial and 
popular exploitation.‖ (Rodowick, 2001, p.1404).  
 
The fact that the majority of theorists mentioned in this part review the ideas of 
the pioneers of film theory seems to support this point. In a similar way I will link 
the historic philosophical and cinematic concepts developed in the last three 
chapters to the new possibilities of digital cinema. This framework will allow us to 
gain new insights about old questions regarding our life and its illusions.   
 
 
Summary 
 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, new developments in cinema have 
always posed a challenge for theorists. When Deleuze classified cinema, he 
defined two distinct types of images, the movement-image and the time-image. 
These descriptions not simply referred to the individual images, but also how 
these images relate to each other and create a system of meaning. For Deleuze, 
the shift from movement-image to the time-image took place after the Second 
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World War, when the particular circumstances of post-war society inspired new 
aesthetic approaches towards film.  
 
Like Nietzsche and Kracauer before him, Deleuze clearly links aesthetic 
movements to social and cultural developments and thus emphasises the 
reciprocal influence between cinema and society. However, he also suggests that 
this shift does not take place in all areas of cinema and admits that although some 
new styles of cinema take on new images and structures, the majority of 
mainstream cinema remains within the concept of the movement-image.  
 
As outlined in this chapter, one of the reasons for this tendency is the way of 
representing its images as an organic whole that creates a very specific and 
powerful type of realism within mainstream (Hollywood) cinema. When talking 
about belief later in his books, Deleuze thus returns to these images and links 
them to the return of grand mise-en-scène and other factors that define the arrival 
of electronic images in cinema.  
 
The writers discussed in the second part of this chapter continue this line of 
thought towards contemporary cinema and suggest a variety of approaches to 
capture and explain these new images in aesthetic terms. The second part of this 
thesis will take on these ideas and apply them to the analysis of the most recent 
tendencies in Hollywood cinema. 
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Part II: 
May we really believe in Hollywood? – 
Towards a modern movement-image 
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Chapter Four: 
Redemption through illusion? – Cinematic myths 
 
In the first part of this thesis I have explored several questions regarding the 
relationship between film and illusion, such as its connection with myth and 
religion, aspects of realism and the influence of modern digital technology. More 
specifically, I divided the field into three key aspects, which I regard as crucial for 
my main hypothesis regarding the importance of illusions for our life and the role 
of cinema in their creation. These aspects are: cinema‘s influence on and 
similarities with religious and mythic discourse; the importance of realism in the 
representation of these themes and finally the possibilities of contemporary digital 
cinema in combining these mythic and religious elements with a level of realism 
necessary in the creation of illusions that are influential and believable.  
 
Notwithstanding the different approaches of these theorists, there is a connecting 
line which links these initial chapters with each other. Common to all writers is 
the acknowledgement of art‘s importance for our social life, and the recognition 
of concepts such as redemption and creative power as well as the contrast 
between cinematic realism and reality, between believability and truth. 
 
Having discussed the theoretical framework of belief and illusion in the first 
chapter of the thesis, this fourth chapter analyses these ideas more specifically in 
relation to cinema. In this context, the notion of redemption is particularly 
relevant and I will explore it in relation to cinematic narratives.   
 
The term redemption is also the connecting thread between the ideas of Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Siegfried Kracauer and Gilles Deleuze, which have been discussed in 
the first part of this thesis. Nietzsche (Birth of Tragedy, section4) first spoke about 
―redemption through illusion‖ pointing out the importance of art in saving us 
from the despondency of everyday reality. Kracauer (1961) later speaks about the 
―redemption of physical reality‖ (p.300), a role that he assigns to film and which 
illustrates the cinematic power of creating a unified view of the world that would 
otherwise be impossible. Deleuze (1989) finally speaks about redemption as ―art 
beyond knowledge‖ (p.259) in the later chapters of his second cinema book, in 
which he discusses the connection between cinema and religion. This statement 
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suggests that art itself is the redemption that propels us beyond rational, scientific 
knowledge and information by providing a higher set of ideas and inspiration. 
Deleuze also assigns modern cinema the leading role in reinstating our belief in 
the world, an idea I will evaluate in this second part of the thesis. As a 
consequence, the questions that will be analysed in this chapter are: How does the 
notion of redemption relate to cinema? What is redeemed and by what means is 
this achieved? Moreover, how is cinema as a medium able to deal with 
redemption and what is the role of the narrative in representing a concept of 
redemption? And finally, how is this connected with a notion of belief, illusion 
and reality? 
 
The first part of this chapter will analyse the redemptive qualities of cinema in 
relation to other forms of storytelling, such as myth, epics and fairy-tales, that all 
carry a motif of redemption. They also encompass a very distinct set of elements, 
e.g. the quest, the hero etc., that are equally relevant for cinema and I aim to 
explore their importance in the creation of a redemptive illusion. As a basis for 
this analysis I will draw on myth theories by Joseph Campbell and others. The 
second part of this chapter applies these aspects to Peter Jackson‘s The Lord of the 
Rings (2001-2003, USA/NZ), which is not only extraordinary in terms of its 
cinematic achievement, but also with regard to its impact on a considerable 
number of people.20 In this context I will discuss how the subject of redemption is 
represented within the narrative of the films, but moreover how these films 
redeem traditional philosophical concepts for popular culture. Accordingly, I look 
firstly at the way the mythic story is constructed in the Lord of the Rings-trilogy and 
compare this to traditional elements of storytelling. Secondly, I will ask how this is 
visualised to emphasise the illusion for the audience. In this context I will explore 
aspects of set-design in close relation to the narrative and demonstrate their 
importance in enhancing the believability of the story. Especially with regard to 
the Lord of the Rings-trilogy, which is often discussed in close relation with its 
                                            
20 In total, the trilogy won 17 Oscars, plus another 249 prestigious international film 
awards (including 10 Baftas) and grossed over 1 Billion USD. The individual films are 
ranked on place 19, 31 and 12 in the ‗TOP 250 best films of all times‘ voted by the fans 
of IMDB. Source: www.imdb.com. [Accessed 16 February 2011]. In addition, the 
seemingly endless amount of fanpages on the internet as well as the wealth of academic 
literature already dedicated to the films are prove of their impact. 
 121 
literary source, this latter aspect provides an argument for the unique potential 
and value of the cinematic version beyond Tolkien‘s original myth. 
 
Finally, I will examine the impact of cinematic epics on popular culture in general 
and discuss how the mythic narratives and the illusive power of the films as a 
whole work together to create not only a most convincing cinematic illusion, but 
also transcend the limits of the cinema screen and influence our view of the world 
as such. 
 
 
4.1 Never ending stories – Redemption, storytelling and artistic creation  
 
As outlined in the introduction, I use the term illusion to describe a system of 
stories and values that inspire a culture. In this sense it is similar to myth and I will 
use the two terms synonymously in this chapter. One of the reasons for this is 
that Friedrich Nietzsche, whose theories inform much of this chapter, also used 
both terms more or less interchangeably and as I am frequently referring to his 
ideas it would be artificial to distinguish between the two terms.  
 
To begin with, I will have a closer look at the concept of redemption. The term 
itself is full of religious connotations; hence notions of belief will also be 
discussed in this paragraph. As mentioned at the beginning, Nietzsche talks about 
redemption in various contexts throughout his work, but especially when he talks 
about art and artistic creation. In his Zarathustra he describes the process of artistic 
creation as the ―great redemption from suffering and the life‘s easement‖ 
(Nietzsche, 2003, p.111). This quote points towards the key aspects of this 
concept: redemption as the process that frees us from a state of suffering and 
thereby makes our life easier and more enjoyable. Crucially, however, Nietzsche‘s 
statement also emphasises artistic creation as the act that brings about the 
redemption. As a consequence, we can assume that the illusion created by an artist 
is fundamental in redeeming us from suffering and therefore making our life more 
joyful. This can, of course, be interpreted as mere escapism, but I argue that the 
notion and acknowledgement of suffering as well as the importance of the 
 122 
creative process suggests a more profound concept of redemption that, unlike 
escapism, reaches beyond the cinema reality in our daily life.  
 
As I discussed in the first chapter, the overcoming of suffering and the creation of 
a world of beauty is not simply a naïve process, but a conscious choice out of an 
instinctive creative drive. The idea that this drive is particularly strong in times of 
crisis also highlights the importance of suffering – not physically but rather from a 
lack of meaning – as inspiration for producing particularly strong illusions. The 
aspect of creativity as a proactive process, which Nietzsche describes when 
discussing ancient Greek culture, is relevant for our examination of cinema 
insofar as it moves the cinematic illusion beyond the simple suspension of 
disbelief towards a creation of belief.  
 
Nietzsche notes in his Birth of Tragedy (1999) that ―human beings themselves have 
an unconquerable urge to let themselves be deceived, and they are as if enchanted 
with happiness when the bard recites epic fairy-tales as if they were true, or when 
the actor in a play acts the king more regally than reality shows him to be.‖ 
(p.151). Even though the cinema audience is usually fully aware of the artificiality 
of the illusion, there is the will not only to be deceived, but also to actively participate 
in the creation of the illusion by transferring the story from screen into one‘s own 
consciousness. In addition, two terms can be drawn from this quote, which are 
also closely connected to the cinematic illusion: fairy-tales and enchantment. As 
these terms are also frequently brought up in the scholarly debate on The Lord of 
the Rings film versions, I would like to examine them in more detail now.  
 
Linking the narrative structure of The Lord of the Rings with Nietzsche‘s ideas of 
redemption and suffering, John J. Davenport‘s essay‗Happy Endings and 
Religious Hope: The Lord of the Rings as an Epic Fairy Tale‘ discusses its mythic 
narrative from the perspective of the fairy-tale. Similar to Nietzsche‘s theories 
about artistic creation outlined in the previous paragraph, Davenport (2003) 
acknowledges that each good fairy-tale equally requires a ―tragic recognition of the 
evil and imperfection of our world, or even a Norse-like resignation‖ (p.209), 
before the story eventually leads to a happy ending. 
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Moreover, he also argues that the redemption from this state of resignation and 
despair cannot exclusively derive from the humans themselves but requires some 
divine assistance. It can be added that like fairy-tales, most Greek myths 
incorporate an element of divine interference or at least encouragement despite 
the heroic efforts of the humans. Hence, most Greek heroes are assumed to be 
half-gods, e.g. Achilles, Perseus, Heracles, which is a way of justifying their 
supernatural powers.  
 
In the Lord of the Rings-trilogy we have a variety of magical beings that help the 
quest, e.g. the wizard Gandalf, the Elves, magic trees and so on. Despite the 
paramount efforts from humans and Hobbits alike it seems obvious that they 
would not stand a chance without this supernatural help. Thanks to this support, 
fairy-tales usually have happy endings, which Davenport calls ‗eucatastrophe‘, a 
term he takes from Tolkien, who coined it to describe the positive opposite of the 
catastrophe.  
 
Davenport (2003) further suggests that the ―synthesis of the epic mode, which 
tends towards tragedy and sorrow, with the eucatastrophic consolation of the fairy 
tale, helps explain what several commentators have recognized as the paradoxical 
‗joy-in-sorrow atmosphere [that] pervades the Rings‘ trilogy.‖ (p.215, Davenport 
quoting C. S. Kilby, ‗Meaning in The Lord of the Rings‘). This statement underlines 
the unique appeal of The Lord of the Rings narrative, which reaches its full impact by 
combining various modes of storytelling, such as historic epics, classic myths and 
fairy-tales. I argue, however, that this combination of joy and sorrow described by 
Davenport is not simply a result that comes out of a combination of two different 
modes of storytelling, but essential to most stories. Drawing on Nietzsche‘s 
notions on happiness and redemption as a result of a creative process inspired by 
suffering, this combination of ‗joy-in-sorrow‘ can be assumed as the essential 
aspect of myth in general. In the second part of this chapter, I will illustrate how 
the epic/tragic and the fairy-tale/eucatastrophic can be found along two different 
axes of narration throughout The Lord of the Rings, which culminate only at the end 
of the films.  
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The notion of enchantment is closely related to fairy-tales and mythic stories. In 
her essay ‗‖My Precious‖: Tolkien‘s Fetishized ring‘ (2003), Alison Milbank 
reveals an interesting aspect of Tolkien‘s literary concept. She notes that he draws 
a clear distinction between magic as something that is manipulative and aimed at 
domination and enchantment, which is seen as a shared creative experience that 
produces delight and enrichment. (Milbank, 2003). This aspect refers to the 
difference between the often negative connotations of illusion as being deluded 
and the positive aspect of actively participating in the creation of an illusion. Illusion as 
enchantment thus obtains a much more positive connotation, which corresponds 
with my initial definition of illusion at the beginning of this thesis. If we interpret 
enchantment or illusion as a shared creative experience of a community or society, 
it is also much easier to understand how it can reach beyond the borders of the 
screen. More than just momentarily enchanting us, fairy-tales, myths and epic 
stories are the very foundation of our culture, not simply something that has been 
added to it or is purely providing entertainment.  
 
Nietzsche (1999) had argued that without that mythic constitution of epics and 
fairy-tales, all cultures lose ―their healthy, creative, natural energy‖ and claims that 
―only a horizon surrounded by myths encloses and unifies a cultural movement.‖ 
(p.108). In this way myth forms a kind of overarching system that informs fantasy 
and artistic creation and is in turn influenced by it. Yet as described in the first 
chapter, we have now lost this essential connection with myth, which prompts us 
to be constantly searching for new founding myths.  
 
This concept of myth is equally relevant for popular culture in general, and more 
specifically cinema, where popular stories become part of a common 
consciousness even though we are often not aware of how much we are 
influenced by it. Nietzsche (1999) emphasises this unconscious aspect of myth 
when he argues that these mythic images ―must be unnoticed but omnipresent, 
daemonic guardians under whose tutelage the young soul grows up and by whose 
signs the grown man interprets his life and his struggles‖. (p.108).  
 
It is important for our analysis of cinematic myths that these mythic narratives are 
not necessarily ancient. Deleuze had pointed out that ―The American Dream‖ is 
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probably the most influential modern myth, an ideological concept created by a 
society in its beginnings. Not only is it still a powerful mythic ideal of modern 
American society, it is also closely related to and hugely influential on classic 
Hollywood cinema.  
 
Apart from the enchantment and resulting happiness we can draw from mythic 
stories, they also have an important function in explaining and structuring our 
world and the provision of unifying concepts that guide us. This is the aspect 
Kracauer focuses on when talking about cinema and redemption. The unique 
power of cinema lies for him in providing these unifying concepts, general ideas 
and visions of the world that create the illusion of a whole.  
 
In his book, A Certain Tendency of the Hollywood Cinema, Robert B. Ray (1985) claims 
that Hollywood‘s narrative structure functions in the same way as myth, by 
magically reconciling society‘s irreconcilable contradictions. He further argues that 
Hollywood‘s illusionist style with its emphasis on continuity editing and individual 
perspectives operates to conceal the sources of its creation, and in that way 
succeeds in making a conservative mythology seem natural, real, and true. The 
aspects of realism and believability, truthfulness in the visual representation is 
therefore crucial in fully understanding modern cinematic myths and I will further 
explore this throughout this second part of the thesis.  
 
To start with, however, I would like to focus on the narrative elements that unite 
most myths, epics, fairy-tales and fantasy stories. As noted in chapter one, Star 
Warscreator George Lucas used the theories on myth by anthropologist Joseph 
Campbell as a basis for developing his fantasy epic and since Campbell has 
subsequently had a significant influence on several major Hollywood filmmakers, 
I will briefly examine his key claims.  
 
Campbell had studied mythic narratives from all over the world and derived from 
them the common underlining threads, which he understood to be essential to all 
myths.21 Through Lucas‘ support and the subsequent script writing manual The 
                                            
21 See: Campbell, 1968, The Masks of God as well as R. S. Segal, 1990, Joseph Campbell: An 
Introduction. 
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Writer‟s Journey by Christopher Vogler (1992), which was based on Campbell‘s 
work The Hero with a Thousand Faces (first published 1949), Campbell‘s theories 
became popular in Hollywood. Mainstream production companies suddenly saw it 
as a shortcut towards creating stories (See: Hollywood‟s Master of Myth, BBC, 1999).  
 
On a very basic level, Campbell described myth as the set of stories that can unite 
people, a description that can equally be applied to cinema. More specifically, 
Campbell later argued that the universal language of cinema allowed myths to be 
presented in a visually compelling manner that transcends linguistic boundaries. In 
cinema, the visual components of cinema aid the storytelling function and can 
therefore make a myth even more universally comprehensible. (Campbell, 1999, 
Hollywood‟s Master of Myth) 
 
However, some elements described by Campbell were not completely new; such 
as his notion of archetypes, which had been previously analysed by the 
psychologist C. G. Jung. The concept of the archetype has particularly attracted 
filmmakers as well as film scholars. An interesting example is Terrie Waddell‘s 
(2006) book Mis/takes – Archetype, myth and identity in screen fiction. Going beyond 
the traditional psychological or psychoanalytical concepts, Waddell‘s essay argues 
for a broader understanding of mythic narratives. Waddell (2006) argues that film 
studies often choose a limited approach in the form of a ―spot the archetype‘ 
concentration‖(p.27), which is problematic for an in-depth analysis. She further 
describes that for Jung archetypes were merely a starting point, a seed, from which 
images evolve.22 
 
Another important claim Waddell makes is that since myths are a deep-rooted 
subconscious phenomenon, they can pervade artistic creation, even if the artist 
attempts to use mythic elements consciously. This is crucial for my analysis 
insofar as it provides a convincing argument for discussing the mythic aspects of 
films such as Star Wars (dir. G. Lucas and others, 1977-2005) or The Lord of the 
                                            
22 Jung described archetype as representations of collective, universal ideas, which enable 
us to interpret our world. See: Jung, C. G., 1969. The archetypes and the collective unconscious. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
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Rings independently from their intended construction as myth by the filmmaker. 
In addition, we may argue that for the audience who is not aware of the reasoning 
behind the making of a film, it is of no importance if the story is consciously or 
unconsciously constructed like a myth, as long as it functions similar to myth.  
 
Waddell (2006) also acknowledges the importance of cinema for our everyday 
reality. She describes that films ―seduce us into a world of illusion‖ in which the 
audience is not a passive receiver but ―invited to juggle mixed ethical, moral, 
philosophical and political messages. Keeping all these balls in the air, while being 
pleasured, allows us to come to our own conclusions about the viability of the 
positions we are watching and how they might apply to our lives beyond the 
screen.‖ (p.27). This statement confirms the relevance for cinematic myths 
beyond primitive escapism without dismissing their entertainment factor. As with 
classical storytelling, the presentation of philosophical and moral concepts in 
modern myths can provide guidance for our life even when presented in an 
entertaining cinematic illusion.  
 
In the above mentioned Star Wars series (dir. G. Lucas, R. Marquand & I. 
Kershner, 1977-2005, USA), the filmmakers consciously play with classical and 
well-known elements of myth, while simultaneously creating an epic myth of their 
own. Therefore these films appear closer to classic mythic fantasy epics than other 
science fiction films despite the interstellar background of Star Wars. The theme at 
the heart of the story is the archaic battle between good and evil and the film 
portrays not a quest to discover new galaxies but the (internal and external) 
journey of a young Jedi to discover his past and his future.  
 
In his book, On Religion, John D. Caputo argues that ―Star Wars reproduces classic 
mythic, ethical, and religious figures, both Western and non-Western, in a 
compellingly contemporary form that has the effect of a vast high-tech Odyssey‖ 
(Caputo, 2001, p.79). He also describes that rather than demystifying transcendent 
religious motifs, the films manage to unite science and faith.Even though the plots 
and settings of Star Warsand The Lord of the Rings are very different, both epic 
series have many common threats, especially in the way they deal with aspects of 
belief, religious symbolism and the basic mythic elements as described by Joseph 
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Campbell.  For example, the quest, the hero‘s journey, is not only the central 
element to the Star Warsfilms, it is according to Campbell also the crucial element 
of all mythic stories. It is also the dominant motif in the structure of the Lord of 
Rings-trilogy.  
 
Althoughmy subsequent analysis will focus on the Lord of the Rings-trilogy, I will 
compare and contrast these films with the previous Star Wars series in order to 
highlight crucial aspects. This will allow me not only to understand the particular 
film, but also to get a more rounded picture on cinematic myths in general. 
 
 
4.2 The myth to rule them all – The Lord of the Rings film trilogy 
 
Peter Jackson‘s film version of Tolkien‘s novel The Lord of the Rings is widely 
regarded as one of the greatest achievements of 21st century cinema so far. 
Equally impressive is also the amount of academic literature that has already been 
written about it. It seems that the style, narrative and symbolism of the films can 
be linked to a sheer endless chain of political, sociological and cultural 
interpretations.23 For this chapter I will also have a closer look at the narrative of 
the films with regard to mythic structures and the concept of redemption as well 
as discussing the relevance of mise-en-scène and set design in the creation of the 
believability of the myth. 
 
The first film of the trilogy starts with a recounting of the ancient ―history‖ that 
caused the problems which will later be dealt with in the actual plot of the trilogy. 
It describes the magic rings that are given to the creatures of Middle-earth. Magic 
                                            
23 For example Kristin Thompson‘s book The Frodo Franchise, which explores the 
workings of the Hollywood industry. In addition, The Lord of the Rings: Popular Culture in 
Global Context by Ernest Mathijs investigates the impact of the trilogy on different global 
cultures; whereas the collection From Hobbits to Hollywood: Essays on Peter Jackson‟s Lord of 
the Rings presents a variety of topics from technological aspects and political implication 
to questions on architecture, merchandising and body image. The edition Lord of the Rings 
and Philosophy, essays from which will be discussed later in this chapter, also provides 
discourses on environmental and spiritual themes.    
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rings themselves are a common theme in fairy-tales and myths.24 In this case, an 
evil power forges another ring that is superior to the others and able to control 
them. Whereas Elves and dwarfs seem to use their magic rings in a responsible 
way, humans are easily corrupted by the power and thus the first to fall.  
 
This example in the introduction suggests that from the very beginning of the 
film, the narrative outlines the weakness of mankind towards the seductions of 
power. This aspect later becomes crucial at various points throughout the story. It 
also implies that in the subsequent fight against evil, mankind not only has to 
overcome its enemies, but also its own flaws. When we see how the first human 
king refuses to destroy the ring and so allows the evil Lord Sauron to persist, we 
can read this as the original sin of the story. This act, consequently, affects the 
whole line of ancestors down to Aragorn, who becomes one of the heroes of this 
story. Aragorn is so anxious about this inherited sin that he initially decides to 
hide his identity and stray through the forests as a ranger instead of claiming his 
right as the heir to the throne of Gondor and reign as king. The weakness of his 
predecessors is the curse from which he has to break free.  
 
We further learn that for centuries the evil power of the ring seemed to have 
vanished until by chance a Hobbit – Bilbo Baggins – got hold of the most 
powerful ring on Middle-earth. This, however, happened unnoticed, even for his 
people. Despite the fact that the narrator describes the Hobbits as the most 
unlikely heroes, the voice over also proclaims that ―time will come when Hobbits 
soon shape the fortune of us all.‖ (LOTR I, 0:06:50) This introduction is 
comparable to the prologue in classic epic narratives and sets the background for 
the actual story, recounting the prevailing myth on which the story is based.  
 
In contrast to this gloomy introduction, the actual story starts with a cosy fairy-
tale setting, when the film moves on to Hobbiton, a pastoral, idyllic place, which 
will be the ultimate contrast to all future places. The Hobbits so far seem to be 
                                            
24 Examples for magic rings in mythology would be the Ring of the Niebelungens that 
features in the Germanic myth of the Nibelungenlied, as well as the ring of Gyges in Greek 
mythology, which is mentioned by Plato in the second book of his Republic and also by 
Herodot (I, 8). 
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unaware of the events that occur in the world around them. The set design here 
has already an enormous impact on the credibility of the story, only for the 
cinema audience but also for the actors.25 The realism and believability of the 
environment is important for the perception of the myth and the aim of the 
production design was to make every place as real and historical as possible.26The 
general notion of the historicity of the story is important insofar as it transcends 
the fictional story and moves it in the realms of myth, which can also be seen as 
fictional stories that are assumed to have a historic foundation, at least for the 
people who believe in it. Here, cinematic realism is the crucial precondition for 
the believability of the story, which then creates a convincing mythic illusion. As 
Buckland had pointed out with regard to cinematic realism in digital cinema, 
which I have discussed in chapter three, believing the world in which characters 
act also gives these characters more realism, not matter how fantastic they are.  
 
As we have discussed in chapter three in relation to digital cinema, even if an 
object or scenery is entirely fictional, it is important that the elements that 
constitute this object, e.g. texture, movement, landscape etc., relate to some aspect 
of our reality and so become understandable. The argument made here with 
regard to the settings of The Lord of the Rings, however, goes beyond simply 
grounding the fictional narration in a realistic setting. By giving the films a cultural 
history of some sort, it creates a complete universe and a sense of time and 
duration that extends the story before and after the actual plot. This is an aspect 
that is important in the creation of truthfulness, as Deleuze noted in his cinema 
books. One of the reasons for Deleuze (1989) to assign cinema the power to 
                                            
25 The realism in the production design prompted actor Ian McKellen, who plays the 
wizard Gandalf, to remark about his first encounter with the set: ―Lord of the Rings is a 
fairy-tale, it‘s an adventure story, it never happened, except somewhere in our hearts. And 
yet, there was Hobbiton, in three dimensions and smoke coming out of the holes where 
they lived underground, and …. I believed.‖ (‗Welcome to Middle-earth‘. In: The Lord of 
the Rings: Fellowship of the Rings, Special Edition, Disc 2, DVD. Los Angeles: New Line 
Cinema).  
26 This aspect is supported by Richard Taylor, a member of the art department, who 
states that they ―had to create an expansive world, something that would spread beyond 
the four corners of the movie screen. The feeling that there are cultures that are strained 
with thousands of years of involvement, creativity and integrity from people and the 
species of Middle-earth‖ (‗Featurette‘, In: The Lord of the Rings: Fellowship of the Rings, 
Special Edition, Disc 2, DVD. Los Angeles: New Line Cinema). 
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reinstate belief is because ―cinema does not just represent images, it surrounds 
them with a world. This is why, very early on, it looked for bigger and bigger 
circuits which would unite an actual image with recollection-images, dream-images 
and world-images.‖ (p.66). As a result, it is able to provide us with the illusion of a 
whole, a complete universe that can then easily move beyond the cinematic 
experience.  
 
From the very first encounter at Hobbiton with Frodo, the subsequent hero of 
the story, it is implied to the audience that he stands out among his people. When 
Frodo meets Gandalf, the first thing he asks him is to tell Frodo about outside 
world. To which the wizard replies ―you are far too eager and curious for a 
Hobbit. Most unnatural.‖ (LOTR I, 0:08:25) In this small encounter already lies 
the cue for all his future adventures. The notion of ―the outside world‖ is 
interesting as it highlights the Shire as a secluded and protected place where 
people do not usually interact with any of the other inhabitants of Middle-earth. 
In addition, Frodo‘s curiosity makes his character stand out and his interest in the 
world beyond his immediate boundaries suggests a certain seriousness, which we 
do not find, or at least not initially, in the other Hobbits that will participate in his 
journey.  
 
Another indication that emphasises this aspect is that the wise wizard is not 
necessarily seen as a welcome guest from the world outside the Shire, but 
described as a ―disturber of the peace‖ (LOTR I, 0:09:47) by the older Shire folk. 
Being curious and searching for knowledge is here perceived as something 
potentially threatening and Frodo‘s search for knowledge puts him in danger. At 
this point the Hobbits are characterised as the naïve side of ―not wanting to 
know‖ which is the basis for their happiness. This is in contrast to the deeper 
happiness and contentment we later encounter in the Elves, which reach their 
inner peace and balance out of an ideal of ancient wisdom, an understanding of 
the natural order of things that can be compared to what Nietzsche 
callsmetaphysical solaceand what can be described as a general quest for the 
transcendent. (See: Birth of Tragedy, 1999, 17-18). 
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The reason for Gandalf‘s visit in the Shire is the birthday party of Bilbo, the 
Hobbit that secretly owns the One Ring. At this point, even the wizard is not 
aware of its existence in the Shire. Yet when Bilbo decides to disappear in the 
middle of his own party Gandalf becomes suspicious. As Bilbo has decided to 
leave the Shire, Gandalf persuades him, indeed forces him, to leave the ring 
behind. However, even now he is not sure that it is The One Ring, although he 
seems to have an awkward feeling when Bilbo calls it ―his precious‖ (LOTR I, 
0:21:10).  As a consequence, Gandalf does not even dare to touch it and leaves it 
on the floor for Frodo to find and so he lets destiny decide Frodo‘s future. 
Gandalf, however, is not just afraid of the way the ring may control him but also 
the power the ring will gain through him. He assumes, as he explains much later, 
that a magical being like him with super-natural powers under the control of the 
ring would cause much more harm than a Hobbit.  
 
As we have already briefly glimpsed in the introduction, the ring and the evil 
power of Lord Sauron, which is bound to it, are on the rise, despite having been 
slumbering for almost thousand years. It is not explicitly clear in the films, if there 
was a certain event that caused awakening of evil power or a constant 
development over the centuries, but it soon becomes evident that the danger is 
immediate. Frodo has to leave the Shire, not to protect himself – on the contrary 
– but to protect his people and the place that is precious to him. At this point he 
has no choice anymore as the choice was made when he picked up the ring, even 
if it was an unconscious one. In just one instance, he is rid of everything that has 
just been so important to him.  
 
This is an element that occurs in many myths and fairy-tales, where a hero first 
has to lose all he has in order to inspire his paramount wish to overcome the 
obstacles and fulfil the quest as this is the only way for him to redeem what is lost. 
Frodo is accompanied by his best friend Sam and two other Hobbits who slip into 
this adventure more or less by accident. Their choice is more deliberate and unlike 
Frodo, they seem unaware of the scale and potential danger of this adventure. 
 
In the meantime, Gandalf visits Saruman, the head of the wizards, for advice. The 
setting of this first encounter is in stark contrast to the later scenes surrounding 
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Saruman‘s tower. In this initial scene, the tower is set in a very beautiful, green, 
natural environment. Soon afterwards this will be turned into a mine for breeding 
Uruk-Kai, a gruesome type of warriors. This change visually reflects Saruman‘s 
fall and highlights his lost connection with nature. Despite having described 
Saruman to Frodo as a wise and considerate man, Gandalf soon has to realise that 
his old friend has been deceived by power and teamed up with Lord Sauron to 
gain control over Middle-earth. Saruman tries to convince Gandalf to join his 
cause, but Gandalf challenges him and calls his longing for control madness. 
Saruman‘s argument is a pragmatic one – we cannot defeat evil therefore it is 
better to join it – but Gandalf contrasts this with a higher, ethical reasoning. The 
fall of Saruman, who is considered to be the wisest of the wizards, demonstrates 
the way in which traditional intuitive wisdom is replaced by cool, abstract logic. 
His modernist view of a changing world is reflected by his turning of the 
surrounding forest into a type of giant mine with thousands of workers, creating a 
quasi-industrial area.  
 
The conflict between rational knowledge and intuitive wisdom that Nietzsche had 
discussed in connection with ancient myth, also pervades the narrative of the Lord 
of the Rings-trilogy, particularly in the conflict between Saruman and Gandalf. 
Nietzsche (1999) describes the advantages of wisdom in contrast to rational or 
scientific knowledge as follows: “wisdom is not deceived by the seductive 
distractions of the sciences; instead it turns its unmoved gaze on the total image 
of the world, and in this image it seeks to embrace eternal suffering with 
sympathetic feelings of love, acknowledging that suffering to be its own.‖ (p.87). 
On this view, science causes us to look at things as abstract entities, thus we lose 
the perspective for the larger connections and unities. Unlike rational knowledge, 
wisdom as characterised by Nietzsche puts the emphasis on an intuitive 
knowledge and experience of the world as a whole, which also includes mythic 
concepts.  
 
This idea of wisdom as including suffering, but also seeing the world as a whole 
and not in abstract terms is crucial for the story of The Lord of the Rings. In the 
trilogy, the modernist, scientific elements usually represent the forces of evil, 
mainly in the person of Saruman. Once deceived by the Dark Lord Sauron, 
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Saruman destroys the ancient forest around him to mass-produce genetically 
created clone warriors. In a later scene, it is a technical device, a bomb, which 
nearly brings down the city walls of the Rohan fortress Helm‘s Deep.  
 
In opposition to Saruman, Gandalf represents the intuitive, spiritual site of 
knowledge. His spiritual wisdom is further emphasised in this film by his close 
connection with nature that is portrayed in his rescue from Saruman‘s tower by 
giant eagles as well as his connection with the mythical horse Shadowfax. In 
addition to Gandalf, the spiritual wisdom is also represented by the Elves, whose 
close connection with nature is apparent in all their scenes and it is clear that their 
ancient wisdom and skill far outweighs those of humans or Hobbits. The Elves 
are also a good example for the second aspect of wisdom, which regards the 
solace that results from it. 
 
Besides its deeper view on the world as a whole, the benefit of wisdom as 
opposed to rational knowledge also lies in the satisfaction and happiness that 
people can draw from it. Nietzsche (1999) had argued that whereas the rational 
human is only able to use its knowledge to avoid negative experiences, ―the man 
of intuition … reaps directly from his intuitions not just protection from harm but 
also a constant stream of brightness, a lightning of the spirit, redemption‖ (p.153). 
This statement supports the idea that redemption cannot be achieved rationally, 
but only through intuitive, creative power. This intuition or wisdom inspires us to 
live, even in the most desperate situations, when rational deduction would lead us 
only to despair. Throughout the Lord of the Rings-trilogy, several protagonists are 
helped by their belief: such as Frodo, who is constantly inspired to go on by Sam‘s 
light-hearted spirit. Gandalf‘s intuition tells him throughout the narrative that 
Frodo is still alive and it is therefore worth continuing the fight. Finally, Sam‘s 
intuition tells him to mistrust Gollum and to protect Frodo despite the latter‘s 
increasing aggression against him. 
 
Gandalf‘s character is also interesting insofar as he represents mystical pagan ideas 
of wizardry and connection with nature with Christian symbolism. This is 
particularly strong in the first film, when the fellowship passes the mines of Moria. 
To begin with, the whole setting of the mines bears distinct religious connotations 
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and The Great Hallof the dwarfs reminds us of a gothic cathedral with its 
seemingly endless heights and scale. More significantly, when Gandalf fights the 
Balrog, an ancient fire monster, on the bridge of Khazad-Dum, his raised arms 
and wooden staff together with his plea ―You cannot not pass‖(LOTR I, 2:02:36) 
is strongly reminiscent of the representation of Moses in scenes from the classic 
biblical epics The Bible (dir. J. Huston, 1965, USA) and The Ten Commandments (dir. 
C.B. deMills, 1923 & 1956, USA).  
 
Finally, Gandalf sacrifices himself for the sake of the group, but only to return as 
a reincarnated, better and more powerful version in the next film. His 
reappearance in Fangorn forest is another strong symbol as his arrival is 
accompanied by extreme backlight, which initially makes it even impossible to 
recognise him. Together with some spiritual background music, his figure now 
reminds us more of a powerful angelic spirit or even a god than of an old wizard.  
 
I use the term reincarnated rather than resurrected as he seems to have undergone 
a significant transformation more like a Buddhist concept of moving from one 
state of existence to a higher one than the Christian idea of Christ‘s resurrection. 
Gandalf has gained significant power, but it is not clear that he has become 
immortal. Initially, he also does not seem to remember who he is or was and 
seems irritated when Aragorn calls him Gandalf. In this way, his character 
becomes a strange mixture of various religious ideas, which may support the idea 
that The Lord of the Rings presents a universal myth rather than a distinctively 
Christian or Nordic one.    
 
In addition to this, whereas in the first film Gandalf the Grey with his wisdom and 
magic skills functions primarily as a mentor and guide for Frodo and his 
companions, his reincarnation Gandalf the White, is not only a more powerful 
wizard, but also a ferocious warrior. Gandalf states that he has been sent back ―at 
the turn of the tide‖ (LOTR II, 0:43:44) to support Aragorn and his allies in their 
battle. Throughout the next two films he becomes a leading figure in the battle of 
Middle-earth, not simply an advisor. Gandalf‘s change from a man of reflection 
into a man of action, from a wise man into a warrior, is very significant. It is the 
essence of the classic cinema of the movement-image, where reflection finally has 
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to turn into action and even the wise wizard finally has to stand up and fight. Yet 
it also indicates biblical themes, especially from the Old Testament, where signs 
and angels are sent to inspire and guide humankind.27 As we will see at the end of 
The Lord of the Rings, Gandalf leaves after their victory and we realise that he really 
was sent back for one specific purpose only.  
 
Whilst Gandalf confronts Saruman at the beginning of the first film, the four 
Hobbits are also facing a major transformation, namely in their environment. 
After leaving the Shire they arrive at Bree. From the outset, the set design of this 
village establishes it as the ultimate counterpart to the bright, sunny and colourful 
village they just left in the Shire. Not only is the complete set in dark, black and 
grey colours, it is also heavily raining. Here again, the use of mise-en-scène and 
meticulous production design supports the narrative structure of the films, and so 
adds another dimension to the understanding of the anxieties of Frodo and his 
friends. They are further away from home as ever before and everything around 
them is alien and threatening. In addition, the inhabitants are humans; this means 
that they are approximately double the size of the Hobbits, which makes the 
whole situation even more intimidating.  
 
This scene presents a common stage in myths, what Campbell called the 
‗Threshold of Adventure‘ (The Hero with a Thousand Faces, 1949). The potential 
heroes have to leave their well-known surroundings and enter a place that is 
somehow outside the law or part of the underworld. As in The Lord of the Rings, it 
is often a pub or tavern (e.g. MosEisley in Star Wars, Episode IV; and the saloon 
in classic Westerns). From now on, Frodo and the other Hobbits are inevitably 
bound to the adventure.  
 
It is also at the pub at Bree, where Frodo first puts on the ring and for the first 
time experiences its power. Interestingly, this happens by accident. Nevertheless, 
he soon encounters the magnitude of this step as the ring draws him into a 
parallel world, in which Lord Sauron communicates with him directly. Sauron tells 
Frodo that he is watching him and then warns him ―there is no life in the void, 
                                            
27 The most memorable example in the Old Testament would be the divine support in 
the battle of Jericho, In: Joshua 2, 1-24 
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only death‖ (LOTR I, 0:51:52). This is an interesting account concerning the 
characteristics of evil in the Lord of the Rings mythology. Here, the evil is portrayed 
as non-existence, as nothingness, it is just a void. 
 
Scott A. Davison (2003) discusses this aspect of Sauron‘s power in his essay 
‗Tolkien and the Nature of Evil‘, in which he compares philosophical concepts of 
good and evil in the narratives of Star Wars and The Lord of the Rings. He argues 
that in the Star Wars films the good and the evil powers are described as two more 
or less equally strong powers that are in an eternal conflict with each other, as it is 
laid out especially in the Ying-Yang concept and other features of Eastern 
philosophy and religion. In The Lord of the Rings, however, the evil power is rather 
characterised as a negation of the good – bodiless and all-consuming. In this way 
it is more comparable with the Christian concept of good and evil, in which the 
evil is usually described as an absence of the good rather than as a clear and 
distinct power of its own. This aspect is further emphasised visually by the fact 
that Lord Sauron as the ultimate evil is reduced to an eye without an actual body 
and resembles a black hole. 
 
Nevertheless, Caputo contradicts Davison‘s characterisation of evil and describes 
the concept of evil in Star Wars quite similar to the way it is portrayed in The Lord 
of the Rings. Similar to the Gollum, Darth Vader, the ultimate evil character of Star 
Wars, is a normal, nice person that is eventually corrupted by evil. The actual evil 
power – the dark side – is never really manifested and it is a loss in faith, 
emotional imbalance, which leads people towards evil. Caputo (2001) writes that 
in Star Wars, ―the messianic age, or the rule of peace and justice, depends upon 
the smooth and harmonious flow of the Force, while war rages when the Force is 
disturbed‖ (p.82). Thus, both epics portray evil in a rather abstract way, as an 
absence of the good. 
 
Following the instance at the Pub, Frodo is brought back to reality and makes the 
acquaintance of Aragorn, who despite appearing as dubious as the other guests in 
the Bree pub turns out to be their saviour at this point. We also find another 
indicator for the Christian concept of evil, when Aragorn recounts the story of the 
Nazgul, the Dark Riders that chase Frodo from the moment he received the ring. 
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In this story, Aragorn calls Sauron ―the deceiver‖ (LOTR I, 0:54:20), a term often 
used in Christian narratives to describe the devil. We learn that the Nazgul were 
the nine kings of men that have fallen to the power of the ring.  
 
Analogous to their bodiless master they appear as black, faceless non-beings that 
only receive their form through the cape and armour they wear. Only when Frodo 
puts on the ring and enters the parallel world of Lord Sauron, he sees the crowned 
mummified bodies of the former kings in bright white underneath the Nazgul 
cloth. The motif of a disembodied evil, abstract and inhuman only intensifies the 
thread as it becomes all the more difficult to overcome.  
 
Later in the story we learn more about the Orcs, evil creatures that hunt the 
fellowship. It is told that they have been Elves, which were seduced by the evil. It 
is not difficult to draw parallels to the Christian concept of the devil as a fallen 
angel. Here, the story makes a clear distinction between the ultimate evil as an 
abstract, bodiless entity, and the majority of evil characters that are not fully evil, 
but seduced by power. In the films the Orcs are often portrayed with a touch of 
humour, as a bunch of lads doing cruel things simply because they are told to do 
so.  
 
We also find this concept of good people being corrupted by power in the role of 
Darth Vader, the central evil character of the Star Wars Films. In this instance the 
film‘s portrayal of evil is closer to the narrative of The Lord of the Rings than its 
general concept of evil. In the beginning, Anakin Skywalker is a hopeful, positive 
character with quasi supernatural powers that seem to destine him to fight for the 
good, but his own fear and hate eventually draw him towards the ―dark side‖. In 
this way he is similar to Saruman, but both Saruman and Darth Vader have to 
realise that their longing for power eventually turns them into slaves of the higher 
evil to which they are eternally bound.  However, whereas Darth Vader eventually 
redeems himself from evil by scarifying himself to save his son, Saruman does not 
reach this point of redemption and is finally left defeated and powerless.  
 
Shortly after leaving Bree, the Hobbits and Aragorn have their first direct 
encounter with the Dark Riders, in which the leader of the Nazgul delivers a near-
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fatal wound to Frodo. Despite his survival we will realise at the end of the story 
that this wound stays with him forever. This incident can therefore be described 
as not just a physical but also a moral injury that indicates Frodo‘s lost innocence. 
It is only due to supernatural powers that Frodo survives the injury. He is saved 
by Arwen, daughter of the King of the Elves. Her first appearance is in strong 
backlight, giving her an angelic look that emphasises the mythical powers and 
godlike status of the Elves. Her magical powers are further underlined by her 
subsequent escape with Frodo to Rivendell, when Arwen raises the waters of the 
river to bring down the Riders that pursue them. This not only shows her powers 
as such, but also demonstrates the close connection of the Elves with nature as 
the source of their power.  
 
This connection with nature is further intensified by the set design of the film. 
Rivendell, the city of the Elves, appears to be grown into the forest, set in a soft, 
warm light and even the rooms always appear very airy and open, with open 
windows and the wind blowing leaves through the rooms. Later in the trilogy, the 
departure of the Elves from Middle-earth is visualised by a change of seasons and 
the falling of the leaves in an autumn setting. It is also interesting to note that 
throughout the films, we find very few indoor scenes and if so they are often 
associated with danger and evil.  
 
When the peoples of Middle-earth gather at Rivendell to discuss what they should 
do with the One Ring, Frodo hopes that his adventure is over and that he is no 
longer bound to the ring. It is, however, clear to the audience, that he is the one 
destined to carry it. Once he had stepped into this adventure he was part of it. 
Despite this apparently clear providential setting, it is interesting to look at the 
role that Frodo‘s active choice of this task plays here. Already in the first scene, 
Gandalf had left the ring for Frodo to pick up, so leaving an element of 
uncertainty. In this scene at Rivendell, we can assume that Gandalf has a certain 
awareness of Frodo‘s future, as he is not surprised, but shows a rather fatalistic 
expression when Frodo finally declares that he will carry the ring to Mordor. 
Gandalf seems to know intuitively that Frodo is the only chance for Middle-earth, 
but equally realises that this most definitely means the destruction of his innocent 
friend. Nevertheless, Frodo must make a conscious and independent decision to 
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accept this fate. Frodo‘s innocence and naivety here makes him the strongest 
candidate to carry the ring. As soon as all the great warriors and heroes of Middle-
earth argue about the future of the ring, its power over them becomes evident. 
This is when Frodo realises that he cannot walk away as there will not be any 
hope otherwise.  
 
What follows is the actual start of the journey, as described in classical mythic 
narratives, such as the Iliad, where the quest is explicitly stated and allies are 
gathered. Here, a team of talented and experienced warriors is gathered to protect 
Frodo and the ring. This is important insofar as it is underlined that although they 
can assist in protecting him from the enemy attacks, they will not be able to help 
Frodo with his actual task of destroying the ring.  
 
In addition, from the outset a traitor is implied. Boromir, the representative of 
Gondor, only follows reluctantly and makes clear that he would rather keep and 
use the ring thinking that this would enable them to defeat the evil. Further 
tension arises when he discovers that Aragorn is his long absent king. As with all 
true mythic quests, the fellowship soon faces the first challenges in the form of 
monsters and strange places, while being watched by Gollum, a unique creature 
obsessed with the ring.  
 
We have already briefly mentioned the role of choice and fate in the mythic 
structure of The Lord of the Rings. This theme reoccurs when Gandalf tells Frodo 
about the Gollum, the creature from which Bilbo acquired the One Ring. Frodo 
argues that it may have been better if Bilbo had killed the Gollum when he had 
the chance. The wizard challenges that and asserts that even ―the very wise cannot 
see all ends. My heart tells me that Gollum has some part to play yet, for good or 
ill before this is over. The pity of Bilbo may rule the fate of many.‖ (LOTR I, 
1:46:04) The full scale of this statement only becomes evident at the end of the 
film when the ring is only destroyed due to Gollum‘s interference. In this sense, 
providence is related to the notion that all actions and decisions influence the 
system of the world as a whole in various ways, maybe not instantly, but in the 
larger scheme of things.   
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Thomas Hibbs (2003) discusses the importance of providence in relation to 
TheLord of the Rings and myth in general in his essay ‗Providence and the Dramatic 
Unity of The Lord of the Rings.‘ He argues that our ―fascination with stories [...], 
with finding one‘s bearing in the cosmic history, is perfectly compatible with, 
indeed seems necessitated by, belief in a providentially structured universe.‖ 
(Hibbs, 2003, p.178). This means that the reason for us to listen to stories is that 
they give us a sense of structure on the one hand, and suggest on the other that 
there is some higher purpose behind all of it that gives life meaning. In this way, a 
providentially structured universe gives people the faith that there is a certain 
order to everything, which they can follow.  
 
In addition, for Hibbs the providential worldview as expressed in religion and 
mythology is largely structured like a story, with a specific plot and a dramatic 
unity and development. This is a significant point with regard to the connection 
between religion, myth and cinema insofar as it emphasises the links between the 
storytelling function of cinema and the presentation of epic stories within 
religious and mythic narratives. We can therefore argue that similarly to religion, 
cinematic narratives not merely entertain, but suggest the general idea of a universe 
that follows a clear structure guided by fate or providence.  
 
Gandalf‘s prophetic statement in his conversation with Frodo points towards this 
providential concept. We finally realise in the third film that despite all his efforts 
it is not Frodo‘s determination but Gollum‘s obsession, which in fact leads to the 
destruction of the ring, and so fulfils Gandalf‘s foresight that Gollum still has a 
role to play in this story. Consequently, this apparently accidental event appears 
less as a matter of chance, but a piece in a complex story that reaches back to the 
moment when Bilbo shows pity towards Gollum. This further implies the moral 
concept that all our actions have consequences and although there is an element 
of choice in the first instance, all subsequent events inevitably follow from it. 
 
Another question arises from this final moment. When Frodo eventually submits 
to the power of the ring, what does that say about the role of the hero in The Lord 
of the Rings? According to Campbell, the hero is the crucial centre of each myth, 
the character that goes on the journey. The Lord of the Rings, however, seems to 
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have two heroes that undergo significant transformations throughout the story 
and I argue that they reflect different modes of storytelling that are joined 
together in the overall narrative. Both Frodo and Aragorn can be characterised as 
the hero of the trilogy, each in a different type of narrative, such as the epic and 
the fairy-tale. As suggested in the first part of this chapter both forms are 
presented as individual strands in large parts of the cinematic narrative, which also 
signifies that each of this strand has its own hero as I will discuss in the next 
paragraphs.  
 
At the end of the first film, Frodo realises that he can no longer rely on the help 
of the others but has to carry on alone. This realisation is caused by Boromir‘s 
betrayal and attempt to take the ring from Frodo. It‘s the breach of trust that 
pushes Frodo over the next threshold in the story and splits the narrative in two 
axes. Whereas the warriors led by Aragorn set out to summon their armies and 
allies for the paramount battle of Middle-earth, Frodo with the aid of his friend 
and protector Sam proceeds on his increasingly desperate journey to Mordor. On 
the one hand we observe the external conflict of the epic battle against Sauron‘s 
armies; on the other we follow Frodo‘s struggle and increasingly internal conflict 
with the rising power the ring. I argue that eventually, his personal struggle to 
resist the power of the evil even overshadows their struggle with the increasingly 
volatile landscape they pass through. This duality of events and journeys persists 
until the very end of the third film when the ring is finally destroyed.  
 
As Deleuze (1985) has outlined in The Movement-Image, the concept of duality is a 
classic feature of Hollywood narratives, representing the organic concept of 
binary relationships that is so important for the success of Hollywood cinema. It 
can therefore be argued that here the narrative structure of The Lord of the Rings is 
particularly well equipped for its adaptation to the cinema screen.  
 
The parallel narratives of The Lord of the Rings are also reflected in the two very 
different heroes of the film. Frodo is the tragic hero, who is pushed into his 
adventure largely if not exclusively by external forces and is finally saved only by a 
eucatastrophic moment of divine interference. He is the least likely hero and is 
helped by a variety of magic tools during his journey, such as the Mithril shirt that 
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protects him from attacks, his sword Sting that glows when Orcs are approaching 
and the flacon filled with light given to him by the Elven queen Galadriel that 
helps Frodo and Sam in their fight against Shelop. His journey becomes the 
journey through the fairy-tale, as described by John J. Davenport (2003) in his 
aforementioned essay. Frodo‘s final salvation can only come to him by fate.   
 
J. Lenore Wright takes a different approach in her essay ‗Sam and Frodo‘s 
Excellent Adventure: Tolkien‘s Journey Motif in The Lord of the Rings.‘ She 
acknowledges that despite our postmodern technological advances and scepticism 
we still long for extraordinary beings and events. Yet, unlike in ancient times, 
when these heroes were often half-gods or other ―special beings‖, we are now 
―realizing that we need ordinary people to be extraordinary. […] We need people 
to be all too human and frail.‖ (Wright, 2003, p.203). For her, the Hobbits Sam 
and Frodo are a prime example of this idea, as they are not just inexperienced and 
naïve, but also physically much more fragile than their human or Elvish 
counterparts.  
 
As I argued, however, it is exactly this apparent incapability that makes them 
particularly suitable for their role in this story as it is their positive and profoundly 
good nature which allows them to succeed. In this sense one could claim that 
despite their frail and inexperienced nature, we could classify them as ―special 
beings‖, as their lack of particularly human traits, such as pride, greed and longing 
for power, makes them if not fully confined from the evil, then at least less weak 
towards it. 
 
Yet, The Lord of the Rings also has a classic epic hero, who transports the second 
strand of narrative. While Frodo and Sam are on their lonely journey, Aragorn, 
heir to the throne of Gondor, rides across Middle-earth to save its people from 
the immediate approach of Sauron‘s armies. Unlike his predecessors, he resists the 
seductions of power and is driven by the pure-hearted desire to save his world. 
However, being aware of the weakness of his ancestry, he is initially reluctant to 
accept his destiny, but then makes a conscious decision to stand up and take 
responsibility. Here, Aragorn is the classic epic action hero; his decision is 
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deliberate and bold. Unlike Frodo, he is also a well-trained and experienced 
warrior, hence a prototype hero.  
 
As suggested above, Aragorn‘s part of the story portrays the epic mode of The 
Lord of the Rings. Once the fellowship (and hence the narrative) is split in two axes, 
Aragorn is involved in various battles: the battle of Helm‘s Deep at the end of the 
second film and several smaller battles that culminate in the final war over 
Middle-earth at the end of the third film. Its title The Return of the King also alludes 
to Aragorn‘s importance in the story.  
 
Apart from his role in representing the epic line of the narrative, Aragorn also 
symbolises the arrival of the age of man while the mythic creatures, such as Elves 
and wizards, are disappearing from Middle-earth. Here, the story of The Lord of the 
Rings does not end with a reinstatement of the peace, but brings upon a major 
change in the set-up of the world. Its happy-ending is incomplete as some aspects 
of the world have been lost forever and the power of evil has left a stain on the 
magical world and so carrying in it the element of the tragic. The only hope now is 
mankind and the enchanted world is finally replaced with a human world that 
unites the epic and the tragic.  
 
This is also the major element of redemption in The Lord of the Rings-trilogy. 
Aragorn redeems not only the honour of his family by resisting evil, but more 
importantly he redeems mankind at large from its original sin. The weakness of 
men has first allowed the evil to take control, both in Isildur‘s refusal to destroy 
the ring and the corruption of the Nine King of Men that turn into the Nazgul. 
Moreover, as well as redeeming mankind by defying evil and giving Middle-earth a 
humble and good-hearted king, Aragorn also performs an act of redemption when 
he summons the ghosts of The Men in the Mountains.By fighting for Aragorn they 
can free themselves from the curse that binds their shadows to this world, unable 
to die. When Aragorn releases them, they vanish and death becomes their final 
redemption.  
 
The duality in the narrative is also reflected in the visual components of the film. 
Following Aragorn‘s journey, both the second and third film largely portrays the 
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epic grandeur of the landscape and the grand mise-en-scène emphasises the scale 
of their task. The scenes in the endless mountain chains and plains of Rohan in 
the second film are highlighted by an infinite amount of pan-shoots over the 
endless wilderness that enhances the epic battle in front of them. The film 
concludes with a final sequence in form of a parallel montage between the battle 
of Helm‘s Deep and the destruction of Isengard, thus further highlighting the 
binary structures of the narrative.  
 
The battle of Helm‘s Deep also replicates a classic mythic battle – the battle of 
Troy. Similar to Troy, Helm‘s Deep is considered unconquerable and only a trick 
– in this case a bomb – allows the evil forces to enter the walls. Unlike the 
Trojans, however, the armies of Rohan have a saviour in the person of Gandalf, 
who finally comes to their aid like a shiny angelic warrior, at a moment when all 
hope seems lost. 
 
The majestic landscapes and sceneries in the epic part of the story are contrasted 
by the increasingly threatening and claustrophobic settings that Frodo and Sam 
are passing through. Even though they are similarly outdoors, the mountain 
gorges, rock formations and marshes they cross, limit their room for navigation to 
a small path and appear not majestic but deadly and inhibiting.  
 
The camera here also focuses more on close-ups of the characters in an attempt 
to capture their psychological development: the increasing mistrust of Sam 
towards Gollum, the growing despair of Frodo and Gollum‘s/Smeagul‘s conflict 
between the good that is left in him and which appreciates Frodo‘s kindness and 
his overriding obsession with The Ring. The lack of establishing and pan-shots 
also increases the sense of being lost that is present in the narrative where Frodo 
and Sam seem to have lost orientation and are going in circles. As a consequence 
they have no choice but to rely on Gollum as their guide.  
 
Another set of binary relationships can be found in the Elves, both in terms of set 
design and character. At the beginning of the first film, we discover the beautiful 
world of Rivendell, the Elvish city grown in the forest diffused with light. 
Towards the end of this film, we encounter another Elvish forest that is a stark 
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contrast to the first. This is emphasised by the fact that several members of the 
fellowship issue their concerns about entering it in the first place. The set of 
Galadriel‘s forest appears much darker, wilder and older than the forest of 
Rivendell. In addition, we do not actually see any buildings such as the tree houses 
and palaces in Rivendell. As a result, the Elves here appear much more like 
nymphs and other natural spirits. As outlined in chapter three with regard to 
Deleuze‘s notion of mainstream cinema, these binary relationships are a crucial 
element in the action-image and I will further elaborate on this point in the 
following chapter when discussing modern Hollywood epics.  
 
The contrast is even stronger in the two rulers. Whereas Elrond, king of 
Rivendell, is a friendly and welcoming man they all like to meet, Galadriel initially 
appears as a much more mysterious and threatening figure. She is described as a 
powerful witch queen, an expression that implies a certain ambivalence in her 
character. The whole setting of the forest is also much more sinister, bearing more 
resemblance with the dark site of Nietzsche‘s idea of the Dionysian. In Rivendell, 
the wild, Dionysian element of nature is balanced by the Apollonian ideal of 
beauty and harmony, whereas the dark and menacing atmosphere of Galadriel and 
her forest reminds us of a darker, wilder side nature that is closer connected to the 
wisdom of Silenius than that of Apollo. (See: Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, section3).  
 
The frightening aspect of her character becomes evident when Frodo offers 
Galadriel the Ring. For a short moment we experience her fantasy, in which she 
sees herself as an all-mighty witch-queen. In this scene the cinematography 
particularly intensifies the narrative. In comparison, in the animated film version 
of The Lord of the Rings from 1978 (dir. R. Bakshi, USA) we also find this scene 
with nearly exactly the same text and structure, but in this film Galadriel simply 
recounts her fantasy in a straightforward way, so that the scene is more or less 
insignificant. Peter Jackson, however, presents Galadriel during her monologue as 
a negative, giant queen with a distorted, menacing voice, which makes her 
character appear even more threatening. Only as she refuses to take the ring, 
hence ―passing the test‖, does she turn back into a more friendly, accessible 
personality, who subsequently supports Frodo on his journey.  
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The dual narratives of Frodo and Aragorn only culminate at the end of the third 
film, after the final battle is won. Even though it is eventually down to Frodo to 
destroy the Ring and save the world, the focus of the film is more on the battle of 
the humans and their allies against the armies of evil. It can be said that the third 
film is the most epic of the three parts, and its focus is on Aragorn‘s return to the 
throne.  
 
As a result, the emphasis also shifts from the fairy-tale creatures of Middle-earth –
Hobbits, Elves and wizards – towards the human race, which will finally take over 
Middle-earth. The Elves are leaving this world, which is reinforced by the images 
of falling leaves and increasingly wintry look of Rivendell in demise. Only Arwen 
remains at Rivendell with her father Elrond and she stays because of Aragorn for 
whom she had given up eternal life. Yet her power is waning and only the defeat 
of Sauron and his evil power will assure her survival. Therefore, Aragorn not only 
fights to save the world but also to save his beloved one.  
 
I have already outlined the aspects of redemption underpinning the epic line of 
the story. As far as Frodo is concerned, it can of course be claimed that he 
redeems the world as a whole, but it is not he who destroys the ring. Nevertheless, 
he himself is also redeemed as the destruction of the ring finally frees him from 
his burden. Sam is the first one to notice the passing of evil. Although their 
situation seems hopeless once the ring has fallen in the fire of Mount Doom and 
the whole mountain explodes, there is a sense of relief in Sam and Frodo. 
 
Nevertheless they survive their ordeal, saved again by magic and so suggesting a 
classic fairy-tale happy-ending. Yet, we eventually see that Frodo will never fully 
recover and his wounds – physically and psychologically – will never fully heal. 
Even though the end of the story is happy in general, it also proves that this is not 
true for all those involved, and so incorporating the element of the tragic into the 
story without fully submitting to it. Frodo‘s physical scar, the result of the first 
Nazgul attack, becomes a symbol for the evil he has experienced. This experience 
will forever exclude Frodo from returning to his old life and only by moving 
towards a transcendent, eternal life, which is gifted to him by the Elves, can he 
finally gain comfort.   
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The final question is then how far does this film version redeem traditional mythic 
concepts for popular culture? As outlined in this chapter, throughout the films we 
find various examples where the visual aspect significantly supports the narrative 
of the myth by enhancing crucial aspects such as the epic scale and the profound 
changes between places and characters. In this way it can be claimed that the 
cinematic version of The Lord of the Rings adds a new layer to the storytelling.28 
 
The most explicit example for this continuous development in the mythmaking 
process is one scene that is unique to Peter Jackson‘s film version and does not 
exist in the books. This scene is also remarkable as it reflects on the meaning of 
storytelling in general and its importance for our life. In this way it can also be 
read as a reflection on the power of cinema as this scene is distinctly cinematic. 
The scene occurs towards the end of the second film as Frodo and Sam continue 
their journey towards Mordor, finally being caught by Gondor‘s soldiers. The 
Nazgul are closing in and Frodo nearly gives in to the power of the Ring and is 
only by a fraction saved by Sam. In his obsession, Frodo attacks Sam. When he 
awakes from his trance and seems to have lost all hope, Sam delivers the 
following motivational speech. It is a narrative device that may sound rather 
vulgar in a book, but is often found in epic films, especially before or after the 
crucial battle.  
 
Frodo 
I can‘t do that, Sam. 
 
                                            
28 This point can be supported by a statement by Brian Sibley, author of the Lord of the 
Rings official movie guide. He remarks that ―J.R.R. Tolkien was very aware that he created a 
world that existed within the books. But he also said it was a world that could be 
enhanced by other people. … Tolkien created a myth. A modern myth. And what has 
happened is that by turning this into a film, a filmmaker has given it a new dimension, has 
taken this myth one stage further. Which is how myths are born, how they are carried 
through generation after generation. So in the way I see Peter Jackson as part of the 
mythic process, which was begun by Tolkien‖ (‗Featurette‘, The Lord of the Rings: Fellowship 
of the Rings, Special Edition, Disc 2, DVD. Los Angeles: New Line Cinema).  
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Sam 
I know. It‘s all wrong. By rights, we shouldn‘t even be 
here. But we are. It‘s like in the great stories, Mr. Frodo. 
The ones that really mattered. Full of darkness and danger 
they were. And sometimes you didn‘t want to know the 
end because how could the end be happy? How could the 
world go back to the way it was when so much bad had 
happened? …  
But in the end, it‘s only a shadow. Even the darkness 
must pass. A new day will come. And when the sun 
shines, it will shine out the clearer. Those were the stories 
that stayed with you, that meant something. Even if you 
were too small to understand why. But I think Mr. Frodo, 
I do understand. I know now. Folk in those stories had 
lots of chances of turning back, only they didn‘t. They 
kept going, because they were holding on to something. 
  
 Frodo 
What are we holding on to, Sam? 
 
 Sam (picks Frodo up – literally) 
That there is some good in this world Mr. Frodo. And it‘s 
worth fighting for. 
(LOTR II, 2:37:52) 
 
This dialogue seems to make explicit the importance we assigned mythic creations 
in the first part of this thesis, namely to provide a meaning and perspective in a 
general situation of lacking belief. In this sense it is not so relevant how original 
the stories are. On the contrary, the basic plot – good defeats evil etc. – is usually 
simple and easily accessible, a characteristic Nietzsche had already described in 
relation to the ancient Greek tragedy. Seeing this battle played out on screen, 
however, gives this ethical idea a convincing visual believability that imprints this 
idea in our conscious and subconscious collective memory. 
 
This scene, intercut with images from the ongoing battle at Isengard, reinforces 
the overall theme of the trilogy in true Hollywood style. Rather than letting the 
audience discover the overall implicit meaning by themselves, the theme is stated 
explicitly. As the narrative of the films was split in three parts, all screened with a 
year‘s break in between them, this scene at the end of the second film summarises 
the quest and points towards the future.  
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Overall, this dialogue may not be so crucial in developing the story, although in 
the film it seems to be the point that gives everybody hope and allows them to 
continue their journey. What it presents, however, is a reflection of the hopes and 
attitudes of the audience and so it redeems the importance of storytelling and 
mythmaking for modern cinema. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the aspect of redemption plays a significant role 
throughout the narrative. The concept of belief and trust in a providentially 
structured universe presented by the main characters reflects universal themes of 
myth and religion and has the capacity to inspire. As a consequence, for many 
people The Lord of the Rings is ―not simply a fictional realm; it‘s a safe haven of 
sorts that they visit over and over again to find re-enchantment and renewal.‖ 
(Light, 2003, p.150). Moreover, the cinematic realism of the films, the grand-scale 
dimensions of the scenery and the attention to detail that helps create a complete 
universe, are able to enhance the literary basis of the myth, by creating the illusion 
of our world as it could have been.  
 
Gregory Bassham (2003) stated in his essay ‗Tolkien‘s Six Keys to Happiness‘ that 
by ―juxtaposing the enchanted with the familiar, the magical with the mundane, 
such works allow us to see the world with fresh eyes. Having encountered ents 
and towering mallorns, we forever see elms and beeches differently.‖ (p.59). The 
influence of cinematic fantasies on our perception of everyday reality, which he 
describes here, is very significant and illustrates the validity of mythic experiences 
in spite of the ‗un-realistic‘ fantasy elements. Hence, the reality of the film does 
influence our view of reality. I will discuss in the next chapter, how the reality of 
our social reality in turn influences cinematic narratives. 
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Chapter Five:  
Healthy illusions? – Hollywood’s Realism and the return of the epics 
 
The previous chapter discussed the subjective historicity of The Lord of the Rings 
and its importance for the believability of the myth. In this chapter I will look at 
the genre of historic epics and its revival in the first decade of this century. Just in 
the first half of the decade, our screens were full of mythic and historical plots, 
starting with Gladiator (dir. R. Scott, 2000, USA), followed by Master and 
Commander (dir. P. Weir, 2003, USA), The Last Samurai (dir. E. Zwick, 2003), 
Alexander (dir. O. Stone), King Arthur (dir. A. Fuqua, 2004), Troy (dir. W. Petersen, 
2004, USA) and Kingdom of Heaven (dir. R. Scott, 2005, USA). 
 
The theories that will be of particular interest for this part are Kracauer‘s notions 
on cinematic content in general and historic films in particular, as well as 
Deleuze‘s theses on the movement-image, the conceptions of history related to 
the movement-image and Deleuze‘s views on the connection between cinema and 
thought. In this context I will initially analyse the characteristics of the movement-
image, or more precisely the action-image as one type of movement-image in 
further detail before moving on to the analysis of two film versions of the Trojan 
wars as a specific filmic example. 
 
I will refer to the epics of the last decade as neo-classical in order to emphasise 
their connection with what Deleuze defined as classical cinema. By this he meant 
the classical American mainstream cinema of the pre-war period, i.e. the cinema 
of the movement-image, which he contrasted with the modern, post-war cinema 
of the time-image. As I will argue that the above mentioned epics are rooted in 
the movement-image even though they incorporate elements of the time-image, I 
find the term neo-classical more appropriate as it also implies the revival of a 
certain style.  
 
For Deleuze (1986), the action-image presents the movement-image par excellence 
and later in his cinema books he often uses the two terms synonymously. As the 
action-image is according to Deleuze also the default form for the majority of 
commercially successful films, I want to evaluate its distinct aspects as presented 
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in the Hollywood epics of the last decade. Unlike Deleuze, who proclaimed the 
decline of the movement-image after the Second World War, I argue that there 
was not only a significant output of biblical and historic epics in the 1950s29, 
which is only comparable to the amount of historic-mythical epics produced in 
the last decade. Moreover, this parallelism suggests a comparison with the 
movement-image of the 1950s, which still seems to portray the classic pre-war 
concept Deleuze describes. How similar are these films in narrative and visual 
representation and how did the action-image develop since then, particularly with 
the use of digital technology? 
 
Secondly, both Kracauer and Deleuze described in their main works on cinema 
developments in film history that are not only linked to technical and aesthetic 
developments, but which are also a reflection of changes in society. I want to 
examine how these historic epics reflect certain ideologies. Following Deleuze‘s 
notions of history, which he borrows from Nietzsche, I will compare the situation 
in the 1950s with the recent revival of historic and mythic epics. In this context, I 
will also critically discuss Kracauer‘s theories regarding historical films and 
elaborate on the similarities and differences in story and representation of these 
films. Here, Kracauer‘s theories on film are particularly relevant insofar as he was 
one of the first thinkers who described aesthetic concepts presented in film as 
symptoms of social developments, first in his book From Caligary to Hitler (1947) 
and then in his Theory of Film (1961). 
 
In the second part of this chapter I will relate these aspects to two specific 
examples of historical Hollywood epics and analyse how they have developed 
with respect to the elements of the action-image, the social-political background 
and the relation between historicity and actuality. I will compare Wolfgang 
                                            
29 Based on the German online film dictionary www.filmlexikon.de, I established that 
1950s Hollywood produced no less than 12 epics with biblical and religious motifs, 
(compared to an average of 3-4 in the following decades), with a variety of other 
monumental epics portraying ancient historic or mythic plots. Famous Biblical examples 
from the 1950s are Quo Vadis (dir. M. LeRoy, 1951, USA), The Robe (dir. H. Koster, 1953, 
USA), The Ten Commandments (dir. C.B. DeMille, 1957, USA) and Ben Hur (dir. W. Wyler, 
1959, USA) as well as those films that feature ancient historic plots, such as Helen of Troy 
(dir. R. Wise, 1956, USA/IT), Alexander, the Great (dir. R. Rossen, 1956, USA) and 
Spartacus (dir. S. Kubrick, 1959/60, USA). 
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Petersen‘s 2004 version of the mythic epic Troy with the classic epic film version 
Helen of Troy, made in 1956 by Robert Wise. More specifically, this part of the 
chapter investigates the mythic story of the battle of Troy and examines the 
correspondences and crucial differences between the two films. Here, I will also 
pay attention to the role digital technologies play in creating a modern version of 
the ancient world on screen. I will further discuss these elements in relation to 
Deleuze‘s interpretation of the importance of cinematic illusions and the 
particular capabilities of Hollywood‘s narrative style in the creation of convincing 
mythic narratives.  
 
Consequently, I aim to support my hypothesis that the need for grand epic 
narratives is particularly strong in our time and that the great classic genre of 
historic film has not lost its power. Nevertheless I want to demonstrate that it has 
undergone a significant development and that his continuous success is at least in 
parts owed to the fact that the neo-classical cinema of the movement-image has to 
some degree incorporated aspects of Deleuze‘s time-image.  
 
 
5.1 Truth as Totalisation– Movement-images, action-thought and history 
 
This paragraph follows Deleuze‘s notion that the organic representation of the 
action-image implies a concept of truthfulness that defines the believability of 
Hollywood narratives. It then looks at the close connection Deleuze (1989) draws 
between the movement-image and a concept of thought. Here I will follow the 
development from the ‗harmonious knowledge‘ of the classic cinema to the 
‗belief‘ of the modern cinema and examines if and how we find both these aspects 
represented in the neo-classical Hollywood cinema. This new movement-image 
also presents a new level of realism in historical films, which is particularly 
interesting when linking it to Kracauer‘s views on historic subjects in film. Both 
theories can be connected to the representations of history as monumental, 
antiquarian and ethical history, which Deleuze borrows from Nietzsche.  
 
In his essay On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Nietzsche argues that 
there are three species of history, monumental, antiquarian and critical, which 
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describe the three different ways in which history is relevant to mankind.30 These 
aspects are as follows: the portrayal of man as a being who acts and strives 
(monumental history), as a being that preserves and reveres (antiquarian history) and as 
a being who suffers and seeks deliverance (critical history). From this description it 
becomes clear why the first aspect of monumental history, which focuses on 
actions and efforts, especially appeals to cinema with its narrative of man‘s 
struggles.  
 
Firstly, let us briefly recall Deleuze‘s notions on the action-image and the organic 
representation of classic American cinema. As outlined in chapter three, he calls 
Hollywood‘s traditional style ‗organic‘. This refers to the way in which filmmakers 
create meaningful images by implying natural connections and using familiar 
structures and archetypes, in order to direct the audience‘s attention away from 
the medium itself towards the complex illusion it creates. However, Deleuze‘s 
organic concept of representation goes beyond merely technical aspects of film 
editing and mise-en-scène to analyse the elements of the narrative in relation to the 
cinematographic aspects. The constitution of a whole, the definition of specific 
milieus as well as the duality of forces are not purely aesthetic aspects, but reflect 
on a specific mode of thinking.  
 
When Deleuze discusses ‗Cinema and Thought‘ in his second cinema book 
dedicated to the time-image, he eventually returns to the movement-image. He 
argues that the movement-image and thought are necessarily linked as the ―Whole 
can only be thought, because it is the indirect representation of time which 
follows from movement. It does not follow like a logical effect, analytically, but 
synthetically as the dynamic effect of images‖ (Deleuze, 1989, p.153). This 
dynamic effect, this synthetically created concept of the Whole, is essential in the 
understanding of the realism of classic American cinema. This type of ―illusionist 
realism‖ accounts for an immediate impact on the audience, it moves people – 
emotionally. For Deleuze this is a functional realism, strictly determined by the 
requirements of the situation and the action. Thus the action-image is the 
                                            
30 In: Nietzsche, F., 1983. Untimely Meditations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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perfected form of the movement-image and remains the standard for Hollywood 
cinema until today.  
 
Nevertheless, when discussing the movement-image and its relationship with 
thought, Deleuze moves beyond the organic representation of classic American 
cinema. He cannot, however, dispose of the action. As Deleuze argues, the line of 
thought can move from the image to the concept (organic), from the concept to 
the image (pathetic)31, but it also has a third form, which is the identity of image 
and concept. He calls this form action-thought and claims that this ―action-
thought indicates the relation between man and the world, between man and nature, the 
sensory-motor unit, but by raising it to a supreme power‖ (Deleuze, 1989, p.156, 
emphasis in original). This relationship between man and the world is represented 
in the relationship between the individual and the society, but also suggests a 
more profound reflection not only on individual actions, but on the general 
relationship with the world that surrounds us. I will show later in this chapter that 
this reflective aspect is particularly strong in the neo-classical epics.  
 
The second aspect Deleuze describes in relation to the action-image is the 
emphasis of the individual. He argues that in the action-image where the milieu 
and characters constantly influence each other, everything ―is individuated: the 
milieu as a particular space-time, the situation as determining and determinate, the 
collective as well as the individual character.‖(Deleuze, 1986, p.146). Nevertheless 
the individual needs the support of a specific people or community. For Deleuze, 
this idea is closely linked to the most profound American myth: ―The American 
Dream‖. For Deleuze (1986), the action-image ―embraces the two poles of the 
American Dream: on the one hand the idea of unanimist community or of a 
nation-milieu, melting pot and fusion of all minorities‖ (p.148) and on the other 
the model of a great leader, who raises from this nation to counteract the 
challenges of the milieu as well as the problems of the situation.  
 
                                            
31 According to Deleuze, the pathetic representation has been developed in the works of 
Sergei Eisenstein and unlike in the organic representation, it includes a qualitative jump in 
the final stages that lift it to a higher level of meaning. For a more detailed description, 
please see chapter three of this work and refer to: Deleuze, 1986. The Movement-Image. 
Chapter 3.2. 
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This aspect can be found in a variety of recent epics, such as Gladiator (dir. Ridley 
Scott, 2000, USA), in which the former army leader first loses his army, royal 
support and finally his family, but then gathers a new group of allies, first the 
other gladiators, and eventually the whole people of Rome. The hero is first 
reluctant to oppose and only after losing everything does his longing for revenge 
motivate him. A similar idea can be found in another historical epic from the last 
decade: Kingdom of Heaven (dir. Ridley Scott, 2004, USA). Here, the hero starts as a 
blacksmith, who has just lost his wife and all hope and only by chance or fate 
arrives in Jerusalem, where he eventually becomes the hero that leads the people 
of Jerusalem to defend their city.  
 
Finally, the classic action-image is defined in terms of binary relationships, as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, and as a consequence its most significant 
image is the duel. The duel, however, is not reduced to its purest form between 
hero and villain (as in the Western), but it can also take place in various other 
parts of the story as well as in the images themselves. As Deleuze (1986) notes, 
the ―action in itself is a duel of forces, a series of duels: duel with the milieu, with 
the others, with itself.‖ (p.146). Hence, the duel in its connection with the action-
image is not simply one particular moment within the action-image, often shown 
as parallel montages, but elementary to the whole film. Deleuze claims that the 
duel may even be external to the film, although internal to cinema itself.  
 
This is further shown when he describes this binary relationship in more 
philosophical terms, saying that the action-image always develops along two axes, 
which are defined by integration and differentiation on one hand and contiguity 
and similarity on the other. Deleuze (1986) notes that the ―axes cut across each 
other, according to a principle of attraction, in order to achieve the identity of 
image and concept: indeed, the concept as a whole does not become 
differentiated without externalizing itself in a sequence of associated images, and 
the images do not associate without being internalized in a concept as the whole 
which integrates them.‖(p.202). Deleuze (1989) later adds that for him this duality 
of the internalisation in the whole and the externalisation in the image, represent 
in cinema as well as in philosophy the ―model of the True as totalisation‖ (p.265). 
In other words, it is a constantly changing universe of moving images, portraying 
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the individual and the world in which he acts, a universe that extends beyond the 
cinema screen.  
 
According to Deleuze, the realism or believability of the American cinema is so 
strong because the audience always has clear points of connection and 
identification, even in historical narratives. He writes that the ―movement remains 
perfectly consistent with the true while it presents invariants, points of gravity of 
the moving body, privileged points through which it passes and point of fixity in 
relation to which it moves. This is why the movement-image, in its very essence, is 
answerable to the effect of truth which it invokes while movement preserves its 
centres‖ (Deleuze, 1989, p.138). When Deleuze argues that the classic action-
image is no longer relevant, this is largely explained by the fact that the images and 
stories have become clichés and as a result the audience can no longer believe in 
them. Deleuze tries to find new images that can reinstate this belief, but I argue 
that by attempting a higher degree of realism and incorporating the more 
reflective elements of the time-image, the neo-classical Hollywood epics can 
achieve the truthfulness and believability of the classical cinema and thus provide 
us with a system of belief to which the modern audience can relate.  
 
The last two aspects of the action-image both refer to Deleuze‘s notions on the 
close connection between ‗The American Dream‘ as the big American illusion and 
the American cinema on one hand and his emphasis on the importance of illusion 
in general on the other. Deleuze (1986) argues that ―a community is healthy in so 
far as a kind of consensus reigns, a consensus which allows it to develop illusions 
about itself, about its motives, about its desires and its cupidity, about its values 
and its ideals: ‗vital‘ illusions which are more true than pure truth.‖ (p.152). The 
idea of having a truth that is truer, or more vital - hence useful, than the actual 
reality resembles Nietzsche‘s conception of ancient Greek culture, which created 
the healthy illusions of Olympic deities in order to deal with the cruelty of 
everyday life. It is the concept of a universal idea, dream or illusion that survives 
through all the changes and exists throughout the different levels of society, no 
matter if this idea has a religious, mythological or political background. It also 
suggests the necessity of such illusions and their importance in maintaining social 
structures. Furthermore, it is obsolete to criticise illusions for being illusions and 
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one cannot, as Deleuze (1986) points out, ―criticise the American dream for being 
only a dream: this is what it wants to be, drawing all its power from the fact that it 
is a dream.‖(p.152). In our constantly changing society this dream, Deleuze 
argues, functions as the unifying concept and provides the illusion that ensures 
the continuity of the nation.  
 
Even though the phrase ‗American Dream‘ is a 1930s invention,32 we already find 
a reference to this concept in Nietzsche, who describes the assumption that 
everybody can reach everything if you only try hard enough as a playful, artistic 
instinct and compares it to the spirit of early Greek culture. In Nietzsche‘s (2001) 
words, it is ―the American faith […] where the individual is convinced he can do 
just about anything and is up to playing any role; and everyone experiments with 
himself, improvises experiments again, enjoys experimenting, where all nature 
ends and becomes art‖ (p.216, emphasis in original). It is the radical optimism 
despite all obstacles that we recover here, and despite its different origins to 
ancient Greek culture, it mirrors the pleasure in creating and experimenting of the 
former, which makes us all artists. Apart from the creative aspect, the role of the 
individual, which is crucial for the action-image, is also highlighted in this notion 
of the American Dream. This emphasis on the individual can also be found in the 
contemporary epics mentioned here.  
 
Unlike ancient myths, which often focussed on the unifying aspects of the 
Dionysian that define an individual as part of a group, as part of the human race 
that is being guided by the gods, the myths in contemporary cinema now shift the 
focus towards the Apollonian aspect of the individual, his decisions, actions and 
inner conflicts. Accordingly, we find various examples of criticism about the 
unifying concepts of myth and the influence of a divine power in some of the 
recent epics, as I will show in the second part of this chapter based on Troy (dir. 
W. Petersen, 2004, USA).  
 
As Kracauer has explicitly examined the genre of historic epics in its relation to 
the redemptive power of cinema, his notions provide another layer to the topic of 
                                            
32 The phrase was coined by James Truslow Adams in his book The Epic of America, first 
published in 1931.  
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neo-classical epics. Hence I will analyse his theories in combination with 
Deleuze‘s ideas of the action-image.  
 
When Kracauer describes history as a problematic subject from a cinematic point 
of view, this can mainly be attributed to two aspects. The first problem for 
Kracauer is the artificiality of the settings and people in costumes, through which 
the audience is constantly reminded of the staginess of the representation. This 
point can instantly be challenged by claiming that this can be said about most 
fiction and Kracauer may here underestimate the ability of the audience to 
suspend disbelief. More importantly, the look and costumes in contemporary 
epics generally aim at a greater degree of realism and avoid all too distinctive and 
colourful historical styles. In addition, with a stronger emphasis on the action, the 
attention is distracted from the staginess and stiff setting of a historic 
representation, which is further aided by digital technologies. 
 
This attempt at realism is also reflected in the narrative structure. Despite still 
showing glorious heroes and epic battles, the neo-classical characters those are far 
less distant from the audience. They are not standing out as ‗supernatural‘ 
individuals, but are characters with flaws and doubts, with whom the audience can 
identify. A good example for this tendency is the latest version of the Arthurian 
legend – King Arthur (dir. A. Fuqua, 2004, USA), in which Arthur starts as a 
soldier from a remote country who does not truly appear destined to rule 
England. He is even about to retire and probably go back to his home country, 
when duty calls for one last time. Throughout the film there are hardly any 
references to a higher purpose – such as becoming the future king – but he is 
merely doing his duty as a good soldier and a good man, helping some people 
along the way. This is a stark contrast to many previous adaptations of the legend, 
where the mystic powers behind the scenes are usually introduced from the outset 
(e.g. Excalibur, 1981, dir. J. Boorman, USA/UK). 
 
The second and more interesting problem for Kracauer in relation to historic 
epics is what he calls the closed universe of historic narratives. For him, an 
essential aspect of cinema is its ability always to point at a wider framework, an 
open cosmos, a before and after – in short, a whole. This is in contrast to the 
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closed cosmos of the theatrical experience. As historic subjects in films are per se 
finite, Kracauer argues that as a result the audience only gets a limited view on a 
closed section of the world without references beyond it. This is particularly 
obvious in studio scenes and even in certain outdoor scenes, where you always 
have the feeling – as Kracauer describes it – that you would see an entirely 
different reality as soon as the camera moves out of frame by only a fraction. (See: 
Kracauer, p.78). 
 
There are two major arguments against this view, especially in the light of neo-
classical historic epics. Firstly, modern technologies have allowed for a much 
more flexible use of cinematic space and we notice that the modern epics have a 
much more frequent use of pan-shots, moving cameras and totals. This gives a 
strong impression of the surrounding world, even if it is not in the frame. 
Meticulous set-design and mise-en-scène, as described in chapter four with regard 
to The Lord of the Rings, also helps to suggest a wider perspective beyond the 
immediate frame. Moreover, the amount of outdoor scenes has increased 
significantly, which gives the landscape and scenery a much more natural touch 
than the staged pompous indoor settings of some classical epics. This can also be 
seen in King Arthur or Troy, where the vast majority of the film takes place 
outdoors.  
 
Apart from these cinematographic aspects, Kracauer‘s argument can be 
challenged when looking at the perceptions of history Deleuze describes in 
relation to the classic American cinema. This is based on Nietzsche‘s 
aforementioned classifications of interpreting history as monumental, antiquarian 
and critical/ethical history. Based on this theory, Deleuze claims that the classical 
American cinema focuses mainly on monumental history. This concept refers on 
one hand to the sublime and grand imagery and heroes it portrays and on the 
other to a concept of history as parallel events, the reoccurrence of great episodes 
during time. A perfect example for Deleuze is D.W. Griffith‘s film Intolerance 
(1916, USA), where the separate episodes are not shown in chronological order, 
but interwoven so as to demonstrate the parallel occurrences of events 
throughout history, but without any causal or dialectical development from one 
historic period to the other. This view on history suggests to us that ―the 
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greatness that once existed was in any event once possible and may thus be 
possible again‖ (Nietzsche, 1983, p.69). It simply implies that humankind does not 
learn from the past, but keeps acting in similar ways irrespective of the times and 
developments.  
 
As a consequence, this historic conception also tends to focus on the effects and 
actions but ignores the causes. The conflicts between the dual forces, such as 
rich/poor or settler/Indian, are seen as a given and even though the immediate 
conflict might be solved, this does not necessarily lead to a dramatic change in 
society. Despite this valid criticism, I argue that this model of history can also be 
interpreted in such a way that certain historic events are not simply parallel yet 
unrelated. On the contrary, by mirroring the situations and actions of individuals 
in different times, this concept can help us to think about recent events by 
looking at them from a new perspective. In that way we can argue that there is 
much more actuality in historic epics than Kracauer acknowledges for classic 
Hollywood cinema, particularly in examples from the last decade.   
 
If we focus on the essential plot of the movement image – man‘s struggle with his 
environment – and perceive the historic events as a mirror of the events in our 
time, as monumental history, then the historic subject becomes a contemporary 
subject. It is no longer something we look back at in amazement or bewilderment, 
but it has a direct relevance for our modern situation. Cinema can thus show us, 
what Kracauer (1961) calls ―the flow of life‖ (p.273), the most cinematic of all 
content. This idea suggests that life goes on no matter what and the eternally 
moving cinema is the ideal medium to portray this. It is also a philosophical 
concept, which is close to Nietzsche‘s idea on the eternal recurrence for which he 
argues in his later works.  
 
There is also a tendency for more openness in the recent historic epics mentioned 
at the beginning of this chapter, which bring them closer to Kracauer‘s ideas. 
Despite his criticism, Kracauer had already acknowledged that cinema may aim at 
this openness even in historic films. He writes that there is this possibility in 
cinema:  
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―one might think of a film which suggests the infinite chain of causes and 
effects interlinking the historical events as we know them. Such an effort 
towards establishing a causal continuum – an effort in keeping with the 
cinematic approach, for reasons indicated in the preceding chapter – would 
bring to the fore numerous incidents instrumental in the ―unfolding of 
destinies‖ and thus lure the spectator out of the closed cosmos of poster-like 
tableaux vivants into an open universe.‖ (Kracauer, 1961, p.80) 
 
Unlike in classical epics whose final scene often marks a distinct end to the whole 
narrative, neo-classical epics often, although not always, show a certain openness 
that points at the ongoing development of the world and new things to come. For 
example, Kingdom of Heaven does end with the hero returning home and starting a 
new life, but it also shows us the English king riding out with his knights on his 
way to Jerusalem, starting a new crusade and thus continuing the battle. There is a 
final conversation between the king and the hero of the film, which is an exact 
repetition of a dialogue the hero had with his mentor/father at the beginning of 
the film. In this way the film suggests that the conflict and battle about Jerusalem 
is not over but perpetual. 
 
Another example can be found in King Arthur. The theatrical version ends with a 
rather conservative wedding scene between Arthur and Guinevere. However, 
included in the DVD version we find an alternative ending that was originally 
intended by the filmmaker. In this version, a lot is left open, it ends on the 
graveyard and although that may seem like a very final place, the narration leaves 
future developments – such as becoming king or marrying Guinevere – open to 
the audience‘s speculations. (King Arthur, DVD, 2004, Walt Disney Studios Home 
Entertainment, USA). 
 
We also find this shift towards more open endings in the key examples of this 
chapter. Whereas the classic 1950s version Helen of Troy concludes with Helen 
returning home to her husband leaving a destroyed and dead city behind, and so 
closing the narrative, the 2004 epic Troy ends with Achilles‘ burial in the ruins of 
the city, but leaves open the destiny of most of the other characters involved in 
the conflict and seems to mark only one intercession in a continuous conflict.  
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In the next section I will more closely examine this neo-classical epic and its 1950s 
predecessor. I call the 1956 version classical as it is still very much true to the style 
of the classical pre-war American style Deleuze describes in the movement-image. 
The neo-classical movement-images, however, where influenced by the arise of 
new images after the Second World War and have since, as I aim to prove, 
developed significantly without losing the essential characteristics of the 
movement-image. Particular attention will be paid to the key features of the duel 
and the hero. Apart from that, I will show that both films clearly reflect a distinct 
historical situation and can be read as illustrations of a specific line of thought at a 
specific time.  
 
 
5.2 Heroes in Action – Ancient Troy in modern epics 
 
Helen of Troy, the 1956 interpretation of the classic myth surrounding the Trojan 
War, is largely focussed on the romantic love story between Helen of Sparta and 
Paris of Troy. From the very beginning of the film, we are aware of the theatrical 
character of this film, fully in line with Kracauer‘s notion of the staginess of 
historic films. The movie starts with an overture (lasting a whole five minutes), in 
which we see nothing but a still image of a large temple door while we hear 
classical music. This is very similar to a production in an opera house. Then, two 
people appear and open the door as if they were to raise a curtain and our view 
proceeds inside the temple. Here again, the closed mise-en-scène with large 
columns on each site of the frame strongly recalls the look of a theatre stage. 
Finally, an off-screen narrator gives a large amount of background information on 
the story that is to follow, which is similar to the prologue common in ancient 
tragedy and classic theatre.  
 
In contrast, most neo-classical epics only give very brief information if at all and 
then start with a battle scene that throws the audience directly into the action. 
Thus the actual sensation of the events overpowers the distant historic 
perspective. (See: Kracauer, 1961, p.81) In other words, the audience is drawn 
into the action of the film before it can reflect on the staginess of the historic 
scenery. Moreover, throughout the classical film version we frequently have an 
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off-screen narrator filling the gaps in the on-screen story, which constantly points 
at the historicity of the film instead of allowing the audience to immerse in the 
actuality of the plot played out on screen.  
 
From the outset, the neo-classical version Troy by director Wolfgang Petersen is 
significantly different from the earlier version Helen of Troy. Instead of a lengthy 
overture and the theatrical set-up, it only provides a short on-screen text that gives 
the essential information on the time, location and principal political constellation 
of the narrative, but this is not read out by an off-screen narrator. Nevertheless, 
the film then follows with off-screen narration, which is, however, not there to 
explain the historical background, but to provide a philosophical statement that 
sets the tone and introduces the theme of the film. As the voice-over says: ―men 
are haunted by the vastness of eternity, though we ask ourselves will our actions 
echo across the centuries…‖ (0:01:31). This already implies the more reflective 
mood of this action epic, which rather than portraying a legendary historic event 
can be seen as a reflection of war that translates well into our modern times. As a 
consequence, from the very beginning it feels much more contemporary and 
topical than the previous version. 
 
There are various other scenes throughout the classical film version that 
emphasise the degree of staginess. When later in the film the Greek ships arrive 
on the Trojan shore, this is shown by night, and so the filmmakers do not actually 
have to show the ships but merely a sea full of signal fires that symbolise the ships. 
In some later day scenes we can clearly recognise that only the first few ships are 
‗real‘, meaning they are solid built props, whereas the others are clearly painted on 
a canvas in the background, which underlines the theatrical setting.  
 
This is in strong contrast to the modern version, in which the possibilities of 
digital technology allow the filmmakers to produce a breathtaking visual 
representation of the Greek ships and armies. This is not only more visually 
compelling and highlights the epic character of the film, it also creates a more 
realistic impression of the large-scale war that is taking place. Due to the 
technological restrictions in the earlier production, the battle scenes are kept 
rather short and often use close-ups and medium length shots, which do not give 
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us a full impression of the actual fight, let alone allow for a philosophical 
perception of this epic war.  
 
The technical and aesthetic aspects outlined support the more significant 
difference between the two versions of the film. There is a general shift in the 
narrative of the films. This difference also reflects the change in the historical and 
social context of both works and can be made clear by looking at the two main 
characters of both films. The first one is Helen, who is particularly important for 
the first film; the second one is Achilles, the main character of the modern film 
version. Both characters emphasise the variation in the general theme of the films. 
Here I argue that apart from individual creative decisions this is a clear reflection 
of the time and situation in which the films were made.   
 
Bearing in mind the social circumstances of American middle class society in the 
1950s, the idea that Helen, wife of Menelaus, runs away with her young lover, 
poses a significant moral problem that would have been alien to the ancient 
Greeks. In the ancient myth this infidelity is explained with a decision made by 
the gods, in this case by Aphrodite, who decides that Paris should get Helen. This 
divine decision is not questioned. A god that would encourage such infidelity is 
inconsistent with the Christian morality which was dominant in 1950s North 
America. Therefore, the narrative is significantly altered and subsequently much 
closer to the biblical epics of that time than to the original Greek mythology.   
 
At the beginning of the film, in stark contrast to the classic myth, Paris sails for 
Sparta to convince Menelaus to make peace, but the latter betrays and arrests him 
and finally even plans to murder him. In this way, Paris is already glorified as the 
lonely hero who would sacrifice himself for the greater good. The original myth, 
however, tells us that Menelaus wanted peace and invited Paris and his brother 
Hector to Sparta, where he treated them with much hospitality and generosity. In 
return, Paris not only stole Helena, but also a significant part of Menelaus‘ 
treasure.33 Whereas to the ancient Greeks, this behaviour may have found 
                                            
33 For a detailed description see: Bulfinch, T., 1979. Myths of Greece and Rome. New York & 
London: Penguin. 
 166 
approval for the cunning and cleverness, it cannot be justified under the moral 
conditions of the Fifties.  
 
More significantly, the film is not only determined to present Paris as the flawless 
hero, but it must also justify Helen‘s infidelity towards her husband. The first step 
here is to portray Menelaus as a cruel, drunken brute, who celebrates orgies with 
other women and treats his wife badly. Helen‘s initial support for Paris on the 
other hand, is portrayed as if it derives not from a romantic interest, but out of a 
humanitarian interest to save him and because she does ―despise oppression‖ 
(0:44:17). However, that still not seems to be enough to justify running away from 
her country and her husband. So finally, her escape with Paris occurs rather as a 
co-incidence and forced upon them by Menelaus‘ soldiers. When she helps Paris 
to escape the soldiers of Sparta, which Menelaus has sent after him simply 
because he is Trojan; she does not intend to go with him. As they are caught, 
however, her conspiracy is discovered and Paris has no choice but to take her 
with him to save her life. This is a somewhat extreme explanation of the moral 
implications of Helen‘s escape. In this narrative, Paris is not the one who destroys 
hope of peace between Sparta and Troy by betraying Menelaus, but it is Menelaus 
who - fully unjustified - refuses Paris‘ peace offer and threatens to kill him.  
 
Despite all that, as Paris and Helen get back to Troy, they face the anger and 
disapproval both of the Trojan people and the royal family. This is repeatedly 
discussed throughout the film and only towards the end, when she wants to give 
herself back to the Greeks, and so sacrificing herself for the sake of Troy, she is 
fully accepted. Again, it is the Greeks who betray them and do not actually want 
her back but claim power over Troy. 
 
This general interpretation of the theme illustrates my claim that films always 
reflect their times and social circumstances and – as I said – certain films flourish 
particularly well in times of crisis. With regard to Helen of Troy it can be argued that 
the social circumstances in the 1950s were a time when people were desperate to 
overcome the trauma of the Second World War and so the film emphasised the 
harmony of family and domestic life within the Trojan court, which was 
contrasted with a brutal war culture of the Greeks. The neo-classical adaptation is 
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much more ambivalent into this point, reflecting the more complex anxieties of 
post-modern culture. 
 
In the few scenes involving Helen in the modern epic, it is clear that she is very 
conscious of her ‗sins‘ and does not attempt to find any moral justification for it. 
Also, unlike in the 1950s version, there is no absolution for her from the family 
and the people. This, however, does not seem relevant as unlike in the first story 
she is not constantly blamed for what happens to Troy. Everybody seems to be 
aware that she is mainly one individual figure involved in a larger conflict. The 
new role of Helen in the 2004 version also suggests a new perspective on the 
relationship between humans and gods. This involves the aspect of providence, 
which we have already mentioned in the previous chapter. In Helen of Troy, this 
providential element is shown explicitly in the figure of Cassandra, Paris‘ sister, 
who foresees the fall of Troy, and she is one of the first encounters in the film. 
Accordingly, the importance of destiny is emphasised very early on. Throughout 
this film, the will of the gods is an important subject.  
 
We have to acknowledge that for the ancient Greeks the idea of divine 
interference was part of their everyday lives, which is reflected in their myths. It is 
nevertheless interesting to see how both films interpret this aspect. As Kracauer 
had pointed out, divine interference is one of the elements of classic tragic 
narratives that are distinctly un-cinematic in so far as they contradict the ‗natural 
aspect‘ of the cinematic and the natural flow of life. This is rather obvious in the 
first film, where the scenes involving references to the gods always seem strangely 
out of place and do indeed remind us of the historicity and artificiality of the plot. 
The role of the gods is never questioned in this film – unlike in the more recent 
version – and it is portrayed in such a way that the people are at their mercy and 
have no power to decide against it. The main problem in relation to the gods in 
Helen of Troy is rather between worshipping the ‗wrong‘ goddess, Aphrodite 
instead of Athena, not questioning the role of gods in general as it happens in the 
modern version. Towards the end of the classical film, when Helen is released 
from her ‗sin‘, Cassandra redeems her by shifting the blame for Troy‘s destiny 
from Helen to the goddess Athena. 
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Instead of Cassandra, who does not appear in the modern version, the moral 
voice of this film is now Briseis, who – in the classic myth as well as in the film – 
has a crucial role in Achilles‘ split with Agamemnon. Her part in this story is, 
however, largely extended in the modern film epic, as it fulfils a very significant 
cinematic role. The interactions with Briseis allow the filmmaker not only to show 
Achilles‘ emotions and reflections as she is the main figure in questioning his 
actions; she also presents the noble and ethical conscience of the film. Although 
she is a priestess like Cassandra, their discussions on the influence of the gods are 
more in-depth and challenging. For example, when Achilles is questioned by 
Briseis about his motifs, he replies: ―I chose nothing, I was born and that is what I 
am‖ (1:26:00), underlining the concept of providence. The shift from Cassandra 
to Briseis, from Paris‘ sister to Achilles‘ companion, also highlights the focus on 
Achilles in the contemporary narrative, an aspect I will discuss in more detail 
further on. 
 
This shows that the subject of belief and fate is still very present in this neo-
classical epic. Yet, unlike the heroes in Lord of the Rings and Avatar, who emphasise 
the importance of spirituality and faith in contrast to the brutal, materialistic 
nature of their opponents, the hero of Troy is more controversial and critical 
towards these aspects.  
 
It is not only Briseis who challenges Achilles‘ moral consciousness. Achilles in 
return also challenges Briseis‘ perception of the gods when she criticises him 
about being a soldier. He tells her as a priestess she is bound to serve all the gods, 
this including Ares, the god of war. This brings her into a personal conflict 
between religious worship and her own moral perceptions, which in turn 
challenges the audience‘s idea about religious belief and individual morality. 
Achilles further tells her: ―The gods envy us. They envy us because we are mortal. 
Because any moment might be our last. Everything‘s more beautiful because we 
are doomed.‖(1:26:59). This is an important statement, as it summarises the 
metaphysical concept of mortality as a necessary criterion for our appreciation of 
life. As in Nietzsche‘s notions on redemption and suffering, which I discussed 
previously, death and tragedy are necessary in the creation of beauty and 
appearance that allows us to enjoy life.  
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Another interesting point is that Briseis replies to this statement saying ―I thought 
you were a dumb brute. I could have forgiven a dumb brute.‖ (1:27:32). Thus she 
signals that because of his obvious insight and conscious reflection on what he is 
doing, there is no justification for his actions by saying he did not know better. 
What Briseis cannot forgive is that an intelligent man with a critical attitude carries 
out the actions he is doing. For Nietzsche (1994), however, Achilles‘ view 
underlines a powerful Greek concept of life that also always involves an element 
of cruelty, it is ―a hard position, but an ancient, powerful, human-all-too-human 
proposition‖ and he further summarises, ―No cruelty, no feast: that is what the 
oldest and longest period in human history teaches us‖ (p.46).  
 
On the other hand, Nietzsche also makes clear that this is a naïve, amoral 
disposition that is an essential part of culture and therefore cannot be challenged 
from the perspective of our modern understanding of moral and ethical 
behaviour. It refers to what he describes as the morality of the master, which also 
includes distancing himself from his people, which is obvious in the case of 
Achilles. Unlike Hector, who portrays the classic hero of the action-image and has 
the support and encouragement of his family and the people of Troy, Achilles is 
not a classic hero in that sense. His intentions and motivations are very individual 
and personal and he rarely seems to be influenced by the opinions of other 
people, neither enemies nor friends.  
 
In general we find a stronger focus on the individual in modern action epics and 
the new perspective on divine influence is another expression of this. With the 
shift from a belief in a higher power and purpose towards a more individualised 
morality and decision making. In the original myth and its classic literary portraits, 
e.g. the Iliad, the gods have a significant role in this war and it seems at times as if 
the humans are merely figures in the great game of chess the gods play with each 
other. There does not seem to be much evidence of free will and conscious 
decision making. This, however, would be completely alien to us today and make 
a cinematic portrait simply ridiculous.  
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Even in the 1956 version this aspect is already toned down, although the influence 
of the goddesses Athena and Aphrodite are more clearly emphasised in this film. 
Here, the filmmaker also uses a rather blatant Deus ex machina, when Paris tries 
to kill Achilles who is leaving with his chariot dragging Hector along. While he 
keeps missing him with his arrows he prays to Zeus to help him find Achilles‘ 
weak spot and instantly an arrow lands in Achilles heel. Apart from the fact that it 
is inconsistent with the myth as Achilles is not killed in this event, the whole scene 
just seems ridiculous. While to the ancient Greeks it may have been perfectly 
common to have a god or goddess guiding the hand of Paris, such obvious divine 
intervention feels completely out of place in contemporary cinema and thus 
destroys the illusion rather than supports it.  
 
In the modern version Troy the only divine focus point is Apollo, but this is often 
used to challenge the ancient belief with modern ideas, for instance when it is 
shown that Achilles has no respect for the gods any more. When for example 
Achilles raids Apollo‘s temple, Hector questions the priests as to why Apollo has 
not struck Achilles down when he desecrated his temple. The priests here 
generally appear as the superstitious elders who not only give bad advice, but who 
also distract people from making rational decisions. 
 
There is another fact to support this modern view on the divine aspects of the 
ancient myth. According to legend, Achilles‘ mother is a sea nymph, which makes 
him a half-god, an aspect that is only implied discreetly and merely recognisable 
for those familiar with the details of the myth. At the beginning of the film, 
Achilles speaks to his mother while she stands in a river bank collecting sea shells. 
To the average cinema viewer she appears like an ordinary mature woman in a 
Mediterranean setting. We only get a glimpse of her mystic powers when she 
foretells her son his future. She says that he can stay home, have many children 
and grow old and happy or go to this war, die and gain immortality. Importantly, 
immortality here is not meant in the literal sense of him becoming a god, but 
about his eternal fame and glory.  
 
This will become the driving force for Achilles‘ participation in the Trojan War, 
which is again an individual decision. Shortly after this scene, a young boy asks 
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Achilles if it is true that his mother is a goddess and if he is really invulnerable as 
the legend goes, to which the latter only ironically replies, if that were the case he 
would not bother with his armour. (0:06:05).34 This notion emphasises the 
aforementioned more ambivalent treatment of myth and belief in the 
contemporary version of the story. 
 
These aspects also support my initial claim that besides Helen, Achilles is the 
crucial character in our comparison between the two epics. He appears merely as a 
supporting figure in the 1950s version, where he is portrayed as an arrogant and 
vain, selfish character who has nothing to do but occasionally show up and fight. 
Even so, he is not very often shown and his only significant fight in this film is 
against Hector. Whereas Helen‘s role is reduced to a backdrop in the modern 
version, Achilles now becomes the central figure. Not only is he now the driving 
character of the epic, his role is also much more complex and multi-layered, 
despite still having most of the character traits mentioned above.  
 
The first sequence of the contemporary version is a mass scene of a horse army. 
Similar to most of the neo-classical epics I have mentioned earlier in this chapter, 
this film starts with an action scene. Here we meet Agamemnon for the first time: 
he is instantly characterised as an arrogant, merciless and power-obsessed king. In 
this scene we also first encounter Achilles, who is called to decide the war in a 
one-to-one fight and with one stroke kills a man twice his size. Right from the 
beginning, we not only anticipate the conflict between Agamemnon and Achilles, 
but also realise that Achilles is not simply refusing to fight for him out of 
arrogance, but because he does not approve of Agamemnon‘s actions. The only 
argument that convinces him to fight is that by doing so he would spare the army 
of soldiers another bloody fight and end this war for them. When walking past 
Agamemnon towards his opponent, he remarks cynically, ―Now imagine a king 
who fights his own battles, wouldn‘t that be a sight!‖ (0:07:18). Unlike in the first 
film, Achilles here is more of a boyish, unorthodox ‗wild child‘ who is sceptical of 
                                            
34 Interestingly, the filmmakers here also seems to refer to a frequently named 
contradiction in Greek literature between Homer‘s extensive description about Achilles‘ 
armour as well as his mothers concern about this and the legend that she has dunked him 
into the river Styx as a baby to make him invulnerable. See: Bulfinch, 1979. 
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Agamemnon not from pure vanity but for plausible reasons. He reminds us more 
of a hero from a classic Western, the outsider who rides into the village to fight 
for what he is asked for but without taking clear sides and obeying the rules. 
 
When the Greeks set out for war against Troy, Agamemnon has no choice but to 
ask Achilles for his support. However, Agamemnon remains very critical of 
Achilles. For him ―Achilles is the past, a man who fights for no flag. A man loyal 
to no country.‖ (0:20:01). Again, there are parallels to a certain type of Western 
hero that focuses on the individual and independent element of his character. 
Frequently in the Western, once the fight is over, the lonely hero is left behind or 
leaves town. This is because society has overcome the evil and reinstalled a new 
power structure, but the hero does not belong to any side and being a warrior 
through and through he is not capable of adapting to the changes in the world. 
We will see later that similarly to this, Achilles is too much a warrior to be able to 
settle down and find peace in a conventional sense.  
 
Agamemnon and Achilles also show two different approaches towards fame. 
Whereas Agamemnon is primarily interested in gaining power and fame in the 
here and now, Achilles does not care much about worldly fame and riches, but 
wants to achieve eternal glory that reaches far beyond his grave. This intention is 
alien to many other characters in the film, which again puts him in a unique 
position. When Hector questions Achilles at their first encounter about his 
reasons to come to Troy, the latter replies: ―They‘ll be talking about that war for 
1000 years.‖ (0:45:17). Hector seems to be confused by this statement, thus replies 
―In a thousand years the dusk from our bones will be gone.‖ (0:45:20). Achilles 
again emphasises his intentions introduced at the beginning by insisting: ―but our 
names will remain.‖ (0:45:25). 
 
Whereas Agamemnon and Achilles form the first of a series of binary oppositions 
– the distinctive element of the classic action-image – Achilles and Hector present 
another crucial pair. The excessive use of these oppositions shows how much this 
neo-classical epic is rooted in the classical movement-image, where binary 
relationships were the basic element of the organic montage of classical American 
cinema.  
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There are also several other important dualities, which not only appear between 
the Greeks on one side and the Trojans on the other, but also within the Greek 
camp between Achilles and Agamemnon, Agamemnon and Odysseus, as well as 
on Trojan side between Hector and his brother Paris. In addition, there is also a 
strong opposition between Agamemnon and the Trojan king Priam, who 
symbolise two aspects of leadership. In a crucial scene that is missing from the 
earlier film version, Priam goes to Achilles to beg for the dead body of his son 
Hector. This scene truly has the dimensions of an ancient tragedy and Priam‘s 
plea even moves Achilles to tears. This scene feels very modern through its 
representation of deeply human emotions, yet is very close to the actual classic 
myth. Achilles here also acknowledges that Priam is a much better king than his 
own king Agamemnon as he cares for his people and not for his own power 
interests. 
 
After having presented Achilles as the main character of the neo-classical epic, we 
eventually move on to the story of Paris and Helen, although this is rather brief in 
comparison to the 1950s film. Unlike in the first version and more faithful to the 
original myth, Menelaus has invited the Trojan princes Hector and Paris to his 
court to make peace with them. This is the complete opposite to the first film. 
Also, Paris and Helen are portrayed as young and somewhat naïve lovers who 
sneak away from the party to give in to their passion. It seems purely a romantic 
interest that brings him there, not the glorified opposition against an oppressive 
Menelaus as it is characterised in the first film. Helen here makes a conscious 
choice of going with Paris, being fully aware of the trouble that will cause. There 
is no pressure on her to go with him.  
 
In general, the female roles in the modern version are much stronger and 
interestingly often represent the more rational and considerate element, in 
contrast to the men in their rage about honour and glory. They seem like the 
conscience of the warriors and often question their decisions, such as the 
aforementioned Briseis, Hector‘s wife Andromache as well as Helen, who seems 
much more mature than the young Paris. It will later be Briseis, not a warrior, 
 174 
who finally kills Agamemnon, another departure from the original myth that 
underlines the stronger female power in this film. 
 
In a reversalof the first film, where Helen tries to persuade Paris to flee to a small 
island and live there a simple live as farmers, whereas Paris feels the responsibility 
to return home, it is now Paris who suggests this lifestyle and Helen who is 
reasonable and convinces him that this is not an option. Paris on the other hand is 
frequently and in stark contrast to his brother represented as a coward, although 
not necessarily in a negative sense. He is simply young and naïve and does not 
seem to have a sense for honour and pride. When he despairs about his own 
weakness, Helen encourages him by saying, ―I don‘t want a hero, my love, I want 
a man to grow old with.‖ (1:22:19). When looking at this statement, it becomes 
clear that he is not simply a coward, but rather symbolises an alternative lifestyle 
that contradicts the warrior culture of pride and honour, which is represented by 
his brother Hector.  
 
We first encounter Hector in the scene at Menelaus‘ court. In contrast to his 
younger brother, he is not only known as a fierce warrior, but also seems very 
reflective and thoughtful. In the course of the film he will become the antipode of 
Achilles as he shows a very different attitude towards war. They both form a very 
strong binary relationship, crucial for the presentation of the central theme of 
Troy.  
 
With the story shifting from the relationship between Helen and Paris towards the 
conflict between Achilles and Hector, the general theme of the film also shifts 
from a romantic love story that caused an epic war to a depiction of war in 
general, to which the romantic element is merely a small reason. In a personal 
scene between the desperate Paris and his father King Priam the latter explains: ―I 
fought many wars in my time. Some were fought for land, some for power, some 
for glory. I suppose fighting for love makes more sense than all the rest.‖ 
(0:57:08). This also shows that the Trojans with King Priam and also Hector have 
a strong sense of family and community, which is in contrast to the Greeks who 
attack them. 
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This narrative shift is already emphasised by the set-up of the film and the extent 
of the battle scenes. For example, even though the earlier version is significantly 
shorter than the later film, the Greek armies in the first film arrive in Troy much 
later in the story, around the 53rd minute, which is nearly half-way through the 
film. The 2004 version not only starts with a battle scene, the Greek armies also 
go ashore in Troy just half an hour into the film. As a result, the vast majority of 
the conflict is played out directly on the Trojan shore and around the battle field 
rather than in the royal palaces. 
 
In both films a significant aspect of the battle of Troy is not the abduction of 
Helen, but more importantly that this is delivering a welcome reason for the 
Greeks to attack Troy. The Greek king Agamemnon is in both films the driving 
power behind the conflict and all too happy to help his brother Menelaus to 
regain his wife Helena while attacking his archenemy. In the classical film epic, the 
few critical, reflective moments largely come from Ulysses (Odysseus), who – as 
in the classic myth – represents the element of the wise, cunning and cynical 
commentator. As an example, when Agamemnon calls the Greeks for their War of 
honour – he remarks, ―Yes, That‘s what the future will call it‖ (0:49:54),suggesting 
that it will be only in the interpretation of the historians to justify and glorify the 
war. Although Odysseus plays a similar role in the contemporary film version, the 
majority of the reflection on war and its purpose here comes directly from 
Achilles, and occasionally Hector. Thus it is no longer the cynical commentator, 
but the warrior himself who is reflecting on his actions.  
 
Hector and Achilles here represent two opposing attitudes of warfare – defence 
and attack. True to the basic elements of the movement-image, this binary 
opposition is often shown via a parallel montage. The first significant parallel 
montage in this context occurs when both armies prepare for their first battle and 
Hector as well as Achilles delivers a short motivational speech to encourage their 
soldiers for the fight. We first see Hector who says to his men that there is a 
simple code, ―honour the gods, love your women and defend your country‖ 
(0:36:55), a statement that underlines the defensive character of his fight.  
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This is contrasted by Achilles, who simply points at the Trojan shore and shouts 
to his men: ―Do you know what‘s there, waiting, beyond that beach? Immortality! 
Take it! It‘s yours!‖ (0:37:42). We can see from this initial fight that Hector on the 
one hand is the protector of house and home, who simply wants to defend 
country and people, whereas Achilles on the other hand is in Troy for his own 
eternal glory. He does not care much about defending Greece, regaining Helen or 
reinstating Menelaus‘ honour. His motifs at this stage are entirely about the war 
itself and they are individual and personal. Achilles motivates his soldiers not to 
fight for the glory of Greece or his own state, not even for the glory of their army, 
but for their personal, individual immortal glory.  
 
Despite that, Achilles does not seem to have any illusions about the immorality 
and reality of war. On the contrary, he tries several times to confront the 
overeager young Patroclus with what it means to fight. In one scene he tells 
Patroclus that he is constantly haunted by the ghosts of the people he has killed 
and makes clear that there is nothing glamorous about fighting as he will have to 
kill people. However, as a man of action this does not lead to remorse or despair, 
but an acceptance that this is what he is.  
 
This is again a presentation of Nietzsche‘s idea of the noble man, which does not 
serve anyone else or fight for a so called higher purpose. This aspect is further 
underlined when Achilles tells Patroclus: ―I taught you how to fight, but I never 
taught you why to fight. … soldiers they fight for kings they never even met … 
they die when they‘re told to die … Don‘t waste your life following some fool‘s 
orders.‖ (1:02:07). This is not simply an advice to his friend not to obey the rules, 
but to challenge him to find out for himself what he is fighting for and to be 
critical about what is worth fighting for. It is clear that Achilles sees himself as a 
soldier as well as a leader, but an independent one – a classic warlord, as 
Agamemnon calls him.  
 
Despite his criticism towards foolish, obedient soldiers, Achilles has more respect 
for them than for the power-obsessed Agamemnon, who tries to claim his victory 
irrespective of who was fighting. When Achilles provokes him by arguing ―the 
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soldiers won the battle‖, Agamemnon simply replies ―history remembers kings, 
not soldiers.‖ (0:52:40). 
 
Apart from the fact that this is a historic epic it also includes a variety of 
reflections on history in general. Agamemnon‘s statement points at Nietzsche‘s 
model of monumental history, which Deleuze picked up in relation to classic 
American cinema as mentioned above. This film is a good example insofar as it 
not only describes the longing for immortality and the ―Olympian laughter‖ 
towards death on the side of Achilles as the great hero of history, it also shows the 
negative side represented by Agamemnon. He is living in the present, exclusively 
focussed on immediate action, ignoring cause and effect in the historical 
process.For Achilles, fame is beyond this life, in fact he seems to be aware that he 
will only gain the glory after his death, but in this sense fame becomes ―the belief 
in the solidarity and continuity of the greatness of all ages and a protest against the 
passing away of generations and the transitoriness of things.‖ (Nietzsche, 1983, 
p.69).  
 
Agamemnon on the other hand shows a very pragmatic attitude towards glory, 
power and even towards the gods. His character easily translates to contemporary 
modern leaders that use every excuse from religion to security to justify the 
extension of their power. It has already been suggested in the classical film version 
that Agamemnon is in this war purely for personal reasons, but this is extended 
largely in the modern version. When reading this film as a general reflection on 
war, then this also implies the driving force behind most wars, not only in ancient 
times.  
 
This more contemporary and realistic take on an ancient topic can also be found 
on the visual level of the film. Throughout the film we find several burial scenes, 
showing not only the people dying in the fight, but also the aftermath of the 
battle. In one remarkable sequence following the first major battle between the 
Trojans and the Greeks, the film shows a long scene, in which we see the Greek 
soldiers collecting the dead and burning them on pylons at the beach. We then see 
the beach brightly illuminated by the fires. In the first film, the pylons are only 
mentioned once when Helen complaints about the Trojan people putting them so 
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close to her window in order to demonstrate that these dead are her fault. 
However, this is never shown on screen and you rarely see dead soldiers after the 
battle.   
 
Eventually, even Achilles no longer fights for eternal glory, but out of a more 
basic human emotion. When Patroclus is killed wearing Achilles‘ armour, Achilles 
is full of rage and his intention to fight alters completely. He is no longer 
concerned with eternal glory, but simply thinking of revenge. When he challenges 
Hector he does not care about Troy or Greece, or about a fair fight, he only wants 
to destroy him. Here, killing Hector is only the start as he even wants to destroy 
his body for the underworld so that he will be punished in this life and the next. 
When Hector and Achilles are preparing for their fight, we find another 
interesting parallel montage that emphasises the binary relationship between the 
two. We see both Achilles and Hector putting on their armour in exactly the same 
manner. This juxtaposes them as the two prototype warriors who may have 
different purposes and ideals to fight, but also share a common thread that sets 
them apart from the other characters of the film.  
 
As several other aspects outlined before, the final fight between Hector and 
Achilles also bears strong reminiscence of Western style confrontations. We see 
Hector and Achilles in an empty desert landscape outside the Trojan walls. They 
are both old style heroes who risk their lives for what they believe in and who are 
not afraid of direct confrontation. This is very different from the previous scene 
when Paris challenges Menelaus for Helen, but flees when he realises that 
Menelaus is about to kill him and seeks the protection of his brother. Here, 
Hector eventually kills Menelaus to protect his brother although it is obvious that 
he disapproves of Paris‘ behaviour. Hector is reluctant to kill Menelaus, who he 
respects as a warrior, whereas the whinging Paris is in stark contrast to Hector‘s 
sense of pride and honour. 
 
With Hector being killed by Achilles, the good man who protects his people is 
overcome by the ultimate warrior, which also has a devastating effect on his 
community. We already see in the first film that the Greeks and the Trojans form 
two different types of societies. The Greeks are presented as a loose alliance, used 
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to fighting each other and only uniting if it is in their own interest. This motif is 
continued in the contemporary film version, although Agamemnon here appears 
as a stronger leader who seems to have forged not only alliances, but effectively 
an empire consisting of the different states of Greece. The Greek society is thus 
the antithesis to the strongly unified community of the Trojans lead by King 
Priam, who appears more like a father figure to his people. In one scene, Paris 
points out to his father Priam that he is such a great king because he loves his 
country and his people so much, which is in stark contrast to Agamemnon and his 
rule of oppression. 
 
Also, family values are emphasised within the Trojan royal court and it is made 
clear that all prefer peace to warfare. Here, the Trojan society is much closer to 
the idea of a nation-community, which Deleuze describes as an essential part of 
the classic American cinema. This time, however, the healthy community is 
defeated by the Greeks. With Hector dead and King Priam broken by despair and 
grief, the city and the community have lost his leader. Paris is not powerful 
enough to prevent the Trojans from bringing Odysseus‘ horse in the city. Again, 
the priests are giving bad advice based on superstitious assumptions and so the 
blind belief in the will of the gods eventually leads to the destruction of Troy.  
 
After the Greeks have entered Troy they burn down the city. Unlike previous 
battle scenes in the modern version, this scene is initially very meditative as the 
soundtrack only allows the battle noises to appear in the background while the 
dominant music is a kind of spiritual singing, which gives the whole final battle a 
philosophical dimension. During the fight of Troy, Achilles is eventually killed by 
Paris. As in the earlier film version, the first arrow hits Achilles legendary heel. 
Unlike in the classic film, however, this does not actually kill him and Paris needs 
a few more arrows shot into Achilles‘ heart to bring him down, which makes this 
instantly more believable and realistic.  
 
Whereas Homer‘s Iliad, which only describes a fraction of the Trojan War, ends 
with the funeral of Hector in all his glory, the modern version of Troy mirrors this 
by ending on Achilles‘ funeral in the ruins of Troy. This also emphasises Achilles‘ 
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role as the central character of this epic and forms another parallel to his antipode 
Hector.  
 
 
Summary 
 
In conclusion, we can say that the neo-classical epic remains consistent with 
Deleuze‘s concept of the movement-image in all its important elements, such as 
the use of dual relationships throughout the film, often emphasised by parallel 
montage in crucial scenes. With the focus on action instead of the historic 
background, it not only further underlines the ambitions of neo-classical 
American cinema, but also challenges Kracauer‘s criticism about the outdated 
artificiality of historic epics.  
 
In general, neo-classical epics also have a strong focus on the individual; in fact 
this focus is even stronger than in the classical epics, which reflects an increased 
individualisation in society. This contemporary background is also apparent in 
other aspects, such as the questioning of divine powers and a critical attitude 
towards the reasons behind warfare.  
 
Apart from these elements, the modern action-image, however, has also 
significantly developed. It has indeed moved beyond the organic whole of the 
classic action-image, which is illustrated by more ambivalent and complex binary 
oppositions, inconsistent and disillusioned societies and people as well as more 
open narratives. With its focus on action, it has overcome the organic 
representation in favour of an identity of image and concept. In this way it shows 
the struggle between man and his world, which Deleuze called action-thought. 
This is largely helped by modern digital technologies that enable the filmmaker to 
create the images in such a way that it reflects the narrative and allows the 
audience to be drawn in the story. As a result, they become part of the reflective 
journey of the film.  
 
Despite the critical treatment of aspects of belief, the revival of mythic epics 
shows that these grand mythic illusions still have a power to help us understand 
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our world and that we need them to be reflective and critical of our times while 
simultaneously implying a certain order and structure by comparing our world 
with a historical/mythical world.  
 
This contrast between our world and a mythical one can also be found in the 
latest examples of digital Hollywood cinema, which seem to have pushed the use 
of technology to such an extent that it no longer seems to support the narrative, 
but get in the way of a full engagement with the film. I will explore this aspect in 
the final chapter of this thesis, in which I discuss the future of the movement-
image. 
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Chapter Six:  
Possible Worlds, Impossible Narratives?– The potentials and limits of 
digital storytelling 
 
In the previous chapters I have discussed various film epics of the last decade, 
starting with the Lord of the Rings trilogy and its mythical themes, such as the 
eternal fight against an ultimate evil, the hero‘s journey, the redemption of the 
world and the belief in the good. Then I looked at recent historical epics and 
demonstrated how they approach myth from a more realistic point of view, both 
in the narrative and in the visual components of the film, while also incorporating 
some of the classic mythical aspects mentioned above. Especially with regard to 
realism, digital technologies played in important role in the impact of these epics.  
The films I will examine in this final chapter continue these ideas. More precisely, 
I will look at the most recent developments in digital cinema, such as fully digital 
feature films and 3D technology and explore how technology further moves 
beyond the boundaries of realism as well as its impact on the aesthetic and 
narrative elements of the films. One hypothesis I aim to investigate in this context 
is that despite their hypermodern imagery, the storytelling seems to be rather 
regressive in the sense that it incorporates clichés of classic Hollywood cinema to 
a much greater level than the epics discussed in the previous chapters. I will 
examine in which way this influences aspects such as redemption and illusion and 
how these themes can be addressed in postmodern narratives.  
 
The latest trend in the development of digital cinema seems to be 3D technology. 
The general idea behind it may not be entirely new, but the three-dimensional 
images created by digital technology are significantly different from the first 3D 
attempts in the 1960s. As a consequence, this technology has a potential to reach 
beyond a mere cinema of effects, even though recent works in this area have not 
yet used its full creative potential to go truly beyond the visual spectacle. 
 
Similar to the first wave of CGI in the early 1990s, this new visual dimension 
often seems to have a pure novelty effect and I want to analyse what impact this 
can have on the stories told. An example is the recent remake of Clash of the Titans 
(dir. Louis Leterrier, 2010, USA), which was not originally planned as a 3D film. 
Only after the success of other 3D films, the effect was added in post-production 
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and so becomes arguably disposable and disconnected with the actual story. This 
is in contrast to the films analysed later in the chapter, where the technology is a 
crucial factor from the outset.  
 
In the context of the new images, I shall also resume my review of Deleuze‘s 
theories on the decline of the movement-image. I shall question whether Deleuze 
is right to assume that we need yet another type of images or whether the 
categories of movement-image and time-image are sufficient to capture the 
advances in visual aesthetics. Therefore, this chapter will continue the line of 
thought of the previous chapters and see how most recent works of digital cinema 
push the boundaries of cinema itself. I will further ask if and how the most recent 
films continue to incorporate concepts of the time-image or if their conservative 
narratives link them closer to the movement-image, despite their technological 
advances.  
 
In the first part of this chapter, I shall summarise Deleuze‘s notions on the 
influence of new technologies and discuss the contributions of more recent 
writers on digital cinema. Linking digital cinema to new impulses in philosophical 
thinking, I further want to explore the possibilities of these new technologies in 
terms of narration. For this, I will briefly look at recent attempts to present 
mythical narratives in a fully digital way, such as Beowulf (dir. Robert Zemeckis, 
2007, USA) or 300 (dir. Zack Snyder, 2006, USA). Like the films discussed in 
previous chapters, they directly draw on mythical and historical narratives. 
Although 300 is the adaptation of a graphic novel by Frank Miller, it can be 
compared to the early historic epic 300 Spartans (dir. Rudolf Maté, 1962, USA), 
which was Miller‘s inspiration.35 My hypothesis is that these fully digital epics fail 
to create an illusion for the audience that transfers beyond the screen experience 
and so are unsuccessful in engaging the audience on an emotional level. Especially 
                                            
35 In an interview with the online magazine UGO, Frank Miller states: ―I was a little boy 
of seven when I saw this clunky old movie from 20th Century Fox called The 300 Spartans 
[released in 1962]. […] I went and sat down and watched the end of the movie and the 
course of my creative life changed because all of a sudden the heroes weren't the guys 
who get the medal at the end of Star Wars.‖  Epstein, D. R. Undated. Frank Miller, 300 
Interview. Under Ground Online. Available from: 
<http://www.ugo.com/ugo/html/article/?id=16424&sectionId=106> [Accessed 28 
August 2010]. 
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in 300, which uses the digital technology to design a new visual aesthetics for 
historical epics by adapting the style of graphic novels, it can be argued that the 
effect on the audience is purely aesthetic, which makes it difficult to immerse in 
the story. Beowulf equally seems to fail to connect with the audience 
properly.Despite the fact that the visual representation is very realistic, it is 
difficult to empathise with the characters, as they are simply lacking ‗human 
touch‘. As discussed in chapter two, Kracauer had criticised Metropolis for using 
human beings simply as ornaments, the visual aesthetic thus eliminating any 
ethical or emotional aspects. A similar statement can be made with regard to the 
two films mentioned here. In Avatar this relationship may be more complex as 
the digital images appear to be more complex and engaging. This point is also 
highlighted in a recent article by scholar Kimberly N. Rosenfeld (2010), who 
claims that ―Cameron pulls the viewer into Pandora‘s world much like people are 
pulled into gaming‘s virtual reality.‖ I will explore throughout this chapter what 
impact this has on the storytelling of the film and if this can help to use digital 
technologies beyond the mere spectacle, which was already a problem in the early 
CGI-cinema of the Nineties as I have discussed in chapter three.  
 
For this reason, I will examine Avatar in more detail in the second part of this 
chapter and analyse whether this film primarily engages the audience on a visual 
level or whether it has the capacity to create an illusionary world that can provide 
meaning beyond the screen experience. Since its release, the film has not only 
divided critics, but also poses some interesting challenges to our perception of the 
role of cinema and the link between images and storytelling. A further question is 
whether Hollywood cinema has so far missed out on the possibilities of the new 
technology to create not only new aesthetical but also new philosophical illusions.  
 
Finally, this chapter will discuss the future role and structure of narratives in 
general and argue that the new imagery may be at its best as a fusion between the 
action-driven heroes and stories of the classical cinema of the movement-image 
and the visual-contemplative aspects of the time-image. We will further explore 
how far philosophy and film studies can contribute to a debate on digital 
aesthetics that is currently dominated by discourses on the technological aspects.  
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Michael Heim (1993) has argued in his book on virtual realities that perhaps ―the 
essence of VR ultimately lies not in technology but in art, perhaps art of the 
highest order. Rather than control or escape or entertain or communicate, the 
ultimate promise of VR may be to transform, to redeem our awareness of reality – 
something that the highest art has attempted to do and something hinted at in the 
very label virtual reality‖ (p.124). In this sense, contemporary digital cinema may 
be able to fulfil Nietzsche‘s demand for ‗redemption through illusion‘ as well as 
Kracauer‘s claim of cinema as the redemption of material reality and Deleuze‘s 
call for the reinstatementof our belief in the world. This idea of redemption links 
this theory to the overall hypothesis of this study and asks how a new digital 
cinema might be able to create illusions that provide us with myths that are not 
simply manipulative and uncritically ideological, but inspire us to actively 
participate in creating a sense of stability and wholeness in our modern life. The 
question is then, how should modern cinema use the technologies and how can 
films interact with philosophy to make the most of these new possibilities. 
 
 
6.1 Postmodern heroes inclassic myths – Storytelling in the digital age 
 
The increasing impact of digital technologies, especially feature films that are 
entirely digitally created, poses a challenge for theorists. Deleuze had already 
suggested that new electronic technologies will affect the very survival of cinema 
itself. Even before the break-through of digital technologies on a widespread 
level, he had argued in his cinema books that the ―life or the afterlife of cinema 
depends on its internal struggle with informatics‖ (Deleuze, 1989, p.259). 
 
The problem already starts with the debate on how to classify digitally generated 
films such as Beowulf and 300. The Academy of Science Fiction, Fantasy and 
Horror classified Beowulf under animation as nominee for their 2008 Saturn 
Awards, whereas 300 was classified as a traditional action/adventure film and won 
this category in the same year.36 However, I argue that in terms of storytelling as 
well as visual representation Beowulf and in parts also 300are much closer to other 
                                            
36 See: Internet Movie Database. Saturn Awards 2008. [online] Available via:  
<http://www.imdb.com/event/ev0000004/2008> [Accessed 28 February 2011]. 
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historical epics of recent years than they are to other animated films. This is 
particularly strong when motion capture technology is used, as it records the 
performance of real-life actors that is later applied to digital characters, but the 
faces of the actors usually remain recognisable. Consequently, it provides a close 
link with our perception of reality that is distinct from classic animation, which 
rather aims at creating characters very different from ordinary humans. As the 
focus of this work is on mythical storytelling and the way it creates illusions and 
meaning I will not further elaborate on the medium specific differences between 
animation and real-life feature films, particularly since the boundaries between the 
two become increasingly blurred. Instead, I treat these films as being similar to the 
historical epics reviewed in the previous chapter.  
 
Deleuze questioned at the end of his cinema books whether his concepts of the 
movement-image and the time-image would be sufficient to describe the new 
electronic images. His mistake here is to assign time-image and movement-image 
to two different ‗wills to art‘ and then claims that we may need yet another will to 
art for the electronic age. Yet, I argue that there is only one artistic drive and both 
movement-image and time-image are the two sides of the coin, even though they 
use different tools. Thus, the future may be the synthesis of both images rather 
than an entirely new type of image, which disposes of both the concept of the 
time-image and the movement-image. 
 
This brings us back to the original illusion created by the movement-image, which 
allows us to believe in a link between man and the world. I therefore suggest that 
the characteristics of the new digital images cannot be found in yet another image, 
but in a combination of both time-image and action/movement-image. As the 
majority of digital cinema currently consists of composites between digital and 
photo-real images, it seems only appropriate to define the theoretical concept 
behind contemporary cinema equally as a composite of both time-image and 
action-image.    
 
In the following paragraph, I would like to revise the elements of both the 
classical action-image and the modern time-image, together with several 
contemporary theories on digital cinema. First of all, digital technologies challenge 
 187 
the concept of the classic action-image by shifting the emphasis from the 
narration to the visual components of the film. On the other hand, digital 
filmmaking allows for a level of continuity that could never be reached before in 
editing; and as discussed in chapter three, continuity is an essential feature of the 
classical cinema.  
 
In an essay on the recent film adaptation of Beowulf, William Brown discusses the 
aspect of montage in digital films and draws connections to Deleuze‘s time-image. 
Contrary to Brown‘s theory, which links this temporal-spatial continuity to the 
concept of the time-image, I argue that the implied continuity is a crucial element 
in maintaining the model of the movement-image. Brown supports his argument 
by focussing on the fact that Deleuze links continuity to montage, whereas the 
time-image is for him defined by ―montrage‖, a showing or presentation of the 
image (from French ‗montrer‘: presenting). As a result, the fact that digital cinema 
does not use traditional editing techniques seem to imply a form of representation 
that is closer to the long takes used in the modern cinema of the time-image.  
 
Despite this being right in essence, Deleuze‘s primary concern is not so much the 
technical process of editing, but rather the connections cinema creates when 
moving from one frame to the next. In the movement-image, the continuity of 
images maintains the organic flow of the film that allows the audience to focus on 
stories and characters. In this way, a virtually created sequence that presents us 
with a fluent and continuous movement-image is more coherent with his theory 
of the movement-image, even if it is not actually cut.  
 
In contrast, the time-image is largely defined by a break in this continuity; the 
images are not organically linked with each other, which is why the focus is on the 
individual frame or image and not on the flow of the film. As a result, it inspires 
contemplation but not movement or action. This shift towards the visual 
component directs the audience‘s engagement with the film from the story and 
the emotional conflicts of the characters towards a purely aesthetic pleasure. As 
Daniel Frampton (2006) had pointed out, ―here the filmgoer has an aesthetic 
connection over and above any natural connection.‖ (p.205). For him, this type of 
cinema is the less interesting option as he suggests that the natural involvement 
 188 
with the film, as found in films that engage the viewer on various levels, is the way 
to inspire new ways of thinking that are particularly cinematic instead of just 
abstract reflections, poetic rather than rational. This point also encourages an idea 
of intuitive wisdom instead of abstract thinking, which informs much of 
contemporary cinema, particularly when dealing with myth. Cinema here aims to 
reconnect us with the world, not necessarily by showing us a realistic image of the 
world as Kracauer had claimed, but by providing a general idea that there is 
something to connect with and so recreating the belief in this world that Deleuze 
demanded.  
 
As with all classic myths, we need strong characters with whose suffering we can 
empathise, so that we can find redemption for ourselves in the destiny of the 
hero. If we do not believe in the existence of the characters then we cannot 
believe in the myth. Hence, a major point of criticism in relation to fully digital 
characters is that the emotional component does not translate properly into the 
computer graphics. Stephen Hunter (2007), reviewer for the Washington Post, 
writes that in ―‗Beowulf‘, director Robert Zemeckis uses a technique called 
‗motion capture‘ to conjure fantastical things, angles into action and sweeping 
vistas to stun your eyes and take your breath away. But what he hasn't mastered 
and what the technique can't do is this: emotion capture.‖ We said earlier that 
cinema not only moves, it moves us, which is a point that seems to be lost in 
some of the recent digital examples.  
 
Yet this aspect can also be interpreted as an aesthetic tool that in fact reflects a 
certain attitude towards the superficial in postmodern thinking. In his essay, 
Brown (2009) claims, that ―if the film can be seen only as enacting the falseness of 
its own construction through MoCap, it is fitting because the film also works hard 
to highlight how humanity‘s own claims to control the flesh are subverted by the 
flesh itself (the monstrous within us).‖ (p.164). Accordingly, it may not actually be 
necessary to achieve a maximum level of photorealism in the digital images, which 
seems to be the current trend. Frampton (2006) had already argued that we ―must 
resist the desire to always ‗reference‘ film to real-world physical laws and 
properties, exactly because contemporary film is leaving those laws and properties 
behind.‖ (p.77).  
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Heim (1993) also expresses this view and describes that especially a ―virtual world 
needs to be not-quite-real or it will lessen the pull on imagination. Something-less-
than-real evokes our power of imaging and visualization.‖ (p.133). This point is 
interesting insofar as it emphasises the creative aspect of digital illusions as well as 
the active participation of the audience in its creation. While provided with a 
story, such as a classic myth, we always interpret it in such a way that it is relevant 
to us and so extend it in our own fantasy. 
 
As the example of Beowulf shows, the modern video game aesthetic and 
superficiality of stories and characters could be a new way of introducing a classic 
myth to a postmodern audience and challenges not only their visual perception 
but may in turn inspire new ways of looking at our own world. As Brown (2009) 
has pointed out: ―What is true formally of motion capture synthespians (an 
uncanny valley between real actor and virtual avatar) is reflected in Beowulf‘s 
narrative: there is a disparity between the image humans have of themselves 
(mighty) and that which the film presents to us (mere flesh) – and only those that 
do change their ways (Unferth, the ever-shifting Grendel‘s mother) survive.‖ 
(p.165-166). This is a message that may appeal to an audience confronted with a 
world of constant change, but it also hints at a concept of hybridisation, which I 
will explore in my subsequent analysis of Avatar.   
 
Why is it, then that so many of the new digital adventures draw on ancient 
mythology? As Tom Gunning (2006) has pointed out in his essay on The Lord of 
the Rings, the confluence  
 
―of technology and magic, of the animated character interacting with ‗live‘ 
actors provokes us to confront a number of paradoxes about new cinema: 
the fascination of mythic representation in an age of super rationalization; the 
role of special effects in mythic narratives; and the questions about the 
borders between the human and the artificial.‖ (p.323).  
 
The cinematic examples discussed in this second part of the thesis are 
representatives of this tendency. I have already briefly discussed the influence of 
digital technologies on the narrative of the film and I will look more closely at the 
interaction between human and the artificial when discussing Avatar in the next 
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part of this chapter. I will now focus on the question of why it is myth in 
particular that seems so relevant for contemporary cinema. 
 
Heim had argued that even when we interact with virtual realities and immerse 
ourselves in the illusion, we always need an anchoring in the real world. As our 
own world becomes increasingly complex and uncontrollable, it is difficult to find 
some anchoring, simply by linking it to photorealistic perceptions of truth. For 
this reason, ―we need some sense of metaphysical anchoring. I think, to enhance 
virtual worlds. A virtual world can be virtual only as long as we can contrast it 
with the real (anchored) world. Virtual worlds can then maintain an aura of 
imaginary reality, a multiplicity that is playful rather than maddening.‖ (Heim, 
1993, p.133). My argument is that universal myths may help us by providing us 
with this sense of metaphysical anchoring, something that is familiar to the 
audience even when the new images push the boundaries of our perception of 
reality. However, more than just drawing on myth, filmmakers as well as 
philosophers should use the opportunity of the new images to go beyond the well 
known and inspire new thoughts and concepts.  
 
As Frampton has argued, by introducing us to new realities, contemporary cinema 
also inspires a whole range of new experiences and emotions, and causes new 
thinking as a result. He writes that―With the image now entirely mappable by 
computer, any section of a recorded image can be changed or eliminated. In the 
new digital image everything is manipulable, everything is re-thinkable.‖ 
(Frampton, p.205). We can then propose that the digital cinema of the future will 
eventually move beyond the modern interpretation of traditional myths and create 
new powerful myths adequate to create healthy illusions for a postmodern 
generation rather than simply producing escapist fantasies based on computer 
games as recent films have done. Finally, Heim (1993) states that the  
 
―ultimate VR is a philosophical experience, probably an experience of the 
sublime or awesome. […] The final point of a virtual world is to dissolve the 
constraints of the anchored world so that we can lift anchor – not to drift 
aimlessly without point, but to explore anchorage in ever-new places and, 
perhaps, find our way back to experience the most primitive and powerful 
alternative embedded in the question posed by Leibniz: Why is there anything 
at all rather than nothing?‖ (p.139). 
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This statement points at our very fundamental need to believe in something, 
which we have discussed throughout this work. It now remains to be seen, if 
contemporary cinema finally creates alternative worlds that have the ―capacity to 
evoke in us alternative thoughts and alternative feelings.‖ (Heim, 1993, p.139). In 
the next part, I will examine the most recent digital epic, which goes a step further 
in creating its own alternative world while still drawing on very familiar classic 
concepts. 
 
 
6.2 When virtual realities become actual – Avatar and the future of cinema 
 
James Cameron‘s Avatar creates its own, hypermodern myth. Despite its futuristic 
premise, it also draws on previous cinematic examples of historical narratives, 
such as Pocahontas (dir. Mike Gabriel, Eric Goldberg, 1995, USA) and Dances with 
Wolves (dir. Kevin Costner, 1990, USA), and other classic stories. Therefore, it can 
easily be compared to the mythical narratives we have discussed earlier. The film 
has already caused an intense debate and not only divided fans and critics, but it 
has also started a discussionamong film scholars and philosophers on the 
relevance and meaning of this film. Some hailed it as a milestone in the 
development of cinema, some criticised it for its excessive use of clichés and its 
recycled narrative. But whether or not this film is a masterpiece or an old-
fashioned Hollywood story in a new look, it clearly challenges the concepts of 
realism and illusion discussed in this thesis and raises several important questions 
on the future of cinema.  
 
In her aforementioned article, Rosenfeld compares the film Avatar to another of 
James Cameron‘s futurist tales, namely the Terminator series (1984-2009). Here she 
argues that beyond ―their mass-market appeal, impressive visuals, predictable 
characters, and surface-level storytelling, these films capture aspects of the 
public‘s current experiences and ideological states.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). This 
statement supports the argument I have been developing throughout this work, 
namely that cinema in general can be seen as a reflection of developments in a 
society and its mental state. As Kracauer had pointed out this is particularly true 
for a mass entertainment industry such as Hollywood. It is therefore worth 
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examining these epics with regard to the way they create meaning as it may enable 
us to gain a valuable insight into ideological developments. This crucial aspect of 
my research can be confirmed by Rosenfeld‘s claim that by comparing the two 
narratives of Avatar and Terminator, we can see an ―ideological shift‖ in these 
stories that can help us ―to understand how they represent the turn from a 
modern Terminator mindset to a postmodern Avatar mindset.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010).  
 
The Terminator films – even though its latest instalment only launched in 2009 – 
largely present the Cold War dystopian view of the future, which informed the 
first film of the series. The same theme also featured in similar works of that time, 
such as the Mad Max trilogy (dir. George Miller, 1979-1985, AUS) and Blade 
Runner (dir. Ridley Scott, 1982, USA). In contrast Avatarnot only presents a more 
optimistic view of the future, it also suggests new relationships with and attitudes 
towards artificial life-forms and technological advances. Accordingly, Rosenfeld 
(2010) writes that Terminator‟s cinematic ―representations of a society in shambles 
brought about by humankind‘s losing control to its machines were popular with 
audiences in a period when the socio-political context fostered anxiety and 
technological mistrust. However, such angst is becoming an increasingly passé 
attitude.‖  
 
It seems that our post-millennial society sees technological advances no longer as 
a threat, but as an essential part of modern life and largely focuses on the 
possibilities it provides in extending our perceptions and experiences. In other 
words, the dark stories of the 1980s have ―been replaced by a new narrative where 
humans, machines, and technology are more similar than different and their 
relations more complex‖ and according to her, Avatar‘s narrative ―embraces 
human-technology-machine relations and extends them into a post-human 
society.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). 
 
A similar claim is made by John D. Caputo in his book On Religion, which I 
mentioned in previous chapters. He notes with regard to a new cyber-spirituality 
that the ―old-fashioned opposition of technology and religion was forged in the 
dusty mines and grimy factories of the industrial revolution, not the virtual world 
of post-industrial cyberspace, where the main menace to our health is not black 
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lung disease but carpal tunnel syndrome, caused by sitting on the computer all 
day.‖ (Caputo, 2001, p.72) His point is that we no longer perceive scientific 
advances as threatening, but embrace the resulting technology not only for 
reasons of work efficiency but also for spiritual enlightenment. It is thus not 
surprising that so many viewers are drawn towards the basic mythic and spiritual 
concepts presented in the cyber world of Avatar.  
 
Nevertheless, several distinct problems of this postmodern thinking are also 
present in Avatar. These problems appear clearly in Rosenfeld‘s (2010) article, 
when she suggests that ―Avatar‘s themes of hybridization, fragmentation and 
hyper-reality are not social liabilities rather, to a large extent, they can be read as 
transformative assets.‖ To structure my analysis of Avatar, I will have a closer look 
at these three aspects, starting with hybridisation or the relationship between 
human and machine/artificial bodies, ‗we‘ and ‗the other‘.  
 
One might argue that in Avatar we do not actually have machines in the classic 
sense, which are opposed to the human body. However, the avatars, despite being 
real organic bodies, are artificially created by mixing human and Na‘vi37 DNA. 
More importantly, they are mere tools and do not have a life of their own unless 
they are ‗entered‘ by a human mind, which directs them. In some sense, they are 
much less ‗alive‘ than the machines in the Terminator films and other science 
fiction epics, which often develop a mind of their own, that often is even superior 
to the human mind.  
 
In this context we find another interesting aspect in the comparison between 
Avatar and Terminator. Unlike in the Terminator films, where the machines were a 
threat to humankind, now the humans and their machines become a threat to the 
planet, a point Rosenfeld discusses in detail. In addition, the human soldiers also 
―merge‖ with machines resembling those of the Terminator series, for example the 
MK-6 ampsuits38. The whole look of the army base and their giant machines 
                                            
37 The indigenous population of the planet Pandora, on which the film is set 
38 Giant metal robot soldiers that are driven by a human soldier sitting in their ‗head‘ 
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indeed resemble the visuals of the Terminator machines in their muted and rusty 
tones and so form a clear counterpart to the bright colours of the Na‘vi world. 
 
Another crucial point with regard to the fusion of bodies and the new form of 
body-mind relationship is made by Rosenfeld (2010), when she describes that the 
human ―minds reside in Na‘vi bodies with both human and other physical 
characteristics.  For instance, Avatar‘s main character, Jake Sully, has an Avatar 
that is blue, seven feet tall, with feline ears and nose. Yet, the avatar‘s appearance 
is still that of Jake Sully, exemplifying postmodernity‘s embodiment of blurred 
boundaries‖. This characteristic can also be applied to digital cinema in general. 
As noted above, even in the digitally generated universes, filmmakers tend to use 
well-known actors whose faces remain recognisable. It seems that even in virtual 
worlds, the audience better engages with characters, where a ‗real human‘ can be 
identified. In addition, the long developed star cult of Hollywood helps create a 
cinematic myth that reaches far beyond individual films and so far, the 
hypermodern digital cinema has not yet managed to escape this tradition.   
 
In relation to Avatar, the idea of an avatar body controlled by a ‗human driver‘ can 
also be compared to Deleuze‘s concept of the spiritual automaton, which is 
outlined in his second cinema book. Here, Deleuze talks about the puppets or 
zombies that are populating modern cinema. According to Deleuze (1989), the 
―puppet and the reciter, the body and the voice constitute neither a whole nor an 
individual, but the automaton‖ (p.257). These automata are no longer the active 
individuals of the action-image but rather wandering around, driven by forces 
unknown and incomprehensible to them. Thus, they bear closer resemblance to 
the characters typical for the time-image, which indicates a further step towards an 
increasingly blurred line between the two types of images. 
 
Significantly, in Avatar, the Na‘vi call the avatars very tellingly ‗dreamwalkers‘ 
(0:43:19) and it is not difficult to see the similarities with the somnambulists that 
Deleuze mentions. The important aspect in Avatar is that it merges this modern 
concept with the classic concept of the action hero. Jake Sully is the puppeteer 
that navigates his avatar, but importantly, he mainly is the classic action hero in 
the role of his avatar, when he seems more alive and driven than when shown as 
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his human self. When he is himself in his human body, he becomes more like a 
zombie or somnambulist, a paralysed outsider who sees no real meaning in his 
life.   
 
During the course of the film the puppet and the puppet player increasingly 
merge into each other and eventually become one. Unlike the rather negative way 
in which Deleuze interprets the spiritual automaton of modern cinema, the 
avatars can also be seen as extending the possibilities of human perception and 
allowing the drivers to act independently from the physical restraints of their own 
life, as Rosenfeld had pointed out. The avatar then becomes an outlet, ―where a 
paraplegic war-torn veteran can experience once again the sensations of his limbs 
and the joy of living.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). This might be the reason why Jake Sully 
is particularly equipped to take control of the avatar. Being wheelchair-bound, he 
is already dependant on some mechanical device to assist him and his avatar is a 
more sophisticated next step.  
 
Talking about advances in the relationship between human and technology, I 
further argue that the apparently ‗primitive indigenous‘ of Pandora are in fact the 
next step in a line of technological developments, from the massive machines 
controlled by a central power, towards a more liberated, organic, global 
information network that has no longer need for heavy machinery. The nature 
surrounding the Na‘vi is an electronic network where each plant is connected with 
the next. When Sully and the scientists first enter the jungle, the head scientist Dr 
Augustine (played by Sigourney Weaver) plugs a device into a tree root and shows 
her assistant the electro-chemical processes taking place within. She calls it ―signal 
transduction from this root to the root of the tree next to it‖ and so on. (0:25:26)  
 
This is a very significant aspect when talking about the Na‘vi, whose visual 
representation – with bows and arrows and naturalist spirituality – limits them on 
first sight to the ‗back to nature‘-element of the film. Upon a closer look, 
however, we become aware of a rather postmodernist concept of nature, which is 
in essence a complex network of data to which the Na‘vi can plug in to 
communicate and gain information. Hence the apparently divine or spiritual 
background of the Na‘vi society does not necessarily conform with our perception 
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of a natural spirituality, as here nature itself becomes an electronic network similar 
to a computer network. In the same way, the Na‘vi form connections with the 
animals they ride by physically connecting their ‗data cable‘ with the animal. On 
this basis one can argue that in contrast to the impression the film wants to give, 
these animals are merely electronic tools, which are activated by the mental 
processes of the Na‘vi. 
 
When John Caputo discussesthe Star Warsfilms, he points out that ‗The Force‘ in 
Star Wars also has a biological origin; the spiritual aspect and the material aspect 
of life are no longer separated. (Caputo, 2001, p.86-87).This can also be said about 
the spiritual network in Avatar, which is mysterious and naturalistic, but can also 
be measured and proven with scientific methods, similar to the midi-chlorians 
that carry the Force in Star Wars and can be tested by a simple blood screening as 
is shown in Star Wars I – The Phantom Menace (dir. J. Lucas, 1999, USA).What we 
see here is an expanding synthesis of spiritual and material aspects and as a 
consequence the idea of redemption also becomes progressively linked to material 
as well as spiritual aspects as we will see later in this chapter. This also allows us to 
draw further connections between Nietzsche‘s ideas of spiritual redemption 
discussed in the first chapter and Kracauer‘s materialist concept of redemption 
outlined in chapter two. Deleuze finally shifts the tension between mind and body 
– spiritual and material – towards a postmodern opposition between actual and 
virtual which overcomes the previous conflict but raises new problems.   
 
The second aspect of contemporary society which can be found in Avatar is 
fragmentation. Kracauer had described fragmentation – or abstractness as he 
mostly calls it – as one of the major problems in our modern society, brought 
upon by an increasingly complex world on the one hand and the shift from a 
more holistic sense of the world to abstract thinking.  
 
Similarly, Heim points out in relation to our obsession with modern technology, 
that we are losing our sense for what is really important. He writes that 
―Infomania erodes our capacity for significance. With a mind-set fixed on 
information, our attention span shortens. We collect fragments. We become 
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mentally poorer in overall meaning. We get into the habit of clinging to 
knowledge bits and lose our wisdom behind knowledge.‖ (Heim, 1993, p.10).  
 
Our relationship with and use of machines only emphasises this sense of 
fragmentation. Let me recall that for Kracauer cinema plays a crucial role in 
overcoming this fragmentation and gives us a sense of wholeness. This was 
probably right in connection with the classic movement-image, which presents us 
with a conception of a whole that integrates the individual. So, when Rosenfeld 
(2010) writes that with ―each machine expansion, humanity struggles to 
understand its sense of place within a world fragmented in its identity and its 
relationship with machines‖, how does this affect cinema? As Deleuze had shown, 
not only modern society has lost its sense of wholeness, of unifying images. The 
modern cinema of the time-image also broke with this organic concept. I will 
discuss in the following paragraphs, how Avatar attempts to combine the classical 
idea of the whole with the fragmented concept of time-image and postmodern 
thought. 
 
The notion of fragmentation is advanced further by the growing influence of 
video games on the aesthetic of cinema. Here, games do not only influence the 
look of films, they also bring upon new concepts in thinking and dealing with the 
world, as Rosenfeld had noted. She writes that similar ―to today‘s identity change 
via multiplayer video games where players create an individual avatar to represent 
their identity in the gameworld […], Avatar advances this concept to imagine the 
future of ‗avatars‘ and visually helps the viewer experience fragmentation and 
virtualization.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). 
 
As I have shown in the last chapter, contemporary Hollywood cinema has in 
principle preserved this idea of an organic unity, but the influence of the time-
image has led to a less absolute system of wholeness and unity, e.g. by more open 
endings and ambivalent characters. Avatar here seems to go back to a more 
traditional concept within the storytelling, up to the point of using rather obvious 
clichés, such as a clear division between ‗the good guys‘ and ‗the bad guys‘, the 
representation of the army colonel as a live-size G.I. Joe-type figure and a 
conclusion in which the intruders are sent home for good. 
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Conversely, the imagery of Avatar challenges the conservative aspects of the story 
and shifts the focus of the film away from the narrative towards the fantastic 
world of its images. As a consequence, the action is frequently suspended to allow 
for a more contemplative approach to the film, e.g. when Jake Sully first 
encounters the jungle of the Na‘vi or later the magic tree. This point is also noted 
by Rosenfeld (2010), who writes that, before ―any significant action takes place, 
the viewer is invited to explore this new world: it‘s analogous to the visual 
discovery within a new videogame.‖  
 
When I discussed the arrival of digital technologies in Hollywood cinema in the 
third chapter, we mentioned that early CGI images often presented a rupture in 
the narrative, to allow the audience to admire the digital dinosaurs or other 
creatures. This effect can also be found in the new 3D worlds of Pandora (the 
planet on which Avatar‟s plot takes place), but to a much greater extent. Now, 
these moments have become a defining element throughout the film and not 
limited to one or two outstanding scenes, as it has been the case in earlier digital 
works from the 1990s. This new type of awe-inspiring images is much closer to 
Deleuze‘s model of the time-image, where a situation is not directly translated into 
action because the visual impact is too intense, too overwhelming. Therefore, the 
situation cannot be quickly captured and processed neither by the mind of the 
character nor by the audience.  
 
In his essay ‗Making Space‘, Sean Cubitt describes the cinematic space of Avatar as 
a series of layers, ―intended to stack up as a believable world‖, which ―introduce 
schisms between foregrounds and backgrounds.‖ In order to overcome this break, 
the film introduces visual focal points that train the ―viewers to watch ‗correctly‘‖ 
(Cubitt, 2010). Yet he also notes that these breaks introduce a new quality in the 
organisation of cinematic space and the gaps ―are no longer merely spatial but 
extensively temporal‖ (Cubitt, 2010). This reflects the suggested influence of the 
time-image with its emphasis on time rather than space and movement. Yet, 
unlike in the ‗proper‘ time-image, contemplation eventually has to turn into 
action, owing its origin to the traditional action-image. 
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The final theme to explore in Avatar is hyper-reality, in contrast to the realism of 
the classical image. First of all, it can be said that in terms of set design, the digital 
Na‘vi jungle appears to be more hyper-real than real and the colours are so much 
brighter and sharper than the soft tones we tend to associate with our experience 
of nature. In this way, the ‗natural‘ surroundings turn into an artificial, alien world 
full of strange creatures and our gaze proceeds from one element to the next to 
analyse its data. When Deleuze (1989) described the shift from natural 
representation to the electronic image in relation to modern cinema, he claimed 
that now the ―screen itself […] rather constitutes a table of information, an 
opaque surface on which are inscribed ‗data‘, information replacing nature‖ 
(p.254).  
 
At the end of the film, when Jake Sully finally decides to dispose of his human 
body and to merge permanently with his avatar, this process is shown as if the 
‗data‘ of his human life are ‗downloaded‘ from his human body and then 
‗uploaded‘ in the new, enhanced Na‘vi body. This process appears more like an 
upgrade to a new computer, where you simply transfer your files to a better 
machine, which also raises a variety of philosophical questions, to which I shall 
return at the end of the chapter. 
 
New cameras developed by James Cameron specifically for this film also enabled 
him to create a new sense of reality. Unlike previous digital technologies, where 
the alteration of images takes place in post-production, these new cameras allow 
the director to film directly in the digital world by placing the actors in the digital 
surroundings while shooting a scene. As a result, much less abstraction is needed 
during the process of filming and the director has an immediate composite image, 
an organic unity between the characters and their on-screen reality. The 
technology here reduces the sense of fragmentation and abstractness at least from 
the perspective of director and cinematographer, which can enable the creation of 
a whole much closer to traditional filmmaking. In other words, without ―having to 
combine the live-action shots with this elaborate environment in post-
production‖, James Cameron ―achieved a more organic feel to the film.‖ 
(Rosenfeld, 2010). 
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In the previous chapter, I discussed Deleuze‘s concept of action-thought 
presented in the movement-image in contrast to the purely optical situations that 
imply an inability to act, which was presented in the time-image. I have proposed 
that the thinking-in-action may be a concept more suitable for our rapidly 
developing modern environment. Avatar seems to mix these two concepts by 
integrating moments of purely visual contemplation with fast-paced action 
sequences. On the one hand, the beautiful 3D images of the Na‘vi world inspire 
contemplation and awe, but this is juxtaposed with the action of and interaction 
with the human world on the other hand.  
 
Furthermore, the traditional demarcation of the two-dimensional space defined by 
the layout of the screen becomes obsolete. Deleuze had already argued that the 
use of depth-of-field by auteurs such as Orson Welles challenges this classic 
model. The three-dimensional imagery of contemporary cinema pushes this 
approach beyond the boundaries of camera reality. Deleuze (1989) claims that the 
―organization of space here loses its privileged directions, and first of all the 
privilege of the vertical which the position of the screen still displays, in favour of 
an omni-directional space which constantly varies its angles and coordinates, to 
exchange the vertical and the horizontal.‖ (p. 254). Rather than jumping out of the 
screen as the 3D effects of the 1970s the new 3D technology opens the depth and 
draws the audience‘s gazeinto the image. At this point, the new technology is close 
to the time-image as the organisation and development of image elements takes 
place in the frame itself, but we still have the action of the movement-image that 
connects these images from one frame to the next. 
 
Rosenfeld (2010) suggests that ―Cameron‘s use of stereoscopic 3D not only helps 
the audience experience full immersion but also seems to be a direct pushback by 
Hollywood studios to recapture an audience increasingly lost to video games.‖ 
This frequent comparison to video games not only challenges our spatial 
orientation and influences a certain aesthetic. By imitating the hyper-reality of 
computer games, it also poses questions about the distinction between virtual and 
actual. The relationship between the two is not only relevant for Avatar as a digital 
composition; it is also discussed within the story of the film.  
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In contrast to a film like The Matrix (dir. A.& L. Wachowski, 1999, USA), where 
the alternative world really ‗just‘ exists in the mind of the human characters and 
therefore can only be accessed virtually, the world of the Na‘vi actually exists right 
outside the doors of the human base camp. Technically, the soldiers and scientists 
do not need the avatars to enter this other world as will be clear later in the film 
when the human armies attack the Na‘vi. They primarily use the avatar bodies to 
facilitate the communication with the indigenous and to engage more immediately 
with the alien world, although primarily to gain an economic advantage. On the 
other hand, though, the ‗human drivers‘ enter virtually into the body of the avatars, 
while remaining immobile in their boxes in a dreamlike state, which is more 
similar to The Matrix. In this aspect we can find another link with the concept of 
time-image, which according to Deleuze no longer opposes actual and virtual. In 
Avatar, it seems, this distinction is no longer possible or even relevant. Here, 
photo-real images merge with digital images, and mix these clearly distinct worlds 
into one virtual fantasy, a hyper-reality. Deleuze (1989) claims that for  
 
―the time-image to be born, […] the actual image must enter into relation 
with its own virtual image as such […]. An image which is double-sided, […] 
both actual and virtual, must be constituted. We are no longer in the situation 
of a relationship between the actual image and other virtual images, 
recollections, or dreams, which thus become actual in turn […]. We are in the 
situation of an actual image and its own virtual image, to the extent that there 
is no longer any linkage of the real and the imaginary, but indiscernibility of 
the two, a perpetual exchange.‖ (p.262).  
 
In that sense, the time-image could be claimed to be dominant in Avatar with its 
actual and virtual world existing parallel. Yet they are not entirely indiscernible and 
one can argue that both worlds reflect the clichés of classical Hollywood cinema, 
e.g. the stereotypes used to characterise the brutal human soldiers as well as the 
‗noble savages‘ of Na‘vi. This duality of worlds also causes problems in defining 
the organic whole, which is essential for the classical action-image. In Avatar, 
everything consists of fragments of both worlds – virtual and actual, digital and 
analogue – and it becomes increasingly difficult for the audience to distinguish the 
two aspects. However, this increasing amalgamation of both worlds challenges 
not only the audience, but it also becomes a theme for the narrative line of the 
main character in the film. 
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The main hero of Avatar is Jake Sully and as in most classic Hollywood narratives 
he stands out from the beginning. First of all, he only becomes involved in the 
adventure by chance, in this case the death of his twin brother. He neither has the 
qualification nor the training for this mission (his brother was a scientist and 
trained for several years before his trip to Pandora). Finally, he is wheelchair- 
bound. This makes him an outsider in three different worlds: as a human he is an 
obvious outsider with the Na‘vi, but neither does he have the intellectual capacity 
or training to fit in with the other scientists or the physical capacity to properly fit 
in with the soldiers. He feels closest to the soldiers as he has been a Marine and 
this group seems to be most familiar for him. This is why he initially promises the 
Colonel to use his ‗scientific mission‘ in the avatar body to spy on the Na‘vi. 
Despite the fact that the Colonel promises him in return that he will receive the 
expensive surgery that would enable him to walk again, Sully‘s main reason for 
helping him is his felt loyalty to the soldiers. This loyalty only ceases when he 
becomes a Na‘vi warrior. This indicates that although he may change sides, he 
cannot change his profession and his inner affinity towards a war culture. In a 
sense, Jake Sully incorporates all three elements of postmodern society described 
before, as a man/machine hybrid in his connection with his avatar, the 
fragmentation of his environment and his mental state by being constantly torn 
between different groups and ideologies and finally the hyper-real Na‘vi 
environment he operates in, which for him becomes more real than his actual 
reality as a human.  
 
We can find another element from the previous chapter in the narrative of Avatar, 
namely the moral dilemmas of a war-torn postmodern American society. This also 
relates to the aforementioned fragmentation of society, where war becomes an 
increasingly abstract, confusing and ambivalent enterprise that leaves soldiers 
behind that are no longer heroes but sufferers.  
 
Similar to the historic epic Troy, the background of international conflicts driven 
by commercial and/or political interests is also very present in Avatar.  We see 
throughout the film that ―financing is still provided by a profit-driven corporation 
that hires an ex-military warmonger contractor, whose crew resembles a 
Blackwater operation rather than a peacekeeping enterprise like the United 
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Nations. Elements of the war economy play out in Avatar with the more humane 
and ethical biologists controlled through and trying to push back from the grip of 
corporate funding.‖(Rosenfeld, 2010). It is therefore not surprising that Avatar‟s 
hero is a disabled war veteran in search for a purpose in his life. As a result, he is 
particularly keen to immerse in the alternative world of the Na‘vi as it not only 
provides him with his lost physical abilities but also gives him a new sense of 
purpose and meaning. 
 
The fact that Sully is partially immobile even before he enters the sleep state that 
allows him to drive his avatar, increases the aspect of freedom and liberation that 
the artificial body provides. This explains that ―when Jake Sully is pulled back to 
homebase, we feel his sense of loss, and the profound struggle between his 
obligations to his earthly body and his desire to be in his avatar body. His ‗real‘ life 
and Avatar life become two incommensurable realities.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). 
During the length of the film, these two lives not only become incommensurable. 
Moreover, the avatar life gains more reality for him than his ‗human‘ world. In the 
film, this inner conflict is shown through a video diary, in which Sully describes 
his increasing confusion between the two realities.  
 
The internal monologue as presented in Sully‘s video diaries, is according to 
Deleuze another feature of the classic cinema of the movement-image that gives 
the audience an insight into Sully‘s personal dilemma and his growing confusion 
of identities – is he Na‘vi or Human? What is more, ―Sully‘s character is also 
increasingly burdened by the fact that he must return to sustain his ‗real‘ body, as 
his virtual life is easier to maintain as well as more liberating, exciting and 
powerful.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). His problem is that as long as his human body 
exists, he has to return to it to eat, sleep and drink as with the decease of his 
human body in the actual world, his virtual life would cease as well. 
 
The relationship between Sully and his avatar body can also be read as a strong 
metaphor for the power of artistic illusion and escapism. It is the ultimate illusion 
of the audience, immersing into the role of the fictional character and becoming 
part of the alternative reality. In this sense, ―the relationships Sully forms and the 
freedom he has to walk again and even more to fly and be at one with nature and 
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the indigenous world demonstrate the ease within the fiction by which one can 
find a more evolved existence.‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). This surely appeals to a 
generation that is increasingly used to recreating themselves virtually, e.g. in online 
games such as Second Life or World of Warcraft as well as on social networking sites. 
Avatar takes their illusion beyond the current limits of reality by showing a 
fictional world in which people truly can become their own avatar. In the way, the 
film adds a new dimension to our discourse on the relation between illusion, 
reality and creative power.  
 
As briefly mentioned above, the immersion in the exotic world of Pandora is not 
just virtual as in The Matrix, where the virtual world is only a product created by 
the neurons in the brain. Sully enters this world via an actual body, while his mind 
virtually moves from his actual human body into the actual Na‘vi body. This poses 
interesting questions for the concept of a body-mind relationship, especially in 
comparison with The Matrix. In the latter film, people can be killed in the virtual 
world even though this happens only in their minds. Accordingly, when their 
mind dies this means that in turn their actual body dies. Even though they enter a 
purely virtual world, this can have a direct impact on the actual one. In Avatar, on 
the other hand, the death of an avatar would not affect the life of the human 
driver. Consequently, one could argue that even though the avatar body is actual, 
it is also artificial and therefore more similar to a fictional computer game, in 
contrast to the virtual world of The Matrix, which is real insofar as it poses a direct 
threat for our life. The two worlds of Avataronly merge at the end of the film, 
when the Colonel no longer attacks Sully‘s avatar but instead destroys the sleeping 
box in which Sully‘s human body (and mind) rests and so deprives him of oxygen. 
While smashing the sleeping boxes, he challenges Sully‘s avatar by saying ―You 
think you're one of them? Time to wake up‖ (2:22:48). There the Colonel tries to 
make Sully realise that his Na‘vi life is a mere illusion and that his actual human 
self is sleeping. The Colonel wants him to wake up and face reality, but for Sully 
his human life is no longer his reality. As a consequence, the final step for the 
hero is to fully immerse in the new world by freeing himself from the restrictions 
of his human body and dispose of it. The human body is no longer part of his 
identity, but has become inadequate and hampering, whereas his artificial Na‘vi 
body liberates him – physically as well as mentally.  
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This idea puts forward very profound philosophical questions. For example, how 
far should we go to improve and modify our body and to what extent should we 
use biomechanics, genetics and the like to do so? When do we stop being human 
and become machines? As Adam I. Bostic (1998) has described in an article on 
cyborgs in film, ―the cyborg is both real and fictional – through it we anticipate 
the implications of emergent technology in which we foresee the final blurring of 
distinction between reality and virtuality.‖ (p.358). This can clearly be said of the 
avatars, which are real insofar as they have actual, physical bodies that interact 
with other beings and can suffer and die. On the other hand, though, they are 
artificial beings, driven by humans. The problem arises when Sully‘s mind/soul is 
finally transferred into his avatar. Does this mean that the artificial Na‘vi body 
becomes real or alive when inhabited by Sully and is he still human even though 
his soul now lives in a Na‘vi body?  
 
These are difficult questions that ask for philosophical answers, not only to 
understand this film, but more importantly to understand the mind/body 
relationship of postmodern society. Avatar shows that there is a way of seeing our 
personality independently from our physical reality. The question of how we 
define our mind in relation to our body, however, informs a whole line of 
philosophical thought starting from ancient Greek philosophy and its analysis 
would go far beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
As far as this film is concerned, it is interesting to note that Avatar portrays Sully‘s 
artificial Na‘vi life as being the more naturalistic element of the story, but also the 
more advanced. His synthetically created life provides him with a stronger feeling 
of identity, belonging and wholeness than does his fragmented, confused and 
meaningless human life. Should we therefore be encouraged to simply dispose of 
our old body and move into a new one? In digital terms, should we aim to 
transfer our collection of mental data, memories, experiences, character traits, into 
a more adequate body once the old one fails to serve its purpose?  
 
When Edward O‘Neill poses the question if the time-image can be postmodern 
and transferred into mainstream cinema he uses The Matrix as one example. 
 206 
According to him, ―The Matrix takes the seer of the time-image and makes him 
into the doer of the action-image but only virtually‖ (O‘Neill, 2000). In Avatar, 
this idea is pushed further. On the one hand, the character of Jake Sully bears 
clear parallels to the seer of the time-image, mainly through his immobile state 
when entering the avatar, which is similar to The Matrix films. However, Sully 
resembles the seer not primarily in his dreamlike virtual state, but also when 
awake as a human. As mentioned before, he is (at least partially) immobile and 
incapable, disillusioned and aimless. Only when entering his avatar, he becomes a 
man of action. This action-hero, however, is not only virtual, but also actual, 
especially when he finally fights against the human oppressors.  
 
Based on the conventions of the classical action-image, something has to have 
changed at the end of the film. In the case of Avatar, this transformation is 
absolute, physical and spiritual. Like The Matrix, Avatar finally cannot avoid 
drawing on basic mythical and religious elements. In consequence, the final 
redemption of the hero comes in form of a ‗reincarnation‘ as a better being – 
morally and physically. As in most modern epics, however, the focus is on the 
individual, and despite the victory of the Na‘vi‘s at the end of the film, it is not 
clear if something profound has changed in the world itself.  
 
Here, Avatar also reflects the general attitude of a society that is permanently 
striving for perfection and keen on tuning its body to catch up with its demanding 
lifestyles. Is the next step that we are no longer satisfied with escaping in our 
minds into a fantasy world, but want to escape physically as well? One of the 
points Rosenfeld had describedwas that Avatar, more than any other film before, 
had caused some extreme reactions from the audience, such as post-viewing 
depression. She argues that maybe ―the public is especially sensitive to the 
contrast between the film‘s hyperreality and the current reality of our depressed 
economy. When these viewers walk out of the theatre, they are let down at 
returning to live in the actual world they must inhabit‖ (Rosenfeld, 2010). 
 
What influence does this have on the role of illusions modern cinema creates? 
Avatar deals with the aspects of illusion and reality on two levels: firstly as a film 
itself and secondly within the narrative of the film. Is it better to live in the fantasy 
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world than in your own world? The film clearly answers this question in the 
affirmative by allowing its hero to fully immerse in the fantastic new world of 
Pandora, but for us, the audience, the philosophical problem remains. Here, the 
film loses out on its chance to truly inspire new ideas as its simplistic narrative and 
black-and-white ideology does not succeed in exposing the superficiality of our 
postmodern world, but rather presents us with a ready-made ideology that does 
not allow for much interpretation and inspiration. In this sense, the film might be 
closer to Kracauer‘s critical notes on myth and illusion by presenting us with what  
he had called confirmative images, images that persuade us to accept them 
uncritically. Nevertheless, there is scope for critical reflection for both film 
scholars and philosophers, particularly with regard to the popularity of these 
images.  
 
Regardless of its hypermodern framework, the story of Avatar is directly serving 
the clichés of the movement-image, such as the duel and the binary oppositions. 
Unlike Troy, which at least partially challenges these relations by multiplying them 
and making them more ambivalent, Avatar returns to a simple good versus evil – 
noble indigenous versus evil intruder – duality. One cannot help but notice that 
the contrast with the hypermodern imagery only emphasises the old-fashioned 
elements in the narrative. The film thus seems to lose out on the opportunity to 
create new modern narratives. The question is then, if the new visual environment 
is sufficient to inspire new thinking. 
 
As shown throughout this chapter, there are several points in the narrative that 
suggests a rethinking of ideas and concepts, but the more subtle critical aspects of 
the film are overpowered by the visual component and so the impressions 
remaining from the narrative are only its most obvious clichés. What we may see 
here, is the start of a general shift away from the focus on the classic storytelling 
towards the visual aspects of cinema. The question, how much the narrative is 
bound to clichés, may then become obsolete. Maybe Avatar‟s narrative is in 
essence just a rather old fashioned story full of clichés, but it remains to be seen if 
future productions will continue along this line or manage to combine convincing 
storytelling with an impressive visual component without one aspect distracting 
from the other.  
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Rosenfeld (2010) concludes her essay by claiming that the ―perceptual habits of 
our millennial generation, those born after 1982, are being formed in an early 
postmodern era. We can expect to see additional shifts in attitudes toward and 
relations with technology, machines, and each other.‖ This suggests that a new 
generation may already have adapted to these new forms of storytelling. What 
remains despite all the changes in the mode of storytelling is the longing for 
stories being told. 
 
Even with this shift in our relation with technology and the effortless blending of 
virtual and actual worlds, we still feel this underlying need for spiritual meaning, 
even if this eventually turns out to be an illusion. This is why Avatar, similar to the 
epics discussed previously, heavily draws on religious symbolism. Right from his 
first encounter with Neytiri (the Na‘vi princess), Jake Sully is introduced as the 
‗chosen one‘. Only the divine intervention of a floating seed from the sacred tree, 
worshipped by the Na‘vi as pure spirits, prevents her from killing him. Shortly 
afterwards this motif is emphasised again when the seeds from the sacred tree all 
set down on Sully and surround him with an aura. Yet, the final, spiritual 
redemption of the hero is closely connected to a material redemption in a new, 
perfected body. Nietzsche‘s idea of a spiritual redemption through illusion from a 
state of despair is thus united with Kracauer‘s idea that cinema can provide us 
with a new, physical connection to our world, or in Sully‘s case an entirely new 
hyper-real world. 
 
In his essay ―Fiction, ET, and the Theological Cosmology of ‗Avatar‘‖, published 
in Theology and Science, Joshua M. Moritz (2010) compares the film‘snarrative to a 
similar story by C.S. Lewis and suggests that perhaps 
 
―it would be best, then, if we understood the story of Avatar as Lewis 
considered the mythical tales of the classical world and the concept of myth 
in general: as a ‗real though unfocused gleam of the divine truth falling on 
human imagination.‘39 In this capacity, such myths awaken us to hidden 
realities, cleanse our imaginations, transform our hearts, and expand our 
                                            
39 C.S. Lewis, Miracles (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2001), p.218 
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understanding so that through them we may ultimately transcend ourselves 
and become receptive to even deeper mysteries and greater truths.‖ (p.131).  
 
This is not only true of Avatar but it can also be applied to Hollywood cinema in 
general. As I have been arguing throughout this thesis, when looking more closely 
at the apparently superficial and entertainment driven mainstream cinema, we may 
find that it not only provides us with a valuable insight into our culture, but also in 
turn provides meaning for a major audience and allows them to gain at least a 
glimpse of a thinking that goes beyond mere escapism.  
 
 
Summary 
 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, traditional concepts of storytelling and 
cinematic representation in mainstream cinema are increasingly challenged by 
changes in the media world, such as the impact of computer games, as well as a 
younger audience that seems more familiar with hyper-real electronic imagery and 
fragmented narratives than with the classic organic conception of the old cinema. 
As Frampton (2006) remarks, the audience is ―ready (conceptually) to accept 
whatever ‗kind‘ of image-reality the film decides to give us.‖ (p.77). It is now the 
work of theorists to provide a profound framework to discuss these new images 
and uncover their creative potential beyond the mere spectacle.  
 
Even so, we can still identify many elements of the classic organic concept of the 
action-image, such as binary relationships and spatial-temporal continuity. It can 
be said that the latter is even intensified through the digital medium. In addition, 
aspects of the time-image have an increasing impact on mainstream cinema, as the 
new technologies seem to shift the focus from the story towards the visual 
component of a film. This creates moments of contemplation and awe that 
interrupt the action. Moreover, 3D technologies create a new level of visual depth 
that draws the audience into the image and enables the viewer to explore the 
various axes of the image. 
 
Nevertheless, the recent developments have also shown that regardless of the 
hypermodern representation, there is still a significant demand for traditional 
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mythical concepts that give us a grounding and connection with the world. The 
possibilities of contemporary cinema to create new possible worlds with 
convincing realism only emphasises the need for anchoring. Here, universal 
concepts are needed more than ever to explore the dimensions of virtual realities. 
This, however, provides a variety of opportunities for philosophers as well as film 
scholars to discuss modern ideas in both the field of aesthetics and ethics. The 
possibilities to create an endless amount of possible worlds brings us back to the 
essentials of philosophy and may help us explain the need for enchantment and 
illusion in our hyper-real, complex and confusing postmodern world.   
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Epilogue:  
Further reflections and future directions 
 
As outlined in the introduction, this thesis started with the vague notion that there 
is a revival of cinematic epics and that philosophy and cinema need to work more 
closely together to create concepts for our understanding of this confusing post-
modern, and increasingly digitalised, world. I set out on a quest for answers, based 
on aesthetic theories by Nietzsche, Kracauer‘s ideas on film and society and 
Deleuze‘s attempt at bringing together film and philosophy. Linking these 
theorists via the redemptive power of artistic creation gave this journey a unique 
and exciting perspective on the quest to uncover the importance of illusions.  
 
It also provided me with the opportunity to link traditional philosophical concepts 
with the contemporary world of digital Hollywood cinema. Throughout this thesis 
I have aimed to show how cinema can be compared to myth and religion in the 
way that it tells stories we want to believe in. It became evident that cinema has an 
exceptional role in contributing to the creation of these necessary illusions, as its 
unique capacity for realistic representation allows film to present us with universal 
ideas that unify our culture. Hollywood cinema with its specific narrative and 
representational style seems particularly equipped to present grand epic narratives 
in a visually compelling manner. Deleuze (1989) had argued that because ―the 
cinematographic image itself ‗makes‘ movement, because it makes what the other 
arts are restricted to demanding (or saying), it brings together what is essential in 
the other arts; it inherits it, it is as it were the directions for use of the other 
images, it converts into potential what is only possibility.‖ (p.151).  
 
Thus, Deleuze‘s concept of the movement-image became a central part of this 
thesis. As the second part of this thesis has shown, the developments in 
contemporary cinema were on the one hand reflections of a changing society that 
required a shift in topics and style and on the other the influence of new aesthetic 
movements in cinema such as the rise of the time-image. Whereas Deleuze had 
mainly discussed this later image in relation to avant-garde or experimental 
cinema, it has also influenced the representation of mainstream cinema, which 
took on some of its characteristics while simultaneously remaining true to the 
concept of the movement-image.  
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The key theme that derived from these observations was that these new myths, 
although largely drawing on classic plots, often develop very contemporary ideas 
and present reflections of a post-modern society full of anxieties and insecurities. 
Interestingly, it was particularly the most recent, most technologically advanced 
films that seemed to be the most conservative in creating cinematic myths. Here, 
digital cinema still has a way to go to create truly convincing mythic illusions that 
can provide post-modern society with the same hope and inspiration that classic 
myths provided for ancient societies.  
 
As pointed out towards the end of the final chapter, philosophers and film 
theorists are now challenged to explore these new myths and develop new 
concepts beyond the boundaries of individual disciplines. The field seems fruitful 
and exciting and while aiming to provide answers to the initial questions, this 
project also inspired a variety of subjects for further investigation. 
 
For example, the focus on the movement-image in Hollywood cinema meant 
leaving out some interesting films that deal with the topic of illusion on an 
individual level rather than as a grant scale epic. Independent films such as Amelie 
(dir. J.-P. Jeunet, 2001, France/D) as well as Tim Burton‘s Big Fish (2003, USA) 
playfully interpret Nietzsche‘s question ―Why could the world which is of any 
concern to us not be a fiction?‖ (Nietzsche, 1990, p.65). In addition, these 
examples also show that the longing for illusion and myth is not simply a 
Hollywood phenomenon. Looking at the developments of world cinema in the 
last decade, we find a clear indication that the trend for big epic narratives is not 
limited to the American mainstream. Other nations have also attempted to review 
classical themes. In Europe, the Danish film Valhalla Rising (dir. Nicolas Winding 
Refn, 2009, DK/UK) plays with ancient Nordic myths and the Spanish epic Agora 
(dir. Alejandro Amenábar, 2009, Spain) portrays not only the life of legendary 
female philosopher Hypathia of Alexandria, but also the conflict between a 
declining Roman empire and the rising influence of Christianity. On the other side 
of the Ural, Russian filmmaker Sergey Bodrov produced with Nomad (dir. Sergey 
Bodrov 2005, France/KAZ) and Mongol (dir. Sergey Bodrov, 2007, 
RUS/GER/KAZ) two monumental epics that mix myth with history. Similarly, 
Chinese productions, such as The Warlords (dir. P. Chan, 2007, China) and Red 
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Cliff(dir. John Woo, 2008, China) portray epic battles in times of powerful ancient 
Dynasties.   
 
Another interesting topic for further research is the role of music in the creation 
of cinematic illusions. This crucial element in the representation and staging of 
myths had already played an important role for Nietzsche, when he talked about 
the power of ancient tragedy and points out that it is impossible fully to 
understand the effect of the tragedy on the audience by simply looking at the 
stories. The interesting aspect about music is that this extra-diegetic and non-
narrative element strongly supports the illusion without itself being illusionary. It 
affects us emotionally and subconsciously and thus distinguishes cinema from 
literature, photography and drama by adding another, very powerful component.  
 
One of the philosophical questions that arise from the ideas developed in this 
thesis is the role narrative structures in general play in the creation of illusions and 
the way we make sense of our life. Here, a closer look at cinematic narratives 
could contribute new insights to an ongoing debate in literary studies, psychology 
and philosophy. In addition, the concluding chapter on James Cameron‘s Avatar 
brought up interesting questions on the relationship between virtual and actual 
worlds and the way modern cinema pushes the boundaries here. Firstly, this raises 
aesthetic questions on the link between cinema‘s virtual worlds and the interactive 
virtual realities of computer games, whose distinct style increasingly influences 
mainstream cinema, not only in terms of visual representation, but also in terms 
of narrative. In turn video games seem to become increasingly cinematic in their 
mise-en-scène and character development. The other aspect inspired by the 
discussion of Avatar relates to philosophical concepts of the relationship between 
mind and body and raises once again the age old question of the nature of 
personal identity. 
 
From a cinematic point of view it remains to be seen if Hollywood 3D-cinema 
manages to move beyond the presentation of pure spectacle and manages to 
produce epics that use the new technologies in order todevelop compelling stories 
that allow the audience to engage with the visual worldas well as with the 
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characters. In this way, contemporary cinema could truly achieve the creation of 
new, post-modern myths. 
 
Finally, despite some rapid developments in the domain of film and philosophy, 
the area of philosophy and television has not yet been explored. Nevertheless, this 
field is potentially very fruitful for our quest, especially since TV drama over the 
last few years has replicated some of the developments in cinema. There have 
been several attempts to create grant historic epics for television, e.g. the remake 
of Ben Hur (TV, dir. S. Shill, 2010, UK/Canada/Spain/Germany) and The Ten 
Commandments (TV, dir. R. Dornhelm, 2006, USA) as mini-series for the small 
screen as well as the BBC‘s successful epic drama series Rome (TV, various 
directors, 2005–2007, UK/USA). The question is, however, do we get the same 
quality and influence from these TV dramas? If they are formally and aesthetically 
similar to their cinematic counterparts, what is it that makes cinema special? Is this 
question simply bringing us back to traditional Apparatus theory or are there new 
aspects to explore? Maybe it is time to have a closer look at how television drama 
can influence people beyond the viewing experience.  
 
In conclusion it can be said that exploring the importance of illusion in cinema 
has taken me on a journey that reflects our very human longing for something 
transcendental, for something that goes beyond mundane entertainment and short 
term escapism. It seems that examples such as The Lord of the Ringsand other works 
discussed show how much cinema influences our culture and vice versa. 
 
This also leads to a rethinking of the way we do philosophy. Lenore Wright 
argued in her article on The Lord of the Rings, that by ―confronting both the 
historical and existential facets of human experience, we begin to understand 
something new about our task as contemporary philosophers – the task to gaze 
into the fragmented abyss of postmodern culture and find meaning and value 
therein.‖ (Wright, 2003, p.200)Looking towards cinema and finding meaning and 
value that may inspire us beyond the pure creation of new academic theories will 
then become the new task of film-philosophers. Thus, distinguishing between 
philosophy of film, philosophy in film or film-philosophy – hyphen or no hyphen – 
will become obsolete and we will again look at the old question of how we can 
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make sense of our life. As a philosopher, I feel this thesis has brought me closer 
to the answer, although many new questions were raised.  
 
The scriptwriter in me is eager to create mythic illusions of her own, but this is yet 
another story.   
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